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THE PRESENT RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION[1]

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FIFTY or sixty years ago anyone fluttering the pages of one of the many magazines which then catered for the cultivated and intelligent English reader would have been fairly certain to come upon an article bearing somewhat the same title as that of the present paper. The author would probably be an eminent scientist, such as Huxley or Clifford; a distinguished scholar, such as Frederic Harrison or Edmund Gurney; or a politician of cabinet rank, such as Gladstone or Morley. Whichever side he might take, he would write with the moral fervour of which Englishmen at that time had an inexhaustible supply. Nowadays the so-called "conflict between Religion and Science," which was then appetizingly hot from the oven, has acquired something of the repulsiveness of half-cold mutton in half-congealed gravy. There seems to be a widespread opinion that Sir Arthur Eddington and Sir James Jeans, with some highly technical and not readily intelligible assistance from Professor Whitehead, have enabled the lion to lie down with the lamb. Well, I have no wish to pipe a discordant note in this scene of Messianic harmony. But I cannot help reflecting that psychology, anthropology, and psychical research have made considerable advances as well as mathematical physics; and that they seem *prima facie* much more likely to be relevant to religion. Even the ordinary common sense of the lawyer and the historian may still have something useful to say on such topics. So, at the risk of being thought a profane disturber

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of the peace, I propose to raise once more the old questions, and to ask what bearing, if any, recent scientific developments have on the validity of religious beliefs.

In considering such beliefs I shall devote my attention mainly to Christianity, since this is the religion in which most of us were brought up, and is the only one with which most of us have any first-hand acquaintance. I fear that there may be some degree of unfairness in this. For there are certain peculiarities about Christianity which make it vulnerable to attacks that might be harmless to some of the other great religions, such as Buddhism, or to religion in general. I will therefore begin by mentioning the most striking of these peculiarities.

(1) The first and most important peculiarity of Christianity is that it is, to an unique degree, a doctrine about its own Founder. Some religions, e.g. Brahminism, do not claim to have any definite historical founder. Others, such as Buddhism in its original form and Confucianism, which trace their origin to a certain ostensibly historical person, claim no more for their founder than that he was an exceptionally wise and good man who first discovered and promulgated certain important moral and philosophical truths, and illustrated his doctrine by the special sanctity of his life. Others, again, such as Judaism and Mahometanism, would claim more than this for their founders. Moses and Mahomet are supposed to have been the recipients of special revelations from God. This, it is alleged, enabled them to know facts about God's nature and His commands to humanity which no amount of reflection on the data of ordinary experience would have disclosed to even the wisest and the best of men. But Judaism and Mahometanism would claim no more than this for Moses and for Mahomet respectively. These prophets are regarded as ordinary men who were extraordinarily favoured by God, not as supernatural beings occupying a uniquely important position in the universe. Now it is an essential part of Christian doctrine that, whilst it claims for the man Jesus all that Judaism claims for Moses or Mahometanism for Mahomet, it also claims something else which is different in kind and not in degree.

I have not been so fortunate as to meet with any account of the details of this doctrine about Jesus which I could fully understand. But, for the present purpose, a rough outline will be enough; and it may be given in the following propositions. (i) There is a single eternal and supernatural existent on which everything else that exists depends one-sidedly both for its origin and its continuance. This may be called "the Godhead." (ii) Within the unity of the Godhead there are three and only three most intimately interrelated "factors" or "moments," each of which can properly be called God. (iii) A certain two of these factors in the Godhead stand in a

peculiar kind of asymmetrical dyadic relationship, which is least imperfectly adumbrated by the analogy of fatherhood and sonship. In respect of this, one of them is called "God the Father" and the other is called "God the Son." The third factor in the Godhead is related to *both* the others by another kind of asymmetrical dyadic relation. This is denoted by the phrase "proceeding from," and the factor in question is called "God the Holy Ghost." (iv) There is some uniquely intimate relation between that eternal factor in the Godhead called "God the Son" and a certain man Jesus who was born at the village of Bethlehem during the reign of Augustus. This relation is such that it is appropriate to say of Jesus (and of no other man) that He was divine as well as human, and to say of God the Son (and of no other factor in the Godhead) that He is eternally human as well as divine. (I must confess that I can think of no interpretation of these statements which would enable me to attach a meaning to them.) (v) The birth of Jesus was miraculous, in so far as He had no human father. His mother was caused to conceive Him through the direct agency of the third factor in the Godhead, viz., the Holy Ghost. (vi) After preaching, and collecting a body of disciples, Jesus was eventually crucified by the Jewish ecclesiastical authorities at Jerusalem. He died on the cross and was buried, but His body never suffered decay. On the contrary, at some period during His burial it underwent a miraculous change in consequence of which it ceased to be subject to the physical and physiological limitations of the ordinary human organism. He emerged from His tomb, which was found empty and open, although it had been carefully guarded; and for a period of forty days He appeared from time to time, visibly, tangibly, and audibly, to certain groups of His disciples. The circumstances of some of these manifestations were such that no ordinary living man could have appeared and disappeared in the way in which Jesus is alleged to have done. (vii) After the expiry of a certain time these manifestations ceased, and Jesus is said to have ascended to His Father in heaven. Since this statement can hardly be admitted to be intelligible if taken in a literal spatial sense, it may perhaps be interpreted as follows. At the end of this period God the Son resumed a relationship with God the Father which had been suspended during the earthly life of Jesus, and He suspended or modified a relationship to the material world which He had entered into at the conception of Jesus. (I do not pretend to understand what could be meant by changes in the relationship of an eternal being either to another eternal being or to the temporal order of nature.) (ix) Henceforth Jesus guides and influences individual Christians and Christian communities by insensible means. He will continue to do this until the Day of Judgment, when He will reappear physically and sensibly, will allot fitting rewards and punishments to the

whole human race, and bring the present order of nature for ever to an end.

(2) The second peculiarity of Christianity is that it took over without question the Jewish sacred scriptures; that Jesus Himself appears to have accepted them; and that apostles, such as St. Paul, whose writings are held to be inspired by the Holy Ghost, used certain statements in them as premises for the exposition and development of Christian doctrines. Now these scriptures contain an elaborate cosmogonical scheme purporting to describe the creation of the world, of animals, and of man. They profess to account for the origin and propagation of moral and physical evil by the disobedience of our first parents to God's commands at the instigation of an evil supernatural created being. It is an essential part of the Christian doctrine that mankind was thus alienated from God, rendered incapable of amending themselves *proprio motu*, and justly liable to be eternally punished. It is also an essential part of that religion that the incarnation of the Son of God in the man Jesus, and the life, death, and resurrection of the latter, rendered it possible (though not inevitable) for men to reconcile themselves with God, to amend their lives, and to attain eternal happiness. I think it is fair to say that there is no general agreement among Christians as to the precise way in which this cause renders this effect possible; and that there are profound differences of opinion about the part played by the voluntary co-operation of men, which is admitted to be, in some sense, a necessary condition of their salvation.

(3) There is a third peculiarity of Christianity which is closely connected with the first. The Christian scriptures and traditions, like those of most religions, contain accounts of ostensibly supernormal events. Now these reported miracles fall into two very different classes, viz. those which are part of the *content* of Christianity, and those which are, at most, part of the *evidence for* Christianity. It is an essential part of Christian doctrine that Jesus survived the crucifixion, and in some sense emerged from the tomb with a transformed body. Any ground for doubting or denying this is *ipso facto* a ground for doubting or denying a part of Christian doctrine. But it is no part of Christian doctrine that Jesus raised Lazarus from the dead or walked on the water without sinking. If every one of the latter miracles were rejected, this would not directly involve the rejection of a single Christian doctrine; though it might weaken the force of one line of argument for accepting Christian doctrines. Now the miracles of most religions fall entirely into the second class; i.e. they are, at most, evidential and not constitutive.

I hope that I have now indicated adequately and fairly the main peculiarities of Christianity. We can now ask ourselves how far, if

at all, the various sciences are relevant to the truth of that religion. I must begin by mentioning an elementary logical distinction which is often overlooked. It is one thing to say of a fact that it conflicts with a certain theory. It is quite another thing to say of the same fact that it undermines the grounds on which people hold that theory. It is quite possible that the former statement should be false and the latter true. If that were so, the theory would not have been refuted and would not even have been shown to be intrinsically improbable; but we should have shown that those who accept it have no valid reason for doing so. Thus our question divides into two. (1) Do the generally accepted methods and results of the various sciences conflict with Christian doctrines, i.e. are they either logically incompatible with those doctrines or such as to render them extremely unlikely to be true? (2) Do they undermine the only grounds which people have ever had for believing Christian doctrines? We will now take these two questions in turn.

(1) The doctrines peculiar to Christianity may be divided into two classes, viz. those which are *about* Christ, and those which, though taught by Him or inferrible from His teachings, are not about Himself. I have already enumerated the former doctrines. As examples of the latter we may take the ethical doctrines enunciated in the Sermon on the Mount.

Now it is quite clear that none of the empirical sciences has or could have any logical bearing on a great deal of the Christian doctrine about Jesus. It is absurd to suppose that empirical science could prove or disprove, make probable or improbable, the doctrine of the existence and triune structure of the Godhead and of the uniquely intimate connection between one of its differentiations and the man Jesus. The fundamental question is whether any part of this doctrine is intelligible, or whether it is nothing but meaningless verbiage masquerading in the grammatical form of intelligible sentences. Obviously that question cannot be answered by appealing to the methods or results of natural science. If any part of the doctrine be intelligible, the second question is whether it is true or false, antecedently probable or improbable. Now natural science is concerned with the interconnections between things or events in space and time; and it is specially concerned to discover *uniformities* of co-existence and sequence among *classes* of phenomena, and to collect these, so far as may be, into a deductive system with a minimum of first principles. Therefore the question whether nature *as a whole system* depends on a timeless non-natural existent, and whether a certain *one* man once in the whole course of history was related in an absolutely *unique* way to the latter, evidently falls altogether outside the sphere of natural science. Either these questions are meaningless or they are not; and it is for philosophers, not

scientists, to settle this preliminary question. If they are meaningless, conflict between science and Christian theology is impossible for the reason which prevents a lion from fighting with a hippogriff. If they are significant, such conflict is impossible for the reason which prevents a lion from fighting with a whale. And similar remarks apply to co-operation.

It would seem, however, that natural science might have a considerable bearing on the miraculous element which forms, as we have seen, an essential part of the content of Christian doctrine. This includes, undoubtedly, the resurrection of Jesus and his subsequent super-normal physical manifestations to His disciples. Whether it also includes the story of His super-normal conception is a doubtful matter which we may leave to experts. I think that here we are at once faced with the general question: "Do the results of science make the occurrence of super-normal events impossible or highly improbable?" This question concerns other religions as well as Christianity, and it concerns alleged Christian miracles which are cited only as evidence for Christianity as well as those which are part of the content of Christian doctrine. Unless science has something to say against the possibility or probability of miracles as such, it can have nothing special to say against the possibility of those miracles whose occurrence is part of the content of Christianity. So it will be best to defer this question.

The sciences of geology, biology, archaeology, and anthropology have collected evidence which, in the opinion of everyone competent to judge, conclusively refutes the cosmogonical, biological, and anthropological doctrines of the Jewish scriptures. Though these doctrines are not in themselves essential parts of Christian theology, they are almost inextricably intertwined with others which are, e.g. with the doctrine that mankind is tainted and alienated from God, and that the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus were necessary conditions without which no man could be saved. Moreover, the fact that these false propositions were, to all appearance, accepted literally by Jesus and made the basis of certain parts of His teaching would seem *prima facie* to throw some doubt on the Christian doctrine of His divine nature.

The only other point to be noticed under the present heading is that Christianity plainly presupposes that human beings survive the death of their present bodies and are, in fact, immortal. Since this doctrine is common to many religions, and is perhaps a necessary condition of any religion, we will defer the fundamental question whether science has anything relevant to say for or against it. For the present it will suffice to remark that, unless science renders the doctrine of an after-life, as such, impossible or highly improbable, it will hardly affect the probability or improbability of the specifically

Christian form of that doctrine. It is true that there are no empirical facts or scientific theories which would suggest that the present order of nature will be suddenly, radically, and permanently transformed at some date in the future. But it is no part of the Christian doctrine to assert that such a transformation will be due to the automatic development of natural processes. On the contrary, the Christian alleges that it will be due to the miraculous intervention of the Godhead. Therefore, unless science invalidates the other parts of Christian theology or renders survival and miraculous interventions unlikely or impossible, it has no relevant objection to make against specifically Christian eschatology.

It remains to consider whether science could render those parts of Christian doctrine which are not about Jesus and the Godhead improbable or impossible. For this purpose we may confine our attention to the ethical teachings of Jesus. Some people would hold that science makes complete determinism certain or extremely probable; and that, if men's actions be completely determined, the notions of moral good and evil and moral obligation can have no application. Some people would hold that anthropological and psychological investigations show that sentences in which ethical words and phrases occur merely express non-moral desires and emotions, repressed in the infancy of the individual or inherited from the pre-history of the race. We might describe either of these views as a form of "ethical nihilism" based on science. Now the question whether science proves or strongly supports ethical nihilism is absolutely fundamental, and goes far beyond the relation of science to Christianity. We will therefore defer it for the present and content ourselves with the following conditional statement. *If* we have any moral obligations, then natural science can throw no light whatever on those of them which are *fundamental.* At most it might support or refute certain derivative and secondary moral rules which profess to tell us how to carry out our fundamental obligations in certain specified kinds of situation. No conceivable development of any of the natural sciences could be relevant to the question whether a person ought or ought not to love his neighbour as himself. At most it might show that some secondary rule, such as "You ought to pour oil and wine into the wounds of persons whom you find lying injured by the wayside," should be rejected because it is not an efficient means of doing good to your neighbour in the circumstances supposed. Now most of the ethical teachings of Jesus express primary or fundamental obligations. Either science shows that *all* talk of moral obligation is meaningless or inapplicable to men; or, if not, it is completely irrevelant to this part of Christian doctrine.

It should now be fairly clear that there are not many points at

which the results of science and the doctrines peculiar to Christianity come into close enough contact for either conflict or co-operation between them to be possible. I think that similar reasoning would lead to a similar conclusion about the doctrines peculiar to any of the other great religions. If there is conflict, it will be over doctrines like the occurrence of miracles, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, and the question whether moral predicates are significant and applicable to men and their actions. These doctrines are common to all, or nearly all, religions, and they are peculiar to none.

(2) We can now pass to our second question. Do the methods or results of the natural or the historical sciences undermine the grounds on which men have believed the doctrines of Christianity?

It seems to me that there is a fundamental logical difficulty, which is prior to any special objections that might be made to the evidences for Christianity on the score of literary and historical criticism or the comparative study of religions. It is this. I think it would be admitted by most Christians that an essential part of their reason for believing specifically Christian doctrines is that these were directly taught by Jesus or are necessary or probable consequences of other statements which He made. But this at once raises the question: "On what grounds do you accept Jesus as an authority on these matters?" I suppose that the answer would be: "Because He was a being of superhuman wisdom and goodness, who was in a position to know the facts and whose mission on earth was to reveal them to men." But this is itself the most central and fundamental of Christian doctrines; and, if Christians accept *it* on the ground that Jesus asserted it or other things which imply it, their whole position is logically circular.

Are there any independent grounds for accepting it? So far as I am aware, the only grounds that have been suggested are the following. Jesus wrought miracles in His lifetime, and was Himself the subject of the stupendous miracle of the resurrection after His death. He produced on those who knew Him so strong an impression of His divine nature and mission that many of them were ready to devote their lives and to meet a painful death in preaching His doctrines. St. Paul, who had never met Jesus and was bitterly and actively hostile to Christianity, underwent an experience which he took to be a manifestation of the risen Christ; he was converted thereby and confirmed in his new beliefs by subsequent supernormal experiences; and he spent the rest of his life in developing Christian doctrine and disseminating it throughout the Roman empire. Lastly, throughout history many people have found that certain Christian doctrines harmonize with their own deepest convictions, they have been willing to live and die for them, and

they have had experiences which seemed to themselves to be evidence for the continued existence of Jesus and for His personal intercourse with them.

Let us begin by giving the fullest weight to this evidence and raising no questions as to whether there is adequate ground for believing that the alleged miracles really happened. At the very utmost it would show only that Jesus was an extremely remarkable and impressive personality; that a whole cluster of noteworthy super-normal phenomena, both psychical and physical, were initiated by His death and continued for some time afterwards in the regions in which He had preached; that certain parts of His teaching harmonized with certain deep-seated feelings and aspirations which the existing philosophies and religions of the Roman empire failed to stir or to satisfy; and that subsequently, when Christian institutions had been established and children were brought up in Christian tradition and doctrine, these teachings (developed, interpreted, supplemented, and modified almost out of recognition) continued to express the aspirations and to evoke the devoted loyalty of many good men.

I can see nothing in all this to justify the doctrine that Jesus occupied that uniquely exalted position in the universe which Christians assign to Him. Therefore it seems to me (as it has seemed to almost everyone *not* brought up in the Christian tradition) unreasonable to allege the mere *ipse dixit* of Jesus as an adequate ground for accepting otherwise unverifiable propositions about the Godhead, about His own relations to it, and about the supernatural origin and post-mundane continuance of the human race. I should hold, then, that the only reasons which have been alleged for accepting the doctrines peculiar to Christianity are invalidated by these general objections, prior to all appeal to the methods and results of natural or historical science. Similar remarks would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to any other religion which grounds its specific doctrines on the authority of its founder or its prophets. No doubt it is true to say that the development of Christianity was a unique phenomenon; but, in the only sense in which this is true, it is also true of any other great historical process, taken as a whole. No *single* historical event, such as the growth of Communism or of National Socialism since 1918, is *precisely* analogous to the growth of the Christian Church. But we can find a number of different *partial* analogies which, taken together, suffice to bring it into line with the rest of history. Again, it is true that the survival of Christianity in its infancy and its subsequent immense development depended on certain unpredictable and antecedently most improbable events, such as the conversion of St. Paul. It is natural for Christians, afterwards, to point to these events as "providential." But a moment's reflection shows that there have been, and indeed must be, such

events in the early stages of *any* historical movement which starts from very small beginnings, is faced with strong opposition and has to compete with many rivals, and does nevertheless survive and become dominant. The innumerable germs of possible religions and polities which have perished and left no trace in history were just those in connection with which no such unlikely event happened. That is why such an event is called "providential" when it does happen and is viewed in retrospect.

Before leaving this part of the subject, I must very briefly consider the following contention, which is sometimes made by Christians. "If and only if," it is said, "you will consent to act *as if* Christianity were true and will take part uncritically in the corporate life of a Christian church, you will eventually have certain experiences which are in fact evidence for the truth of Christianity, and you will be in the right state of mind to appreciate their cogency." Now it is just conceivable that this contention might be true. But it is evident that there would be other, and considerably more plausible, psychological explanations of the apparent facts. Moreover, a precisely similar claim might be made by the adherents of any other religion, and it is in fact made by the practitioners of the Indian systems of Yoga. Lastly, it is obviously impracticable to carry out this recommendation in connection with all the important rival religions, and it is unreasonable to pick out one of them and to perform the experiment with that one only.

So far we have supposed, for the sake of argument, that there is good evidence for the miracles recorded in the Christian scriptures. We must now examine this supposition. Here again we can go a long way with the help of ordinary logic and common sense without needing to appeal to the special methods and results of the sciences. Let us grant for the present that miracles are not impossible, and that it is not inconceivable that there should be evidence available of such strength that it would be unreasonable to doubt that a certain alleged event did happen and was miraculous. Then I assert, without the slightest fear of contradiction from anyone who has studied the records, that there is no direct evidence for any of the New Testament miracles which is comparable in weight to the evidence for some of the alleged miracles of modern mediumship. For the levitation and other super-normal physical phenomena of D. D. Home we have the contemporary autographic testimony of Sir William Crookes, one of the ablest experimental scientists of the nineteenth century, who was deliberately investigating the phenomena in his own laboratory under controlled conditions. It would be merely impudent to suggest that the direct evidence for the resurrection or the ascension, available to us here and now, is comparable with this.

Now either a Christian apologist accepts these alleged mediumistic miracles or he rejects them. If he accepts them, he acts consistently, and moreover he can use them to show that the New Testament miracles are not altogether without parallel, and therefore not antecedently so improbable as sceptics allege. But, if he does so, he must give up the contention that the New Testament miracles testify by their uniqueness to the unique status of Christ and the complete reliability of His metaphysical and ethical teachings. If he rejects them, he can continue to hold that the New Testament miracles are unique. But now he must justify himself in accepting, on very weak direct evidence, antecedently improbable stories similar to those which he rejects where the direct evidence is extremely strong. So far as I can see, there are two and only two moves open to him at this point. The first is to allege that it is antecedently very improbable that miracles should happen in connection with a decidedly second-rate human being, like D. D. Home, whilst it is antecedently quite likely that they should happen in connection with a divine being such as Jesus was. So weaker evidence will prove in the latter case what even the strongest evidence cannot prove in the former. To this contention the simple and sufficient answer is that anyone who uses it cannot, without logical circularity, adduce the New Testament miracles as evidence for the divine nature and mission of Jesus; since he assumes the latter as part of his ground for accepting the former on the evidence available.

The other possible move is as follows. It might be said that, although the *direct* evidence available to us for the resurrection and the subsequent appearances of Jesus is incomparably weaker than the direct evidence for certain mediumistic miracles, yet the *indirect* evidence is overwhelming. The indirect evidence would be such facts as the change in the attitude of the apostles from despair to an active and lifelong conviction of Christ's survival, the conversion of St. Paul, and so on. I am certainly not inclined to underrate the force of this contention, for these changes seem well attested and very remarkable, and they do demand some kind of explanation. But the utmost that can be inferred is that *something* very queer must have happened soon after the crucifixion, which led certain of the disciples and St. Paul to believe that Jesus had survived in some supernatural way; and that they were able to transfer this conviction to many others. The following remarks may be made about this.

(i) I hold that the careful work of the Society for Psychical Research has made it almost certain that there is a residuum of truth in the many accounts of phantasms of the living at crises in their lives, of the dying, and of the recently dead, being "seen" by educated Englishmen who were awake and in normal bodily and mental health at the time. I assume that such experiences are

initiated by some kind of telepathic "impact" received from the person whose phantasm is "seen"; that this sets up a subconscious process in the mind of the recipient, analogous perhaps to that which takes place in post-hypnotic suggestion; and that eventually this ends by producing a sensory hallucination relevant in its details to the circumstances of the person from whom the telepathic impulse originated. Now I should think it quite likely that Jesus, who was plainly a very remarkable personality, might be strongly gifted with the power to send out such telepathic impulses at the great crises of his life and perhaps at other times too. But this would not be any good ground for attaching implicit belief to all His ethical and metaphysical teachings. I should not be at all surprised, e.g., to find that Herr Hitler had this power. But, if he has, I should not *ipso facto* accept without question all those racial and political theories which he has preached with such intense conviction and applied with such conspicuous success.

(ii) However this may be, it is plain that a telepathic impact, once received, would be much more likely to develop into a full-blown sensory hallucination in the minds of men like the disciples than in a contemporary educated Englishman. With the latter any such development has to overcome extremely strong inhibitions, since the final product would be utterly alien to the whole "climate" of scientific materialism in which he has always lived and thought. Therefore I should expect that telepathically initiated sensory hallucinations, such as the S.P.R. have studied, would be far commoner and far more detailed and impressive among persons like the disciples than among contemporary educated Europeans.

(iii) A "tough-minded" scientist, who rejects without question all the alleged evidence for contemporary super-normal phenomena, might find it difficult to deal with the indirect evidence for the resurrection and the subsequent appearances of Jesus, if he ever fairly faced it. Actually, of course, he adopts the attitude of the ostrich and faces *neither* problem. But even he could claim with justice that there might well have been some quite simple and honest mistake, or some deliberate malpractice or deception on the part of some interested person or group, in connection with the body of Jesus; and that no direct evidence for it remains. Any particular theory of this kind will, no doubt, seem highly gratuitous and unlikely. But, after all, none of them can be so improbable antecedently as the theory that Jesus really rose from the dead, unless we assume what we have to prove, viz. that He was a divine being. And we must remember that, whilst *each one* of a number of alternative theories may be antecedently very improbable, it may be highly probable that *one or other* of them is true in view of the facts to be explained.

I should claim now to have disposed of all the alleged grounds for accepting specifically Christian doctrines, by the use of quite simple arguments without needing to appeal to modern science at all. I think we can safely assume that no appeal to science will *reverse* our decision, though it might reinforce it. It is also safe to say that we could have used similar arguments to show that there are no grounds for accepting the specific doctrines of any rival religion which relies on the authority of its founder or its prophets as the evidence for its teachings. I shall therefore devote the rest of my paper to certain wider questions, which we have hitherto set aside as being relevant to all or most religions, and not only or specially to Christianity. I will now take them in order.

(1) Has science anything to say for or against the possibility or the probability of miracles? Before we can answer this we must try to explain the term "miracle" or "super-normal event." This is not easy to do, but I think that the following method of treatment is fairly satisfactory. There are certain very general principles, mostly of a negative or restrictive kind, about mind and matter and their mutual relations, which we all commonly assume without question. These form the rigid framework within which all our everyday practice, our scientific theories, and even our ordinary fictions and speculations are confined. The following are some of the most important of these principles. (i) A body cannot enter or leave a closed vessel so long as the walls are intact. (ii) The weight of an object at the earth's surface cannot be altered except by immersing it in fluids of various densities. (iii) A human mind cannot *directly* initiate or modify the motion of any material thing except certain parts of its own organism, such as its arms and legs. (iv) It is impossible for a person to perceive any thing or event at a given moment unless this object has set up a physical process which affects the percipient's organism at this moment and produces characteristic sensations in his mind. (v) It is impossible for a person to have knowledge of a past event, except by inference or report, unless one or other of the following conditions is fulfilled. (*a*) The past event initiated a physical process which was transmitted with a finite velocity through space and has now reached the observer's organism and produced a characteristic sensation in his mind. Or (*b*) the past event was either an experience had by this person, or was the object of such an experience. The first condition is fulfilled in the case of a man perceiving an event which happened long ago in a remote star. The second condition is fulfilled in ordinary memory of past events. (vi) It is impossible for a person to have non-inferential knowledge of an event which has not yet happened. If he knows beforehand that such and such an event will happen, he must do so either by inferring this himself from his knowledge of

general laws and particular facts about the past and the present, or by accepting the results of such an inference made and recorded by another person. Examples are provided by the two cases of an astronomer, and a student of the Nautical Almanac, knowing that a total eclipse of the sun will happen at a certain future date. (vii) It is impossible for one man *A* to know what experiences another man *B* is having, or what propositions *B* knows or believes unless one or other of the following conditions is fulfilled. (*a*) *B* makes a statement in speech or writing or some other form of conventional symbolism, and *A* perceives the record and is able to understand and interpret it. Or (*b*) *A* perceives *B*'s gestures, facial expressions, interjections, etc., and draws inferences from them and from his knowledge of the general laws of human behaviour as to what is happening in *B*'s mind. (viii) After a person has died, his mind either ceases to exist, or, at any rate, ceases to be capable of affecting inanimate matter or the bodies or minds of living men and animals.

I would not claim that this list of eight restrictive principles is exhaustive, or that they are all independent of each other. But I think it is good enough for our present purpose, which, it will be remembered, is to explain what is meant by "super-normal" or "miraculous." By an "ostensible miracle" I mean any event which *seems* to conflict with one or more of these principles, whether it does so in fact or not. By a "miracle" I mean an event which *really does* conflict with one or more of them. Phenomena which appear to conflict with well-established laws of nature, or which cannot be explained in terms of them, but which do not apparently conflict with any of these restrictive principles, may be called "*ab*normal"; but they will not be even ostensibly *super*-normal or miraculous.

Evidently there are always two questions to be asked about any account of an ostensible miracle. (i) Did such an event as is reported really happen, and is the description of it which the witnesses give completely accurate so far as it goes? (ii) If so, is it really miraculous? Does it really conflict with any of the restrictive principles which mark off the realm of normal and abnormal phenomena from that of super-normal phenomena? Could it not be accounted for without going outside these limits?

About the first question two of the sciences, both of fairly recent origin, have something very important to say. These are Abnormal Psychology and Psychical Research. It had always been known that human testimony is somewhat unreliable, and that human observation is somewhat defective as regards the details of perceived things and events. But no one had suspected how extremely unreliable they are, even under quite favourable conditions, until the S.P.R. investigated the matter experimentally. The classical paper on this subject is by Mr. S. J. Davey in Vol. IV of the Society's *Proceedings*.

The extent to which intelligent and educated persons, who were under no emotional stress, erred, both by omission and by supplementation, in their reports of what they had seen, is almost incredible; but Mr. Davey's results have been fully confirmed by later experiments. The contribution of abnormal psychology and psychoanalysis is to show that the real causes of much human action are hidden from the agent's introspection, and are concealed rather than revealed by his overt speech and action. We know that these causes often produce an inability to perceive or to remember or to report certain facts which were physically and physiologically well within the witness's field of observation.

In regard to the second question the most important points to be made are the following. (i) We may dismiss at once, with the contempt which it deserves, the statement that "Science proves miracles to be impossible." This is just ignorant bluff and bluster, which a moment's reflection on our definition of "miracle" and the nature of inductive evidence suffices to deflate. (ii) The development of physical science has shown that many events which were ostensibly miraculous are capable of a normal explanation. The growth of our knowledge of hypnotism, of multiple and alternating personality, and of the extreme sensory hyperaesthesia which characterizes certain hypnotic and hysterical states, tends in the same direction. (iii) The facts and theories of psycho-analysis, already mentioned above, very much weaken the force of such familiar arguments as the following. "This act must have been miraculous unless the agent was deliberately cheating. But it is incredible that a man of his high character, with absolutely nothing to gain by cheating, and much to lose if detected in fraud, should have practised deliberate deception. Therefore it must be miraculous." (iv) In spite of all this, I must express my conviction that psychical research has made it far more probable than not that certain kinds of phenomena which are miraculous, in the sense defined above, do in fact occur. I include under this heading telepathy (both experimental and sporadic), certain of the *mental* phenomena of mediumship, and precognition. I should not, as at present advised, include with confidence any of the ostensibly super-normal *physical* phenomena of mediumship. It remains to note that, if these super-normal phenomena should ever become familiar and be found to fall under general laws, we should eventually reject the restrictive principles with which they conflict and should then cease to call them "miraculous" or "super-normal."

(2) This naturally leads to our next question. Has science anything to say for or against the possibility or the probability of a person's mind in some sense surviving the death of his body? I will begin by remarking that, in my opinion, it is almost a *sine qua non* of any religious view of the world that some men at least should

survive bodily death. I take it that one minimal demand of religion is that what we count to be the highest spiritual values shall not be merely ephemeral by-products of complicated material conditions which are fulfilled only occasionally in odd holes and corners of the universe, and are unstable and transitory when fulfilled. Another minimal demand is that there shall be at least rough justice, e.g. that evil deeds shall in the long run bring evil consequences on the doer of them, and not wholly or mainly on others. I do not see how either of these demands could be even approximately met if no man survives the death of his body. For, if this be so, not only does all the value which depends on the character and dispositions and the personal relationships of an individual vanish at his death; but also human society must eventually come to an end, and with it must perish all the values stored up in social institutions, works of art, and scientific treatises. Moreover, it is a commonplace that wicked men often die before they have brought on themselves either bodily suffering or remorse, or the disintegration of their characters or intellects, whilst wise and good men are often stricken down at the height of their powers, or survive into an old age of disease and dotage. Therefore, if science does make human survival impossible or very improbable, it does, in my opinion, deliver a fatal blow to *all* religion.

Now, with the doubtful exception of psychical research, none of the sciences tells us anything which lends the least probability to human survival. On the contrary, all that biology teaches of the detailed affinity of ourselves with the other animals, and all that physiology and anatomy tell us of the intimate connection between lesions of the brain and nervous system and aberrations or obliterations of consciousness, produce an overwhelming impression of the one-sided dependence of mental life on certain very specialized and delicate material structures and processes.

As a professional philosopher, I am, of course, perfectly well aware that these scientific facts do not constitute a "knock-down" disproof of survival. If there were any positive grounds *for* believing in survival, it would be easy enough to devise hypotheses to reconcile it with the biological and physiological facts which seem to make it so unlikely. I am also well aware that there are philosophical arguments against accepting the one-sided dependence of mind on body as an ultimate truth. (I have dealt with these in various parts of my published writings, and I do not find them very impressive.) In my opinion there is literally nothing but a few pinches of philosophical fluff to be put in the opposite scale to this vast coherent mass of ascertained facts, unless empirical evidence from psychical research should be available.

Do the findings of psychical research up to date do anything

serious to redress the balance? Here we must distinguish between direct evidence for survival, and evidence which tends in the first instance only to throw doubt on the epiphenomenalist view of the relation of mind and body. As regards the direct evidence, there certainly exists a considerable amount of mediumistic communication which undoubtedly involves super-normal knowledge, and is in some respects strongly suggestive of the posthumous intelligent action of certain definite human beings, such as Edmund Gurney, Dr. Verrall, and others. Yet even this is so incoherent and repetitive, and so full of surprising ignorance and error, that one feels driven to seek some other super-normal explanation of it. Moreover, the contents of the communications give us no help in the frightfully difficult task of forming any plausible positive conception of life after the death of the present body.

This brings us to the second kind of evidence. If the occurrence of telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition were established, this would have no *direct* bearing on the question of human survival. But it would have the following indirect relevance. It would tend to throw doubt on the adequacy of the theory (which all other known facts seem to support so strongly) that the human mind is one-sidedly and completely dependent on the brain and nervous system both for its existence and for every detail of its actions. Now it is this apparently well-established fact which makes the hypothesis of human survival antecedently so incredible. On the other hand, the establishment of telepathy, etc., would also work, for a different reason, in the opposite direction. For, if we grant these powers to ordinary men during their lifetime, we may be able to explain by means of them the mediumistic communications which constitute the only direct evidence for survival.

My conclusion is that, for this essential doctrine of religion, psychical research is the *only* possible gift-horse in the field of the sciences, and that even it is quite likely to prove to be a Trojan horse. In spite of the ambiguous character of the animal, I should hesitate, if I were a religious man, to look it quite so superciliously in the mouth as the leaders of religion habitually do.

Before leaving the subject of human survival I must touch very briefly on the following point. Christians often allege that the resurrection of Jesus constitutes evidence for human survival; that, without this evidence, the doctrine would be a mere pious aspiration; but that, with it, human survival becomes an established fact. This is a favourite theme of Easter-day sermons. Now, if I may say so without offence, this seems to me to be one of the world's worst arguments. Let us grant, what is at best questionable, that the resurrection really happened as described. Even so, the case of Jesus would differ from that of any ordinary man in at least two quite

fundamental respects. In the first place, if Christianity be true, though Jesus was human, he was *also* divine. No other human being resembles him in this respect. Secondly, the body of Jesus did not decay in the tomb, but was transformed; whilst the body of every ordinary man rots and disintegrates soon after his death. Therefore, if men do survive the death of their bodies, the process must be utterly unlike that which took place when Jesus survived His death on the cross. Thus the analogy breaks down in every relevant respect, and so an argument from the resurrection of Jesus to the survival of bodily death by ordinary men is utterly worthless.

(3) I have now taken in turn two general doctrines, viz. the possibility of miracles and human survival, one of which is vital to Christianity, and the other perhaps to all religions; and I have considered the bearing of science on each of them. In this, the concluding section of my paper, I find it convenient to proceed as follows. I propose to take certain of the sciences; to state how they have been relevant to religion in the past; and to consider whether (and, if so, how) their effect has been modified recently or is likely to be modified in future. Before doing so I will make two remarks. (i) The influence of a scientific discovery or theory on a religion can hardly ever be put in the form of a definite argument which can be tested by the criteria of formal logic or probability-theory. It may not refute the religion, but it may make one's whole intellectual and emotional background so utterly different from that in which the religion originated and flourished that it becomes psychologically impossible for one to take the religion seriously. The religious beliefs of the ancient Greeks have never been refuted, and I do not see how they possibly could be. But no one would think it worth while nowadays even to raise the question whether there are beings answering to the description of Zeus or of Hera given in classical writings. (ii) In the case of any religion which is still alive, such as Christianity in contemporary England, the effect of such influences as I have been describing varies enormously from person to person even among those of much the same level of intelligence and culture. Moreover, those who are differently influenced *now* will, for that reason, be liable to make very different estimates as to the influence which the sciences are likely to exercise on religion in the future. Where this element of subjectivity is greatest I intend to make it quite explicit by talking in the first person and stating how *I* am affected and what *I* should anticipate. Such statements need not be of merely biographical interest, for they might happen to make explicit what many of my contemporaries are vaguely feeling. If and only if this is so, they are not wholly impertinent.

For our present purpose we may divide the sciences into three groups, viz. (i) the sciences of ostensibly non-living matter, (ii) the

biological sciences, and (iii) the sciences which deal with specifically human topics. This classification is hierarchical, in the sense that the second group presupposes the first, and that the third presupposes the second. In the first group the most important for our purposes are astronomy and physics. In the third group the most important are history and archaeology and anthropology; psychology, normal and abnormal; and psychical research.

I will begin with astronomy. Any religion which can be taken seriously by intelligent men must be cosmic and not merely parochial. As men we shall necessarily be most concerned with that part of the divine system which immediately affects our race and our planet; and, if we believe that a religion has been revealed to men, we may reasonably expect that the revelation will be most explicit about that part of the system which most concerns ourselves, and which we could not have discovered by our own unaided efforts. Nevertheless, it is essential to any religion on the grand scale that what immediately concerns us should not be something isolated and self-contained, but should be an integral part of a wider system which covers the whole universe. Now Christianity, like all the great religions, claims to be cosmic in range. But it is also to a very marked extent geocentric and anthropocentric. Christ came to *earth*, he became a *man*, and eventually he went back and *ascended* to His Father in heaven. Now, as it seems to me, Christianity contrived to be at once geocentric and cosmic only because it originated and evolved against a background of astronomical theory in which the earth was the centre of the universe. This would naturally be assumed without question as a popular belief by the apostles and all the early Christians; and, in the detailed scientific form of the Ptolemaic system, it is explicitly taken by the great medieval theologians as the material setting of the divine drama. It seems to me to be assumed by Christ Himself; and some of His statements, which are perfectly sensible on that assumption, seem to be pointless on any other hypothesis.

Now, since the eighteenth century we have known that the earth is one of a number of planets at various stages of development circulating about one of a number of suns. Naturally I am not so silly as to suppose that this constitutes a *refutation* of Christianity. All I can do is to record the fact that for me personally the Christian story and the Christian theology in a Copernican universe wither like a plant taken from a hothouse and bedded out in the Siberian desert. I know well that many of the greatest astronomers have found no difficulty in remaining simple and earnest Christians. I have no comment to make except that the human mind has a wonderful power of keeping different parts of its knowledge and belief in water-tight compartments. If there is anything at all in

the difficulty that I feel at this point, no progress in astronomy which has been made since Galileo and Newton and no progress that may conceivably be made in the future can make any difference.

I do not think that the revolution in astronomy need have that detrimental effect on religion in general, or on most of the other great religions which, in my opinion, it has on Christianity. It has been said that an atheistic astronomer must be mad. I am not at present concerned to dispute this. What I do wish to suggest is that a *Christian* astronomer must have a more than Nelsonian capacity for applying his blind eye to his telescope on occasion.

We may now leave astronomy and pass to physics. In my opinion the *logical* bearing of mathematical physics, whether of the classical or the relativistic and quantic kind, on any form of religion is quite trivial. I am inclined to think that the only real logical connection is the following. The fact that all the immense variety of inorganic natural phenomena fall under a few very general laws, and that these laws are of a comparatively simple mathematical form, seems not to be logically necessary. It looks like a kind of uncovenanted mercy, and it constitutes a certain resemblance between inorganic nature and certain products of intelligent human action, such as games of skill, puzzles, musical compositions, etc. Again, the fact that human beings have been able to discover these fundamental laws of inorganic matter, and to acquire thereby a considerable degree of practical control over it, exalts our estimate of the human mind and enlarges the gap between it and any animal mind. These two facts and their interrelation do, so far as they go, lend some support to a view of man and nature which may fairly be called "religious."

I must next mention a supposed connection between mathematical physics and religious belief which I suspect to be unreal. A distinction has been drawn between two kinds of physical law, viz. "determinisitic" and "statistical." Until quite recently the fundamental laws of physics were held to be of the deterministic kind, and the statistical laws were held to be derivative. Nowadays, in the opinion of many eminent physicists, the situation has been reversed, and henceforth we must hold that the fundamental laws of physics are of the statistical kind. Now it has been alleged that, if the fundamental laws of physics are deterministic, all human volitions must be completely ineffective, i.e. that nothing in the material world would have been different if there had been no volitions, or if human beings had made different decisions. It is also alleged that, if the fundamental laws of physics are statistical, it is at least possible that some human volitions do make a difference to the course of events in the material world. Now it is plain that the ethical content of religion is closely bound up with the common-

sense opinion that some human volitions are effective. Therefore, if the allegation which I have stated were correct, it would be true to say that the classical physics was incompatible with an essential presupposition of religion. And it would be true to say that recent developments of mathematical physics had eased, if they had not completely removed, this conflict.

I believe that this argument is full of fallacies and confusions. I have gone very fully into the question in my contribution to the symposium on *Indeterminacy and Indeterminism* in the Aristotelian Society's Supplementary Volume X. I will therefore confine myself here to the following obvious remark. If the principles of classical physics do entail that all human volitions are ineffective, they conflict with the presuppositions of natural science just as much as with those of religion. For every scientist who ever devises and carries out an experiment assumes that his thoughts and volitions are making a characteristic modification in the course of events in the material world.

It remains for me to mention a certain psychological connection which probably does exist in the minds of many people between their religious beliefs and what they have heard about recent developments in theoretical physics. The conceptions of classical physics were perfectly straightforward and easy for anyone to grasp and to picture. Mathematical knowledge was needed only for working out their detailed consequences. The concepts of relativistic and quantum physics cannot be grasped except by a person of considerable mathematical training who sees them as factors in a whole complicated context of theory. And they cannot be pictured at all. When attempts are made to express these concepts and laws in familiar language to uninstructed persons who interpret it literally, a mass of paradoxical and apparently self-contradictory verbiage results. Now in the good old days those who attacked Christianity from the standpoint of science could make great play by contrasting the plain common sense of physics with the mind-destroying hocus-pocus of theology. It can now be retorted that the principles of modern physics look as nonsensical as the Athanasian Creed, and yet are vouched for by eminent scientists and validated by practical applications which we can all use and abuse. In consequence some people are inclined to think that there may be something in the mysterious and apparently nonsensical verbiage of Christian theology after all.

Well, it is not for me to say that there may not be. But I do say, without the slightest hesitation, that the psychological cause which I have just described is no rational ground for thinking that there is. There is nothing mysterious or paradoxical or self-contradictory in the physical concepts and laws so long as they are formulated in

the symbolism which is appropriate to them and are viewed in their own proper context. The mystery and the paradox arise only when this symbolism is translated into ordinary words which have certain familiar associations, and when those words are heard or read by persons who lack the knowledge which would enable them to reject or correct the images and ideas which they naturally evoke. I do not think that any theologian would pretend that the paradoxes and apparent contradictions of Christian theology arise simply from this kind of distortion of something which can be quite clearly and intelligibly stated in an appropriate symbolism to experts who have mastered it. Be this as it may, the following reflection is surely obvious. The fact that contemporary physics has to enunciate its principles in the form of apparent paradox and nonsense may be a good reason for hesitating to reject off-hand *any* doctrine *merely* because it looks paradoxical and nonsensical when stated. But it cannot be a good reason for accepting any *one* form of apparent nonsense, e.g. the Athanasian Creed, in preference to any *other* form, e.g. the Kabbalah or the Hegelian Dialectic.

We can now leave the science of inorganic matter and pass to the biological sciences. I said that Christianity was essentially geocentric and anthropocentric. We have considered its geocentric aspect in connection with astronomy; it is the anthropocentric aspect of it to which biology is relevant. Christianity arose, and Christian theology developed, in a certain context of beliefs about the relation of man to other living beings on earth. Man was created "a little lower than the angels," and he occupies a unique status in a hierarchy of living beings at the dividing point between the angels, who are purely rational beings without material organisms, and the brutes, who are perceptive and sensitive but wholly non-rational animals. I must confess that this seems to me to be still the best available description of the peculiarities of man as he now is and as he has been throughout the whole of his written history. But contemporary biology makes it practically certain that, if we go back far enough into the pre-history of the human race, we find it developing by insensible steps from ancestors who were purely animal.

Now I do not think that there need be any great difficulty in fitting religion in general, or certain of the great historical religions, such as Buddhism, into this changed biological framework. But, for my own part, I find it difficult to see how Christianity can be fitted into it without being so radically transformed as to be unrecognizable. Certainly I know of no satisfactory attempt at such a reconstruction of Christian belief; and, unless it can be accomplished, I suspect that Christianity will become less and less credible with each succeeding generation. It may survive for a long time as a kind of religiously toned "ethical uplift"; but I cannot believe that this

will persist indefinitely when cut off from its cosmological and biological roots.

I have already said all that seems necessary about the bearing of abnormal psychology and psychical research on religious belief in general and on Christianity in particular. It only remains for me to add a few words about the influence of the other specifically human sciences. I think there is no doubt that, for many people, the results of the comparative study of religion, and the data supplied by anthropologists and archaeologists, make religious belief impossible. It seems to them to be a pathetic survival of certain beliefs, emotions, and practices, which were natural enough in the childhood and ignorance and impotence of the human race, but have now lost all meaning and relevance. This is not quite the impression which these facts produce on myself. It seems to me that science has equally humble and disreputable origins, that there has been a development in depth and insight in religion as well as in science, and that both must be judged ultimately by their fruits rather than by their roots. On the other hand, I find that the facts of anthropology and comparative religion make any claim by any particular religion to an exclusive possession of the truth too utterly ridiculous to be worth a moment's consideration.

I have one more remark to make before ending my paper. To me the occurrence of mystical experience at all times and places, and the similarities between the statements of so many mystics all the world over, seems to be a significant fact. *Prima facie* it suggests that there is an aspect of reality with which these persons come in contact in their mystical experiences, and which they afterwards strive and largely fail to describe in the language of daily life. I should say that this *prima facie* appearance of objectivity ought to be accepted at its face value unless and until some reasonably satisfactory alternative explanation of the agreement can be given. Now I am well aware that certain psycho-analysts would give one explanation of it, and that certain Marxian theorists would give another. Such explanations do satisfy some people who have studied them, and they form the staple diet of a great many more who have not done so, but have swallowed them whole in order to be in the vanguard of culture.

Now I think that each of these two types of theory contains some interesting speculations which may turn out to be true, and may cover some of the facts. But each of them seems to me to suffer very obviously from two defects. The first is that they are plainly constructed by persons who have very little first-hand or even second-hand experience of religion, and are strongly antipathetic to it from one cause or another. I should feel some hesitation in accepting theories about the nature of music and its function in

human life, excogitated by a tone-deaf psychologist whose wife had recently eloped with a musician. The psycho-analytic and the Marxian theories of religion seem to me to wear too jaundiced a complexion to inspire complete confidence. The second defect is this. Although the exponents of these theories make a tremendous parade of being "scientific," it is perfectly plain to anyone who has studied any genuine science that they have no idea of the *general* difficulty of proving any far-reaching explanatory hypothesis, or of the *special* difficulties which exist in a field where experiment is impossible, and even the "observations" consist largely of hearsay and tradition. The degree of their confidence is a measure of their scientific incompetence. They seem to have no notion of the importance of confronting their theories with negative instances, or of considering whether half a dozen rival hypotheses would not explain the facts equally well.

I have been obliged to paint the scene as I see it; and the prospects of Christianity, as I see them, are somewhat gloomy unless applied science (that blind Samson) should uproot the pillars of the house and bury pure science with it in the ruins. Though I am not a Christian, and never have been one since I began to think for myself, I take no pleasure in this prospect. Whether Christianity be true or false, Christ's parable about the subsequent fate of the man who was left "swept and garnished," after the expulsion of a demon that possessed him, seems to me to be profoundly true of humanity as a whole. Ordinary human nature abhors a vacuum, and it will not for long rest content without some system of emotionally toned and unverifiable apocalyptic beliefs for which it can live and die and persecute and endure. When I contemplate Communism and Fascism, the two new religions which have entered into the clean-swept place and possessed it, and when I consider the probable consequences of their sisterly bickerings, I appreciate the concluding lines of Mr. Belloc's *Cautionary Tale* about the boy who ran away from his nurse in the Zoo and was eaten by a lion. "Always keep a hold of Nurse, for fear of finding Something Worse."

ON THINGS IN THEMSELVES[1]

PROFESSOR H. F. HALLETT

THE subject on which I am to address you this evening is one which, though it is of fundamental importance both for philosophy and for practice, cannot but present the gravest difficulties for such treatment as falls within the limits of this occasion. Philosophical problems are always difficult, but those of ultimate metaphysics are in this respect egregious. For the simplifications that are open to the scientific phenomenologist who can rest content with a spatio-temporal world, or to the analyst who concentrates on the objective content with which the human understanding most conspicuously concerns itself, are not open to the metaphysician. He must meet the full complexity of things: not limiting himself to their appearances as objects within human experience, nor to a reflective analysis of their objective content, but taking them as they must be in themselves in order that they may appear as they empirically and reflectively do appear for the special cognitive faculties of man. I ask, therefore, for your patience and attention as I try first of all to lead you into, and then, as I hope, out of, the metaphysical labyrinth. For what I have to describe is something of a metaphysical adventure, or, if you like, a metaphysical ghost-story, in which the ghosts assume such reality as to make the solid things "give up the ghost"—which is just as it should be in a good ghost-story!

Nothing has been more noteworthy, I think, in the history of recent and contemporary philosophy than the widespread acceptance of what have been styled "realistic" theories, both of knowledge and of the nature of things: subjectivistic theories have suffered total eclipse, and idealism has fallen well within the penumbra. My own philosophical development has belonged almost exactly to this "realistic" epoch, and my opinions have been uniformly of that type from the days when I came under the direct inspiration of Seth Pringle-Pattison—a philosopher noted for his "realistic" criticisms of the Hegelian school, both with reference to the nature of the finite individual, and also with reference to general epistemological theory.[2] The persistence of this "realistic" bias in my own speculations

[1] Lecture delivered in outline at the Evening Meeting of the Institute on December 13, 1938.

[2] These views were put forward primarily in the three series of Balfour Lectures: *Scottish Philosophy, Hegelianism and Personality,* and *Realism* (the last named being first published in book form posthumously in 1933).

must be attributed to the great impression made on my callow mind by that distinguished teacher—nor was there much in the intellectualistic system of Spinoza, to which I turned for the subject-matter of my 'prentice work,[1] to lead me to modify my bent; at least not at the start. But, if I may for a moment or two continue on this personal note, nothing has impressed me more in recent years with respect to my own opinions, than the change of emphasis that I find between the present direction of my thought on fundamental issues, and what appears to have been my prevailing tendency only a few years ago, so far as I can recover that from my published writings. I am not conscious of any sudden conviction of error, or change of course, but only of an increasing enlightenment (which I fear some of my friends will name the reverse), a loosening of intellectual bonds, that has focused and clarified some of the great issues.[2]

As to the source of this change of outlook, I make no doubt that somewhere is to be found the influence of that transcendent genius among philosophers, Immanuel Kant; for I find myself thinking more often and more fruitfully of his conceptions and conclusions in relation to the great problems of metaphysics. I think no one could cease to be influenced all his life by the close study of the Kantian philosophy that used to be an essential part of the training of a young philosopher; yet the changes in my outlook did not come immediately from that source. They issued more directly from my often repeated reflections on the doctrine of Substance and its Attributes in the philosophy of Benedict Spinoza: a subject that has occupied the intellectual ingenuity of every student of this twin-star[3] of the philosophical firmament, and has received a wide variety of interpretations. That, however, is not my subject this evening, and I must not linger upon it; suffice it to say that these reflections at last led me to concentrate attention upon the general notion of *Being* and its varieties; and I came to see, with great illumination to myself at least, that the real nature of a thing[4] must be what it is *in itself*, and

[1] *Aeternitas* (Clarendon Press, 1930). In the voyage of philosophy every man is partly a "sailer" and partly a "tacker"; and though it is by tacking that philosophical progress is made, and the mind comes to discover itself, it is by sailing that we gather way, and come to understand the traditions of our craft.

[2] Like a planet originally drawn off from its sun under the attraction of a passing giant into an outer orbit of "realism", the mind returns to its centre along a slowly narrowing spiral, under the centripetus of an inescapable logic, and even against its native centrifuge.

[3] It would be an appropriate, though anachronistic, nemesis if philosophical progress should prove to have taken its true rise and course from the complementary speculations of a German and a Jew!

[4] By "thing in itself" it will be seen that I mean *ens in se*, not *corpus sive objectum in se*. The argument at this stage is metaphysical, and refers to Being as such, without special reference to this or that sort of existent the conception

not what it is *for another*. For its nature as it is for another can be no more than an external view of it as an *object* of perception or thought; and this cannot precisely and completely answer to the nature that it possesses in itself *as it lives and operates*.

Now this principle seemed to bring the doctrines I had previously accepted as near axiomatic into serious question: I had inferred the ultimate nature of reality from the character and criterion of knowledge. The Real, I had said, following the celebrated "ontological argument," must be the perfect, for by the truth of a belief we *mean* the perfection of its object; or, more modestly, this perfection in the object of the belief is our only possible *test* of truth. But now I saw, or thought I saw—and with some dismay at first—that the most perfect object must fall short of reality, and the most adequate belief be wholly beside the mark. For knowledge is essentially knowledge *of objects*, the relation of a knowing subject to an object that is known;[1] and an object is by its very nature and definition a thing as it appears *for* a knower other than itself; it cannot be the thing as it is *in itself*. I saw also that there must be some means of checking our beliefs other than an analysis of their objects; somehow and somewhere we must have direct access to the things in themselves. So far from objectivity being the same thing as reality, it can never be more than external appearance. Thus I came to recognize that the really fatal error of recent and contemporary thought is what I have called its "radical objectivism": its identification of the real with the objective. I saw that I must retrace my steps towards the opposed, unpopular, and supposedly refuted doctrines of the older subjectivists like Berkeley and Leibniz, though not perhaps accept those views as a final resting place. I did not immediately grasp the connection of these conclusions with the Kantian theory of the noumenon, the thing-in-itself,[2] or as the *Critick of Pure Reason*

of which may happen to be prevalent. If *ens in se* were taken as equivalent to *objectum in se* we should have to assert the reality of a "Nothing that nothings" —an expression, negative in form it is true, but nonsensical only for those who dogmatically identify the objective with the real; yet (and indeed therefore) particularly well-suited to the understandings of such "radical objectivists", as signifying Being that is not objective, and operates non-objectively.

[1] And this applies, be it noticed, to both knowledge by "acquaintance", and knowledge by "description". Not, however, to "enjoyment" as it is *defined* by Alexander, though I am less sure about his actual *use* of it. Cf. especially *Space, Time, and Deity*, I, p. 19: "The angel's view"; and pp. 103–8: "Subject and object self". And in the issue, of course, Alexander's "radical objectivism" is not in doubt.

[2] One of the chief signs of the greatness of Kant was, it seems to me, his constantly reawakened and justified resistance to the elimination of things in themselves. Even that great scholar, Professor Kemp Smith, from whom many of us have learnt so much, is inclined to *complain* of Kant's repeated *failures* to conform to the "genuine critical doctrine", as if this signified irresolution in

sometimes misnamed it: the "transcendental object"; for like Kant himself, at least in some moods as the third designation emphasizes, I had always thought of the noumenon as some sort of objective existence, though of course as an unknown object. In spite of being a "thing in itself" it might also be a being *for* another, though not for any *human* knower; and I remembered the seemingly conclusive inference that an unknowable entity is a *non*entity that has no real right so much as to appear in intelligent discourse. But the Real, as a thing in itself, I now saw might well be unknowable *as an object*, yet be judged to be real *in itself*; and this might explain what idealist critics had sometimes noted with merriment: the extensive "knowledge of the unknowable" possessed by some philosophers; and also that "dissatisfaction with the form of knowledge as such" that had disturbed Bradley, and been judged by Pringle-Pattison to be "chimerical".[1] A belief might have all the marks of truth, its object be completely coherent and comprehensive, and thus devoid of no objective perfection, and hence merit the name of "knowledge", and yet provide no satisfactory apprehension of the Real as it is in itself, i.e. as real. Indeed, it *could* not do so, for its object would still be only an object, a being *for* something other than itself: an external view, an appearance, an objectification; not an inward being, a reality, a thing in itself. I saw that to be real *means* to be unknowable as object. What I had always regarded as the very *perfection* of knowledge, viz. its revelation of an external and independent object, I now saw, by an intellectual *volte face* (not uncommon in our recognition of truths that lie, as Berkeley says, "so near and obvious to the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them"), to be its *essential vice*. Here, indeed, was a "transvaluation of all values" for an intellectualist! I had opened my eyes and the ghost was beginning to take solid form, and horror to possess the victim!

I do not, of course, claim that this "Copernican revolution"[2]

the grasp of his own principles, and a feeble recession to dogmatism. On the contrary, as I think the analysis of the *Critick of Practical Reason* indicates, it was genuine insight that led Kant to refuse to make the mere analysis of human knowledge, or experience, the measure of the Real, i.e. to take the unprobed bifurcation of subject and object as the essential form of the macrocosmic-microcosmic Real. This is not to reject "criticism" but to relegate it to its proper subordinate place in methodology. In ontology it is nugatory.

[1] *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 122. It is surely a curiosity of metaphysical obstinacy that Bradley, who saw so clearly that the fatal difference of subject and object implies that "not even absolute truth is quite true", could not infer that the real is not object; but he must needs fall back on a real that saves its objectivity at the price of merging, blending, fusing, dissolving appearances in a "higher" unity that, as Pringle-Pattison said, is "asymptotically approached in the lowest organisms."

[2] I use this Kantian phrase to indicate, what I cannot now expound, the relation that exists between what I am advancing, and the Critical standpoint.

constitutes a new discovery in philosophy. In philosophy new discoveries are rare; and I doubt not that these distinctions have, in one form or another, been noted again and again after periods in which the native "radical objectivism" of the finite mind has prevailed. An obvious instance of this is to be found in the philosophy of Berkeley, though it can hardly be said that he made very much of his clear recognition of the distinction of active and passive being. We have no *idea*, he tells us, of the self: it is not the passive object of knowledge, but its active subject. Yet it is not wholly hidden from us, for we certainly know the meaning of the words "spirit" and "soul". But beyond this "notion" that each conscious spirit has of its own nature, we can only perceive it by the effects that it produces, i.e. by changes produced by it within the world of objects.[1] But, as has often been objected, the use of the word "notion" in place of the word "idea" for our apprehension of active being, solves no problems and produces no special enlightenment. In Berkeley's case, indeed, it was made the foundation of a destructive criticism of his doctrine, both in the writings of Hume (who was led to search—and surely with *a priori* unsuccess—for the subject among the objects;[2] like an anatomist looking for life or mind among the tissues, an astronomer searching for God among the stars, or an idiot hunting for tigers among the moral virtues); and also among those less sceptically inclined, who found his afterthought about "notions" a

The thesis might even be defended, I think, that the essence of Kant's doctrine is unconsciously epitomized in Spinoza's definition (*Eth.* I, Def. iv) of an Attribute of Substance (*quod intellectus de Substantia percipit* tanquam *ejusdem essentiam constituens*), at least as it is applied to known Attributes. Substance would then be the *ideal thing in itself*, and the Attributes the *ideal objects* of knowledge. Spinoza's view seems to have been that where object and thing in itself are ideal, they are also identical. But this is what I am disputing.

[1] "There can be no *idea* formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert, they cannot represent unto us . . . that which acts. . . . Such is the nature of Spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth. . . . So far as I can see, the words *will, understanding, mind, soul, spirit,* do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever." And, added in the second edition: "Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some *notion* of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating—inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words." (*Principles of Human Knowledge*, Part I, sect. xxvii.) A grudging admission!

[2] "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other . . . I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. . . . Were all my perceptions removed . . . I should be entirely annihilated . . . a perfect nonentity." (*Treatise of Human Nature*, IV, sect. vi.)

serious contradiction of his vigorous polemic against "abstract ideas". Yet the distinction that he was attempting to make was, it seems to me, not merely ineluctable, but metaphysically vital in the highest degree, and capable of transforming the whole range of our ontological conclusions.

At this early stage of our inquiry I will be more moderate, however, and say that the metaphysical principles that I have sketched out do raise some very difficult problems that must not be lightly brushed aside, or secreted under an amplified terminology. The difficulties concern both epistemological doctrine, and also the foundation and movement of ontological inference. If knowledge is to be taken, as prima facie seems to be necessary, as a relation of subject and object; and if no object can, from its very nature as object (or external appearance for another) be in the full sense real, it would seem that knowledge is impossible because its very notion is incoherent. For by "knowledge" we must mean *true* belief, i.e. belief about the *real*; yet the real can never be the *object* of knowledge.[1] From this incredible set of relations I draw the conclusion that the prima facie view of knowledge as a subject-object relation is in some way defective; for I must not reject the *a priori* principle that every real as such is a thing in itself, and that no being *for another* can be more than appearance. I ask, then, whether the view of knowledge as, not merely prevailingly but even essentially and exclusively, knowledge of objects has not been taken uncritically from the sort of apprehension that is most conspicuous in the experience of the unreflective finite being, viz. the perception of material things? For even our conceptual knowledge is thought of as knowledge of a range of objects, though of a new and more general type; and that, plainly, on the time-honoured assumption that *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu*, and in total disregard of the Leibnizian *caveat: "nisi intellectus ipse"*, which, inadequate as it is, at least should give us pause.

But not only must we extend our conception of knowledge, we must make a more piercing and unprejudiced inquiry into the foundations of our ontological inferences. Like Descartes, though with even greater urgency, we must put aside all the generally accepted objects of human experience and science, not because we may be deluded in this or that matter by the special nature of our faculties, or by some interfering *deus deceptor*, but because, one and all, they are objects, and therefore no more than appearances, and that, even when they are not distortions, but objects of the most unequivocal objectivity. We must discover some indubitable existent or existents that are not merely things as they appear *for others*, but

[1] Nor must we forget that the conclusion that knowledge is impossible itself claims to be knowledge, so that the assertion conflicts with its own purport.

things as they are *in themselves*. Our doubt gnaws deeper than any conceived by Descartes: for he had but to assure himself that God is perfectly good, and the deepest of his doubts was put to rest; but we, on the contrary, might almost say that the doubts that have threatened to devour us are not dispelled by, but founded upon, the perfection of "God": at least we must say that they are founded upon the limitations of the knowing "self", in virtue of which in experience it is always confronted by an "other", which because, and in so far as, it is an other, and not the self, can only appear objectively, but not be grasped as it is in itself. This is the essential "Idol of the Tribe", which we must be able to correct, or be compelled to settle down in a final scepticism.

But is our search for truth, then, altogether and in principle hopeless? I think not: for if the self is confronted by an other, equally that other is confronted by the self; if the self can only know its other as object, and not as it is in itself, may it not know itself, not as object but as a thing in itself? For in its apprehension of itself it is not baulked by otherness: it possesses itself. It seems strange that, in his theoretical discussions at least, Kant seemed always to be thinking of things in themselves as *others* in themselves and made no use of the fact that the distinction between its nature in itself and its nature for another afflicts not only the others but also the self. This too has a nature in itself as well as an appearance for others; and thus affords a more favourable case for our inquisition.[1] It is true that in his practical philosophy Kant made a nearer approach to this point of view, for the moral law within the individual has its origin not in man's phenomenal nature but in his noumenal being as a rational thing in itself. Yet even here, the natural "radical objectivism" of the human mind deflected him from undertaking an inquiry into the light thus shed on the nature of things in themselves, and confined his discussion to ethical questions relating to the character of moral action. I do not wish to suggest that the problem is easy if we attack it in the self's own citadel: it is in fact intolerably difficult, and some may think it inscrutable; but what I am saying is that it is here *if anywhere* that it can, by man, actually be met and solved. But we must approach it cautiously and by a circuitous path if we are to penetrate to its very heart.

[1] Of course he *discusses* the distinction at some length (cf. e.g. *Critick of Pure Reason*, B 157–9), making use of his characteristic account of the difference of "knowing" and "thinking". I am conscious *that* I am, though even this is a "thought" and not an "intuition"; *what* I am in myself I cannot know, but only my appearance to myself, i.e. as an object in time. Yet "I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of *its power of combination*".

I

For our primary and typical thing in itself, then, I shall look where René Descartes himself looked: to the self, and not to the nugatory world of objects. For each man, his own active self is the cardinal and indubitably certified reality. This, in the real, he is; this, as his part of the real, he can infallibly assert; this is his sample thing in itself. No man can doubt his own reality: he may doubt its prima facie appearances, even the appearances of himself to himself. The whole of his life may be a dream from which he has never, and will never, awaken; but he cannot doubt that his life, or his dream, is founded upon an indubitable core of reality. Certainly of no being can he be more certain than of the being that he fundamentally is. The certainty is, indeed, complete when he defines it as certainty *that* he is, and refrains from any positive assertion as to *what* he is. Not that it can be true that he is, unless he does also possess a distinct nature: the assertion that whatever he is, he can be certain *that* he is, means no more than that he is certain of his reality while keeping an open mind about the precise character that he really possesses; not that he exists without character, as an empty objective *punctum* of being. He is certainly real; he is an *ens in se*, a thing in itself. He also appears to himself, and perhaps also to others; he is a thing *for* himself and *for* others, an object. He is conscious that his appearance often belies his real nature, and suspects that what he really is, is never fully manifested by his objective appearance. What, then, is he? He is all that he is as a thing in itself; not what he is as an object for another (even when he is, in some sense, himself that other—as when he sees his own limbs and trunk). He distinguishes most clearly between his body and his mind, and thinks of himself as an embodied mind, or a rational animal, according as he is chiefly impressed by his intellectual or by his physical characteristics. Are these only appearances of the man, or are they his real character? Can he, as he is in himself, be an extended body with a mind capable of thinking and perceiving objects? If he is a *mind*, he must be that mind as it is in itself, actively performing the functions of a mind; if he is a *body*, he must be that body as it is in itself, actively performing the bodily functions. In himself he cannot be that mind as it appears as an object for another man, i.e. as it is viewed either by the classical psychologists as a set or system of psychological entities: perceptions, volitions, judgments, and the like (mere mental entities or constructs about which we may speak, but which clearly have no existence as things in themselves, or even, perhaps, as real objects for others); or by behaviouristic psychologists as a complex function of the behaviour of an organized body, as that body and its behaviour appear for the perception and understanding of another man, or of

the man himself using his external senses. We cannot, therefore, look to psychology in either form for the nature of the human mind as a thing in itself: it is vitiated by objectivity. If again, man is a *body*, still in himself he cannot be that human body as it is commonly and outwardly perceived, as an objective appearance for an external perceiver (even though that perceiver is the man himself viewing himself as an external object). Nor will anatomical dissection lay bare his bodily nature as it is in itself: for all the dissected parts remain as objects externally perceived. You cannot discover the body as it is in itself by external perception either of the body as a whole, or of its dissected parts; to do so you must *be* the body actually carrying out its proper bodily functions. Thus we cannot look either to common perception, or to physics, physiology, and neurology, for the nature of the human body as a thing in itself. So that body and mind alike, as commonly perceived and scientifically understood, are no more than objective appearances.[1]

Next, I shall try to discover what the human mind and the human body *are* as things in themselves, and not as things for others, or in relation to others.

(*a*) The Human Body as a Thing in Itself

The nature of the human body as a thing in itself is a question to which I have devoted some attention elsewhere,[2] so that I must not, this evening, stay to elaborate the subject in much detail. This was, indeed, my point of entry into the present set of problems; for it was the precise function of the human sense-organs in external perception that led me at the start to see that all our views on these subjects are vitiated by the natural "radical objectivism" of the finite mind, and that unless we can correct this "Idol of the Tribe

[1] Even the view of the mind as the *subject* of knowledge, when we do not try to objectify it, bears relation to the object that it knows; and therefore as such stands condemned with its object. This is true whether we adopt a subjectivist or a realist view concerning our knowledge of objects: the subject of knowledge would bear relation to objectivity whether it created its object or received it complete, or took a part only in its construction. In the issue it will be seen that I derive objectivity from otherness, and the object from the opposition and co-operation of self and other.

[2] See especially: *The Roots of Duality in Human Knowledge* (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1937–38, pp. 168–88). Perhaps I may be allowed to say here that the account of perception given in the present lecture constitutes a development of the above-named paper, and is, I hope, therefore more credible. I think that this may be especially the case with reference to the heavy work that seemed to be assigned in some sections of the former paper, to the human body as it is known to physiology. This left me unsatisfied at the time, and I am relieved to find that it was not necessary to the theory advanced.

par excellence" we shall never gain insight into any subject that involves real action on the part of the body or of the mind. Now plainly the body *does* something in perception, though it does not perceive, and we can only discover what that action is if we leave the objective appearance of the body, i.e. the body as it is for common perception, physiology, and neurology, and try to take up the point of view of the perceiver himself in the very act of perceiving. This is easily said, but not so easily done, so firm is our interest in external perception.

How, for example, does the seeing eye perceive itself; what does the eye look like in the act of vision? How does the touching finger feel itself; what does the touching finger feel like in the act of touching? If we can answer such questions we shall gain knowledge of what the percipient's body is, not indeed in itself as a merely unconscious physical thing, but *for its own mind*, for its superadded consciousness. We shall not have achieved our end, but we shall at least have taken up an "inside" view, in place of the habitual external view of the body. Using an optical analogy, I have expressed this refocusing of perception by saying[1] that the mind has a "dioptric" view of its own body, but an "external" view of other bodies; and that in this inner view the man's own body, as partially "resonant" to things other than himself, appears as identical with perceived nature. I am sorry that it seems paradoxical to say that my eye, as "dioptrically" viewed by my mind, is identical with visual nature as it is for *me*; though for *you*, necessarily taking up an external standpoint, my eye is only an insignificant part of *your* visual nature; but I still think that there is no means of escaping the conclusion.[2] So important, indeed, do I take this distinction to be that until it has been incorporated into the theory of perception, I see no hope of solving many of the problems that are discussed and discussed interminably in this part of philosophy, and I desire, therefore, seriously and urgently, to commend my suggestions to the notice of philosophers.

I now go further and say that all particular features of my perceived objective world are attributable to the nature of things other than my body in so far as they fall within the limits of that body's possible "resonance"; but that the space-time in which I perceive them, and which is the ground of their contours, is attributable to my body *as a thing in itself* under the stimulus of their obstruction: visual space-time to my "eye", tactual space-time to my "organ of touch", and so on; and that these several space-times

[1] *Loc. cit.*

[2] The paradox is even more pronounced if I look at my eye in a mirror: for then my "dioptrical" eye actually *contains* my objective eye (or an image of it) as one of its minor details.

are reducible to one because the different senses are but modifications and complications of the primitive sense of touch.

You may remember that Berkeley[1] said that empty space is unresisted physical motion; and occupied space, physical motion resisted: what I am saying is related to this account of the generation of space, but goes far beyond it. Berkeley's assertion as it stands might in fact be regarded as analytical, seeing that it merely derives space from what already involves it, viz. motion. Such an interpretation would, I think, miss the point of Berkeley's discovery, according to which the motion that generates space is the inward experience of mov*ing*, and not the outward appearance of being mov*ed*; and this is essentially what I mean to assert when I say that empty space-time is unresisted physical *action*, and occupied space-time that action resisted. Let me try to make clear the significance of this attempt to generate space-time from the action of the self. When I stretch out my arm and touch this lampstand with my finger, the distance of the tactual sense-datum at the point of contact of my finger and the object is the amount of physical action that has taken place before resistance was met and the sensation occurred. Now you will say: what do you mean by "amount of physical action"? We have, you will say, in fact no perception of any such physical action as such, but only the continuous series of sense-data that we locate in the muscles of the arm, very much as we locate the final tactual sense-datum at the tip of the finger or at the surface of the lampstand. If no knowledge of the occurrence is supposed to be available except what comes from the experience itself, then all you will possess will be a series of "kinaesthetic" sense-data followed by a tactual sense-datum at the point of contact of the finger and the lampstand. How can it be supposed that this *series* becomes a tactual sense-datum experienced *at a distance*? How do the "kinaesthetic" sense-data (as we call them, supposing a more complete knowledge than our hypothesis warrants) *become* distance? My reply is that no one, not even Berkeley, ever supposed that to be possible: these

[1] "When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is *Space*. But if I find a resistance, then I say there is *Body*: and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less *pure*. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to be supposed that the word *space* stands for an idea distinct from, or conceivable without, body and motion. Though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others; which hath occasioned infinite mistakes. When therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains *pure space*: thereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance: but if that, too, were annihilated, then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space." (*Principles of Human Knowledge*, Part I, sec. 116.) Cf. also *De Motu*, sect. 55.

"kinaesthetic" sense-data are *objects*, and not what is asserted to be the distance, viz. the *action* that we objectify as "stretching out the arm and touching the lampstand". Let us take an even simpler case, and reduce the movement to the little tap of the finger that I give to the bulb of the lamp to feel whether it is hot. There is the slight "kinaesthetic" sense-datum in the finger, then the sting of the heat. But is there not more? Is there not the *possessed action* of tapping that unites the kinaesthesis and the sting into the total object: "finger tapping bulb and feeling it hot"? In a more prolonged movement there is a greater complexity of kinaesthesis, but still the same unification by the *action* that is being performed, and that we *read into* the series of sensations, and make into the perception of motion in space, with the stages marked off by the sense-data. This action is no object but a thing in itself; it *appears* as an object, under the stimulus of resistance, in the form of space-time with the resistance at a contour. Nor is the action itself a motion: it *appears* as a motion, through the unification of the sense-data under the *schema* of space-time. That *schema is* thus the objectification of action, just as the special distance is the objectification of *that* action. If it were not for the resistance offered by an other to the action of the self, we should never conceive space-time at all: its otherness induces us to interpret the action that we consciously *possess*, as motion that we can *observe*; and from this, as Berkeley says, we derive distance. The action in itself is no object; the other, as it is experienced, extends or objectifies our action as space-time. What I assert, therefore, is that if we had no apprehension going beyond the "kinaesthetic" and tactual sense-data, we should never apprehend distance, but only, at best, a series of data in time. But because we are *acting* while these data are presented, we find them to be "kinaesthetic", i.e. we regard them as stages of a physical action. The action that is not in itself physical, is objectified as such, with a limiting contour qualified by sense-content.[1]

[1] I am anxious to make it clear that I am not asserting that there is a *sense of action* when we act consciously. This is, in fact, what I am denying: for a *sense* of action implies a sense-datum of action comparable to a colour-sense-datum. But this would be an *objective* content, whereas the action of which I am speaking is a thing in itself, and no object. When we act consciously, we consciously *possess* the action as it is in itself. It is this action consciously possessed that unites the sense-data of kinaesthesis as marking stages of the action: the action has stages only as thus operating and objectified as space-time in which the objective contents are ordered. The important thing is, that I am *acting* in this set of changes; I am walking, I am moving my finger, and so on. The difficulty we experience in grasping this derivation of space-time, arises from the developed character of all our conceptions and expressions of physical action such as the exploring of the shape of a body by touch or sight. The muscular sensations are so called only in so far as they are referred to the muscles that are already spatio-temporal contours; our exploring of an

Let this, then, stand as an account of what I mean when I say that the distance of the object from the perceiver is the amount of unresisted action that is performed before a limit is reached where further action is resisted by an opposing other. Now this action limited by the other, takes the self beyond itself to an awareness of that other, which thus becomes an object *for* the self, and not what it really is *in* itself, viz. an action. Its otherness as apprehended by the self is objectivity, that is, external or spatio-temporal existence. The action of the self thus comes to be interpreted as motion in space-time generating distance; and the limit to it, as an impenetrable spatio-temporal barrier. This gives us a contour at which the tactual quality resides.

But further, the representation of the action of the self as motion in space-time also implies the presence of the self as a "percipient frame of reference", and it is from this that the idea of the human body develops (through complex and ambiguous interperceptions), as both a set of exploring "organs", and also as a "region of reference" from which spatio-temporal "distances" are reckoned—a body distinct from, yet within, the general world of objects, and mobile in relation to them. In the simplest case that we have been considering, it is the percipient spatio-temporal "origin of reference", rather than an objective "organ": only in more complex perceptions can this

object is already thought of as physical action of the arm and hand in running over the contours. But if we think ourselves back into the primitive stage of beginning to act and finding an obstruction or resistance registered as sense-content, it will be understood how our action is spatio-temporalized by the urge to arrange the sense-data in an order of co-existences and sequences—an urge founded on practical needs. The action does not itself appear as an *element* in the objective world, but as its objectivity, i.e. as space-time.* The orders of the various sense-data only determine the special conformation of the "bodily" contours of space-time—not its spatio-temporality. This is the objectification of action in terms that will synthesize with the sense-data. We do not know that they are the only terms—a consideration that may throw light on the unknown Attributes of Spinoza's Substance. Private space-time is the space-time required to do this for the sense-data of the individual; actual space-time that required for the common sense-data of the social whole; standard space-time that required for the standard sense-data of science, which is thus so far a modification of the uniform space and time of Newton. We need not suppose that the most elementary sense-data are already spatio-temporal; they are so only in so far as they are complex. Thus also they become varied by appropriate spatio-temporal synthesis, and are distinguished from the primitive sense-datum of touch (which is indistinguishable from resistance), as sound, colour, taste, etc.

* The same is true of the "effort" that Berkeley makes the determining factor in "absolute" motion: we say *we* move over the road, and not the *road* under us, because we are conscious of *our effort* in moving. But if this were a *sense* of effort it would not help in the least, for it would only be a new sense-datum. It is because it is *consciously possessed action* that it determines the motion as *ours*, and not the road's.

develop into an objective organ, or set of organs, capable of being perceived externally by the self itself, working from adjacent places within a total region determining the contours of the body. Thus the human body is then a "region of view", or percipient contour, at or from which we variously observe the world of objects spatio-temporally separate from it, and with which it establishes "resonance". Thus we think of the finger as moving towards the lampstand, or in the simple case we were considering in which we are confined to the present "touch", of the percipient "place" as doing so; and of the distance of the object as being the space traced by the finger or the moving "point of view", respectively. In still more complex cases, we may substitute for the movement of the finger, the length of a stick with which we touch the object: the tactual quality then resides still at the impenetrable contour, i.e. at the *far* end of the stick. This, indeed, is essentially what happens in vision, though the complication has usually made difficulties for the inquirer. Viewed externally, vision is no more than a highly developed and differentiated mode of touch, in which, like the blind man groping with his baton,[1] we explore distant objects with a vast assemblage of synchronized "batons"[2] composed of "lines of force" or "rays of light"—whatever these phrases may properly be made to stand for. So again for hearing: we exercise the sense of touch with the ear, making use of a complex baton composed of vibrant air.[3] Now think once again of a self capable of receiving no more than a very simple tactual sensation, and devoid of all the data derived from the other senses: the body of such a self is, for its percipient mind thus limited to "di-aesthetic"[4] perception, no more than the space-time in which its physical action is limited by a qualitied contour beyond which it

[1] Cf. the use of this analogy by Descartes in his account of vision (*La Dioptrique*, Discours I).

[2] The complexity of the organ of vision, as a vast assemblage of elementary organs, all working together, as compared with the relative independence and simplicity of the organs of touch, reciprocates with the total appearance of visual space, as compared with the "cobweb-like" character of pure tactual space. The finger, e.g. traces the outlines of the object, while the eye sees the complete outline at once, at least with small objects. For an animal with isolated and independent visual "spots" distributed like the touch-spots of a man, visual space would be very like our actual tactual space when uncorrected by vision. Auditory space is most vague from the relative fluidity of its medium —like a blind man groping with a baton made of plasticine!

[3] Hence the "stars" that we see with a blow on the eye, the noises produced by the surgeon's probe in the ear, the silence of the vacuum, and our blindness in a dark room. The specialized sense-qualities are, I think, spatio-temporal modes of synthesis of the primitive touch-datum—at least from the external point of view. In themselves they are actions.

[4] I now substitute this term to avoid the exclusively optical suggestions of "dioptric"—the term that I have previously used to express the perception we have of our own sense-organs in the act of using them, and not by external perception: their *being in and for self*, not their *being for an other*.

cannot act; while its object is that resisting contour occupied by the simple tactual quality.[1]

Consider such a self as finding no resistance to the action that constitutes it: then its body (if it could have a body) viewed by its mind (if any) di-aesthetically, would be empty space-time. We must remember, however, as my parentheses are meant to suggest, that such an unimpeded self would perceive no objective world, and would have no "di-aesthetic" body, and hence no subjective mind. For it would have no "other" that it did not itself eternally create. Thus neither objectivity, nor the reciprocal subjectivity of a perceiving mind, would arise: for subjective mind and object are mutual emanations of the finiteness of a self at once limited and stimulated by its other; yet that other, equally with the self, is no object but an action. Like the solid mass of barium sulphate that is precipitated from the inter-mixture of sulphuric acid and barium chloride, objectivity, or decorated space-time, emanates from the mutuality of acting self and reacting other. From the action of the finite self in relation to its limiting other, space emanates; from the poverty of that action in comparison with eternal creation, time emanates; from the mutual resistance of self and other, the limiting contours of objects are traced as appearances of the other in relation to the self. As to the qualities that occupy these contours, I will say less at the moment; I shall have good reason to speak of them at some length before I have done. The original primitive tactual "quality" is, I think, not different from resistance of action to action, or positive impenetrability. The action and the resistance or reaction are, of course, mutual, and the simple "quality" thus occupies the spatio-temporal contour.

The analysis to which I have now subjected the notion of body as a thing in itself is sufficient for my immediate purpose. As a thing in itself it must be unknowable,[2] but we can make some approach to

[1] Originally the quality simply occupies the contour confronting the self's "point of view", and is thus perceived as common to the body and to the object. Where the quality is very intense, it tends to attach itself to the body as pain or pleasure; where it is more gentle and varied (as with softness or roughness), to the object. Successive complications of the perception tend to confirm the attribution of the quality to the object as first suggested by the resistance of the other: our combined external and di-aesthetic perception of the body (in which the body may become an object, while other objects do not become the body); the use of the mirror; intersubjective intercourse; the conditions of sight and hearing, which make use of physical media through which the object is felt as remote from the body: all tend in the same direction.

[2] Unless, of course, we regard its action as including the action of self-apprehension, or conscious possession; as perhaps we may. The question is not of great importance for ultimate metaphysics if we must deny that body, even as di-aesthetically perceived as space-time, survives in the ultimate Thing in Itself as eternal Extension; as perhaps we must.

the conditions of its reality if we view it from within its own actively functioning being, as it appears for its own mind. When we do so, as with our own organism, when we view it "di-aesthetically", we find it to be, not an independent thing but an emanation of the relation of self and other: an appearance of the other arising from the opposition to the conscious self by that other. In its spatio-temporality, equally with its primitive "quality", it is derived from the relation of self and other. Abstract the content from the contours, and the spatio-temporal *schema* collapses from vacuity. It can only be maintained by the mutuality of self and other; for absolutely empty space-time is not even spatio-temporal. It is the absolute ghost![1] Man as a thing in itself cannot therefore be a body: a solitary self must be bodiless. That the body is a *phenomenon bene fundatum* is doubtless true, and follows from my analysis: but it is not a noumenon, a thing in itself. Nor is its phenomenality due to the imperfection of our apprehension of it as an object, but to the mode of its origin. It is an emanation of self and other—it cannot therefore be a self in its own right.[2]

[1] Thus the most perfect and conclusive science, for which all knowledge would be mathematical, would have for its object, Nothing. Not, however, the *Nothing that nothings*; but the *Nothing that is nothinged*: the science of ideal contours, posited "for the sake of argument".

[2] Spinoza, on the contrary, asserts that Substance is objectified, among infinite other ways, as Extension, i.e. not empty space, nor space as an abstract concept, but the eternal genetic cause of all physical phenomena. This seems to me to involve the presence in Substance, as being in self, of action that is specifically "physical" (though not "corporeal"—cf. *Eth.* I, xv, Sch.), together with the infinite other forms of action. If this meant no more than that Substance (*Natura naturans*) *creates* the physical world (as well as every other kind of world), the question would then arise: at what point in the hierarchy of creation does "physical" action first appear? Not, *ex hypothesi*, within the creative source, but somewhere within *Natura naturata*. The further question would then be: where precisely are we to draw the line between *Natura naturans* and *Natura naturata*? It has been usual to draw it between Substance (=Attributes) on the one hand, and the Immediate Infinite and Eternal Modes on the other. In that case the Attributes are not *creations* of the divine objectifying intellect, but fall within its creating nature. That seems to make Extension a distinguishable thing in itself or divine action, among infinite other forms of action in Substance, and this conflicts with my analysis of it. But if we draw the line between Substance as ultimate action in itself, and the Attributes as divine objectifications of that action produced by a creative Intellect, we might then accept Extension (= physical action) as an Attribute of Substance—objectified not by commerce of self and other (as with us), but by creative action. Its objectification among finite beings might then be traced to a transcendent source expressing itself in the transcendental genesis I have described. Spinoza's own proof (*Eth.* II, i et ii) is *a posteriori*, in that it infers the Attributes from "individual thoughts" and bodies by removing their limitations.

(*b*) The Human Mind as a Thing in Itself

My treatment of the notion of the human mind as a thing in itself can, happily, be much more summary than that of the human body which has involved us in such complications and difficulties. It is important, however, that I should consider it, even if but briefly, in order that my conclusions may not be mistaken for a crude mentalism. To minds versed in the contrasts current in recent philosophy, it might seem that my reaction from "realism (i.e. objectivism) must necessarily involve me in a retreat to idealism (i.e. mentalism), and that I must hold that a thing in itself must necessarily be subjective mind. My references to Berkeley might also tend to foster this supposition. I must, therefore, lose no time in dealing with the claim of the human mind, *taken strictly as a knowing subject*, to the status of a thing in itself.

First of all let me re-emphasize that this knowing mind must not be identified with what has sometimes been called the "empirical self", i.e. the self as it is supposed to appear as an object of reflection within the range of experience. There are no Lockian "ideas of reflection". I confess that I have for long been very sceptical about this common object of psychological inquiry. *Subjective* mind cannot appear as an *object* of reflection; we have no ideas of the operations of the mind. Indeed, the "empirical self" is no more than a mental artifact produced by desperate psychologists in a misdirected and vain effort to make the study of the "soul" a "science" by assimilating its content and methods to those of the physical sciences. It is this fundamental error that makes a great part of psychology no more than an exquisite instance of the "radical objectivism" of the human mind. Certainly, then, we must not look for the human mind as a thing in itself to any such quasi-object: we must agree with Berkeley that of the soul or mind or self, we have no idea: it is not, and cannot appear as, an *object* of knowledge. If we are to apprehend its nature we must take it as a *functioning subject*. And why, let me ask, should we not do so? Our hypothesis is that, at least on one side of our empirical nature as men, we *are* such minding subjects: must we not, then, in the very act of minding, mindfully possess ourselves; in the very act of knowing, consciously possess ourselves? Why should it be thought to be necessary, how should it be thought to be possible, in order to gain acquaintance with ourselves as minds, to carry out a mysterious process of objectification, and then to reflect upon the vicious appearance? Except, as I have said, in the interest of a psychology framed upon the mistaken analogy of the physical sciences![1] We need not, and we cannot, project ourselves outside of

[1] I do not wish to affirm that psychologists have in no degree succeeded in avoiding this vicious objectification of the soul. But the fallacy has, I think,

ourselves, in order to apprehend ourselves; there is no *speculum mentis*: for the mind cannot appear as an object—not even when it is the mind of another. We *possess* other minds in mutuality; we do not *know* them as objects, though we know their bodies, note their behaviour, and "impute" their mentality. With our own minds this is even more evident: as knowing, we possess our knowing selves; consciousness illumines both the object and the subject, though differently, to match the difference of status. More truly, perhaps I should say: what we call "consciousness" is the knowing itself masquerading as an abstract substantive, *more psychologico*. To say: "I am conscious of an object" is *a fortiori* to say: "I am conscious". In knowing, we apprehend in appropriate ways both the object that we know and the subject that is knowing it; and it is both inconvenient and misleading to call both apprehensions by the same name, "knowing", without qualification.[1] For though it is true that the knowing mind cannot be prevented by its own conscious nature from consciously possessing itself as active, yet this possession should be called *being* rather than *knowing*.[2] *We are consciously active in being actively conscious*; we do not know our action as an object, we possess it as cognitive relation to objects. The mind's action constitutes its reality as a thing in itself, and not those factitious entities that are conveyed by the psychologist's abstract substantives: experience, consciousness, perception, knowledge, thought, belief, complex, emotion, and the rest. These are false objectifications of subjective actions, and are devoid even of those empirical foundations that seem to support the analogous process of objectification in the physical sphere. For while it is true that in some sense we *do* perceive physical or extended spatio-temporal objects, no one in any sense has ever apprehended, or could ever apprehend, these false psychological objects. They are not *entia realia*, or even *entia objectiva*, but *entia rationis*, if not, indeed, *entia ficta*.

never been sufficiently recognized for psychologists to be as keenly on their guard against it as it deserves. Even the psycho-analytic schools, that have made the most determined efforts to get at the real action of the soul, have produced not a few new monstrous mythological psychical objects.

[1] Spinoza, however, as a good intellectualist, has, it would seem, no qualms: "Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that is the idea of an idea, is nothing but the reality of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object; if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so to infinity." (*Eth.* II, xxi, Sch.). The philosopher is, I think, emphasizing the same point, viz. that consciousness illumines the whole experience, both on its subjective and on its objective side. For an idea is not a passive thing like "a dumb picture on a tablet", but involves the very act of thinking. (*Eth.* II, xlix, Sch.) But his expression is obscure.

[2] And in the same way our apprehension of another mind is a discovery of identity rather than a contemplation of difference; or it is nothing.

Thus we must reject the objectification of subjective mind even more vigorously than we rejected the objectivity of body. But further, our rejection of body as a thing in itself extended even to the relatively truer inner or "di-aesthetic" perception of it, because it contracted to objective nonentity when deprived of relation to its other; so also we must deny the *inseitas* of subjective mind even in its subjectivity, because it thus bears relation to objects. We need not, it is true, go so far as to say either that the objects create the mind, or that the mind creates its objects, for the objection applies to knowledge as a relation even of mutually independent subject and objects. Subjective mind is vitiated by that relation: for without objects it must contract to subjective nonentity.[1] My principle, therefore, that objectivity is an emanation of the interaction of self and its other, condemns not only objective body but also subjective mind—because knowing as such bears essential relation to objects and disappears with them.

II

We have been compelled to deny that the *human mind*, whether taken as a psychological "object", or as a knowing subject related to objects[2] in some sense given to it; and also the *human body*, whether

[1] This condemnation only concerns *subjective* mind, i.e. mind *qua* knowing objects, and not mind in its conscious self-possession. In the same way the rejection of body concerned only its objectivity, and not its self-occupation. But it remains a question, for me at least, whether the action that is the real "body" in itself, and the action that is the real "mind" in itself, can be distinguished, except in their relative perfections as actions. For the self-occupied "body" is not spatio-temporal; and the self-possessed "mind", though it is conscious, is not in the strict sense "knowing". The common distinction of body and mind has thus been superseded in the action in itself that constitutes the self. Whether the perfect self-possession of an infinite being involves its spatio-eternal objectification, and reciprocal subjectification, is the question that Spinoza answered by making both Extension and Thought, Attributes of Substance. The question is to some extent one of definition, for plainly Spinoza did not mean by Extension a quantity of space (*Eth.* I, xv, Sch.); yet neither does he mean merely that the action that is Substance is absolutely free, i.e. has no limiting other: for this truth appears as a separate proposition (*Eth.* I, xvii). Perhaps he means that since Substance is an eternal action, perfectly possessing itself, this entails a double objectification of its essence, as eternal Thought of action, and as eternal action thought of, viz. Extension. But though we must not forget that he does not conceive the divine Intellect anthropomorphically, as dependent on the action of its independent other (*Eth.* I, xvii, Sch.) his view certainly seems to involve an ultimate intellectualism that may well be no more than the last refuge of the "radical objectivism" that I have deplored. But, on the other hand, objectification may be synonymous with creation, the essential action of Substance.

[2] This applies to conceptual objects as well as to perceptual, in so far as the content of the former, *qua* objects, is derived from the latter.

viewed externally, or even di-aesthetically; are things in themselves. Both subjective mind and objective body are derived beings; they constitute together the experiential bifurcation that issues from the relation of finite self and its complementary other. This is what I have meant when I have sometimes asserted that a finite being is no mere "section" of the Real, but one of its real "parts". As a section it could never have "subject-object" experience; it could not transcend itself even so far as to apprehend "objects". It is a finite-infinite, transcending itself because its other is its complement. Out of this self-transcendence arises "experience", or the bifurcation of *self* as knower of objects, and *other* as object known. Because it is finite, the action that it is in itself is limited by the actions that are its others; because it is self-transcendent, its action is brought into relation with those actions. These, then, it apprehends as objects (i.e. beings *for* other), because, as other, they limit the indeterminacy[1] of its action. In themselves its others are no more objects than is the self; their objectivity is their appearance for the self as finite. Yet its other is not merely the *limitation* of the "free" action of the self; it is its *opportunity*, its field of determinate action, through which its freedom of indeterminacy becomes a real freedom of purpose. Thus objects are never merely expressions of objectivity: they are never mere spatio-temporal contours determined by mutual impenetrability; but at least *qualitied* objects; often *materially reacting* objects; sometimes *vitally responsive* objects; while here and there appears a friend, an *alter ego*, a beloved. But these qualities, this technique, are not what make the object spatio-temporal, but are progressive triumphs over objectivity, by which the self finds itself in its other, and its other in itself.[2] This is the more fruitful obverse of objectivity, by which the empirical *scissura* of subject and object is progressively cicatrized. This is the *realization of the object*, that offsets and corrects the *objectification of the real*. Nor is it ever wholly absent from our experience: even the objects that we most passively observe are never pure objects or spatio-temporal contours. We find in them the resistance or impenetrability that the self shares with its other—for here, too, action and reaction are equal and opposite. We assign to them also the sense-quality which in di-aesthesis decorates their contours, and in external perception is traced to the external appearance, or body, of the self, rather than to the

[1] The abstract freedom of the finite self is "indeterminacy" only in so far as it is conceived as abstract. In its concrete relation with its other, the supposed indeterminacy is realized as partial self-determination, and even self-legislation. This reaches its ideal expression in the real freedom of the creative One.

[2] "So . . . by my love
Thyself away art present with me still."

objects. And to these qualitied objects we impute materiality, and sometimes life or vitality, on the analogy of these modes of action as they fall within our own experience correlated with our external perception of our own bodies. It is as absurd to think of life as an objective thing in itself, as it would be to think of materiality as a thing in itself,[1] or as we have shown it to be, to think of mentality. These are modes of action, real in themselves in their degree, and as actions, but infected with unreality as they are "imputed" to spatio-temporal objects. For thus they are externalized, objectified, and either taken as no more than functions of spatio-temporal motion, or what is no less erroneous, though better in intention, as mysterious objects of unknown character, inhabiting and actuating spatio-temporal contours.

I have just spoken of the way in which we "impute" quality and action to objects, but, as I explained at an earlier point of my argument, this "imputation" is no more than the appearance in the ambiguous perception of our common life, of that which is, for di-aesthesis, immediate possession. This is most evidently the case with our apprehension of subjective mind in another person: from the double standpoint of our common experience, it seems that we "impute" the mind after an examination of the behaviour of the object, and on the basis of an analogy with our own inner experience and externally observed bodily behaviour. But no one really *believes* that this is the way in which we have contact with our friends and associates, much less the child with its mother, or the lover with his mistress. Our possession of each other involves no inference: we are united in rational intercourse, just as material things are united in mutual action and reaction; and living things in organic mutuality. We call an object that resists our push, material, because we have possessed its resistance; the object that responds to our organic stimulus, living, because we have possessed its vital response; the object that converses with us, rational, because we have possessed his meaning; and where the understanding is perfect, a friend; while in love we directly possess, and are possessed by, the beloved. No concrete object in our experience is purely objective;[2] and in the beloved, objectivity is superseded, so that bodily death itself, and the cessation of all knowledge, cannot overcome love.[3] Here we have no longer the recognition of something objective to degrade our possession by distance and transiency, but the direct intuition and

[1] Thus vitalism, like materialism, and mentalism, is only an expression of our "radical objectivism." These are all forms of action, and not spatio-temporal objects. Nor can we escape by the Humian expedient of "neutralism".

[2] Space-time is the pure object (= O).

[3] "Love's not Time's fool, though rosy lips and cheeks
Within his bending sickle's compass come."

mutual possession of self-transcending selves.[1] And so the bifurcation of experience is healed: no longer is the self divided from its other by "a great gulf", and negated by its determination; but the self possesses itself in its other, and is determined by its negation. All finite experience lies between these limits, and is the emanation of our finite-infinite nature as action. Its transcendental origin has been expressed as "imputation" of content, or quality, or action, to spatio-temporal contours: but, as we have seen, it is "imputation" only in so far as we view the cognitive situation externally, as a relation of an embodied self to a world of objects. In that view, we suppose that the content in the knower is "imputed" to the object. The appearance, I have said, is ambiguous, in that it implies a double mode of perception: the *di-aesthetic*, in virtue of which we perceive (e.g.) the "red" as located at the objective contour of the "rose"; and the *external*, in virtue of which we perceive our own body as compresent with the red rose, that acts upon it to produce a certain "resonance" in the eye. We then conclude that the red *as we perceive it* must be really in the stimulated eye, and not in the rose, so that we think that we "impute" the red in the eye to the rose that we see. Yet as I have sometimes said: how snugly the red fits the contours of the rose; how impossible to separate them![2]

[1] Thus the distinction between the qualitied objects that we *perceive*, and the active objects that we *recognize* by their reaction to, or their co-operation with, our active bodies, is a difference between the object that is *given* us in our concourse with our other, and the object that we *construct* by imputing action of various grades, on the analogy of our own active body. The Kantian categories are primarily principles of the constitution of physical bodies; objectivity belongs, as we have seen, primarily to space-time, though the categorized objects are still infected with objectivity. So with all the types of action "imputed" to objects: they are infected with objectivity because our active body is itself an object—though ambiguously so, because the self is viewing it externally, rather than as it essentially should, di-aesthetically. Thus we assign the action that we really possess as selves, to a body that is no more than an appearance of the self; then on this confused analogy we "impute" action in the other to its appearance. In love these confusions are put to confusion, when the self possesses the other, not as other—for the other in itself is not other but self—but as self. It is thus that love is the "emendation of the intellect".

[2] My analysis of the perceptual situation agrees in principle, I think, with that given by Reid, but goes beneath it to provide a "transcendental" explanation of the "suggestion" and "belief" of the real existence of an object, that he asserts to belong by nature to the "simple apprehension" or sensation, and to be neither *subsequent* to it, nor an *inference* from it. It explains also Reid's refusal to make "sensation" the mere abstraction that his analysis of perception would seem to entail. The "suggestion and belief" I have combined as "imputation", and assigned to an external view of the perceptual situation, which in common experience is made at once more adequate, and more ambiguous, by the inclusion of relations that can be apprehended only in the di-aesthesis of the percipient.

Now we may ask: what corresponds in the "di-aesthetic" perception to the "resonance" of eye and rose that appears in the external view? In di-aethesis the eye is not an object among the other objects within the visual field: it has, so to say, expanded[1] to include all that falls within visual nature. Thus in di-aesthesis there is no "resonance" of eye and rose as objects within the field; that "resonance" is the objective transcript of the relation of the real "eye" and the real "rose", i.e. of the visual action and its congruent other. The objective "red rose" is the offspring of that relation, in which the spatio-temporality is the expression of otherness, and the quality-content the expression of identity. For the quality belongs to the spatio-temporal contour that expresses the limits of the action of self and other. The objective red rose is an appearance of some "filament" of identity in difference of self and other. Berkeley, it is true, denied that colour could be divorced from extension (though his own theory of the *minima visibilia* refutes his assertion)—my assertion is that the qualities of the red rose belong to the real other, *as actions*; while the objectivity is appearance. Thus we do not "impute" either the quality "red" to the spatio-temporal contour of the object-rose, or the action "red" to the rose as a thing in itself: we *find them there* in both cases.[2] The term "imputation" only has application within the ambiguous perception of our common life, which needs both externality and di-aesthesis, and "bunches them together" uncritically: thus giving rise to problems that have "gravelled" philosophers for centuries.

The same is true in essence, and in some respects even more obviously, of all the content that we apprehend as present in spatio-temporal contours: materiality, based on action and reaction; vitality, based on stimulus and response; mentality, based on rational conversation—in each case we have possession of the other appearing as at a common boundary in space-time, though with increasing discomfort. Only when we come to love does the spatio-temporal appearance at last utterly collapse as incongruous and futile; here neither "imputation" nor "discovery" will serve, but only "possession". The self and its other coalesce to a concrete unity in difference. If we continue to regard the beloved as embodied, that

[1] The "expansion" is less incredible if we remember that "sight" has been extended even on the external view by the optical "batons" that correspond to the blind man's stick in the case of touch. The blind man's hand has, for his di-aesthesis, been transferred to the ferule. So my eye touches the Great Nebula, and rests upon Orion.

[2] I will go so far as to say that the real "rose" *enacts* red—and does so consciously, in so far as it is capable of acting consciously. Thus also the reddened retina of my eye enacts red, and consciously when the optical "batons" are working badly through some error of focussing. Cf. also Descartes's remarks on night-vision in cats in *La Dioptrique*, Discours I.

identity is bifurcated, and we experience love as physical contact, as physiological intercourse, as social co-operation, as "the marriage of true minds", as a complete understanding; but love as it is in itself, is that identity of self and other that is ideally expressed as "the infinite love wherewith God loves himself." For this is the full self-possession of his creative nature (*Natura naturans*) in the full expression of that nature (*Natura naturata*). In God the two are necessarily one, because the other is not given, but is a perfect self-creation: in us, because the other is given, their union is contingent. Nevertheless, it is possible, for, as I have said: we are no mere sections of nature, but real parts of it; not dead finites, but self-transcending finites, or finite-infinites.[1]

In all knowledge of objects, then, there is a simultaneous opposition and co-operation of self and other: so far as the other limits the self, it appears as spatio-temporal; so far as it is its opportunity, its "opening", the spatio-temporal contour is occupied by quality or technique. That content is apprehended by possession. In so far as we possess the action that is colour, or sound, or touch, we find it in the other; in so far as we possess the action that is materiality, we find it in the other; as we possess the action that is life, we find it in the other. And we find each truly only where it is to be found, though under the categories of our impotence, i.e. in spatio-temporal contours: we apprehend objects as active—though in truth only selves can be active. The activity that we impute to objects is a derived activity, or relative degradation of it: motion, causation, instinct, technique, viewed as operating among objects, are exiles in a strange land. Yet they are not exiles to the self that acts: because I am material, I can grasp and make use of the materiality of the stocks and stones; because I am living, I can enter into and respond to the vitality of the animal; because I am a knowing mind, I can understand and converse with the minds of other men; because I am active, I can understand and co-operate with the endeavours of my fellow men; in so far as I love, I can possess the action of the beloved, and be possessed, for this is love's technique. It is thus that spatio-temporal contours become objects; sense-data become things; the physical, vital; the vital, animate; the animal, intelligent; and man, a god.[2] It is thus also that artifacts become "works of art"; the politician, a statesman; and the moralist, a saint. We may, indeed, go so far as to describe the interaction of material things, the intercourse of living things, the communion of minds, as their "love" for one another; for love lays bare "the pith and marrow of our attribute". Knowledge of objects is the nostalgia of the self *dépaysé* by otherness.

[1] Cf. B.D.S. *Eth.* V, xxxvi.

[2] "He said, 'Ye are gods' . . . unto whom the divine apprehension was given" (John x. 35).

Thus our original "dissatisfaction with the *form* of knowledge as such", that destroyed our confidence in all the objects with which knowledge has to do, is at once established and mitigated by a closer scrutiny of the *content* of knowledge. We have found that no actual object is entirely constituted by objectivity; though by its objectivity it must needs be infected and vitiated. Even the objects of pure dynamics are possible only through the inclusion of action that is not objective: nay, the very contours of space-time are expanded, and determined, and sustained, by action. And the elaboration of scientific knowledge concerning more and more concrete objects: material, organic, animate, conscious, involves an increasing reliance upon internality and action; by which space-time progressively loses its pre-eminence. So the form of knowledge is qualified by its content, its objectivity by technique, and with increasing intimacy as knowledge perfects itself in love: for love is pure technique.[1] Thus while the form of knowledge divides the object from the subject, and thus desubstantializes both; the content of knowledge is their reunion and reconciliation. The ghostly things in themselves are realized as knowledge blossoms into love; meanwhile, the external objects with their prima facie ineluctable givenness and impenetrable solidity, and all the mighty frame of things in limitless space and unending time, correspondingly "vanish away into nothing, by a regular and just diminution."

My adventure is at an end; we have explored the labyrinth together, and come safely out at last. The ghosts that first startled us have established themselves as the soul and essence of reality; the objects that seemed so real have been shown in their true colours as the essential "double gangers", with space-time as the ghost *par excellence*. And so, though bitten desperately by a deeper even than Cartesian doubt,

"The man recovered of the bite,
The dog it was that died!"

[1] Cf. Descartes, *Meditations*, Reply to Obj. V, Med. iii, sect. 10.

THE AESTHETIC DOCTRINES OF SAMUEL ALEXANDER

LORD LISTOWEL, Ph.D.

THOSE, like the present writer, for whom the late Samuel Alexander unlocked doors to new realms of wisdom and delight, or who basked in the sunshine of encouragement and kindly advice he gave so readily to younger men, will understand with what alacrity this opportunity was seized of paying a small tribute to the memory of so unusual and attractive a personality. To resurrect the mind that has built of its own fabric a mansion so vast that its chambers have room for every fact of experience and every theory of science will always provide a happy and appropriate memorial to one whose main business in life was the disinterested speculation idolized by the Greeks as the worthiest employment to which the human spirit can devote its powers. My own share in this labour of love is small and limited in scope; I want to fill in one corner of the picture of Alexander's philosophical system, drawn by Professor Muirhead in the last number of *Philosophy*, by describing in some detail what he thought about Art and Beauty in their most important aspects and relations.

If one were to venture a conclusion from the sheer bulk and volume of Alexander's philosophical writings, one would say with little hesitation that aesthetics was his youngest, and after metaphysics, his favourite child. Putting ontology on one side as naturally the most serious topic for a born system-builder, nourished from intellectual infancy on the Bradleyan tradition, there was no branch of philosophy to which he devoted more time and study, or about which he wrote more voluminously and talked more incessantly, than the theory of the Beautiful. Prior to the production in 1920 of his *magnum opus*, he managed to find leisure in the interstices of teaching for one book on ethics and another on epistemology, but from that date until his death last summer, a span of eighteen consecutive years, he was constantly reading papers and publishing pithy manifestos on aesthetics alone of the many subjects that might have absorbed the unfettered attention of his final period. It has happened on numberless occasions that a poet's creative impulse burned brightest in the years of his youth, growing steadily dimmer and more pedestrian with the passage of time; but crabbed age, with its passionless serenity and detachment from personal preoccupations, is more usually the blooming season for philosophy.

It was certainly no disadvantage to Samuel Alexander that he took the plunge into aesthetics from the topmost pinnacle of fame, at a moment when he was already recognized on all sides as the leading spirit of his generation in British philosophy, and long after the laurels of academic prowess and professional success had lost whatever glamour they may once have had. In the cool evening of his life there was nothing left to distract him from the single-minded quest of truth.

But why, of the many unsailed seas he must have been tempted to chart, did his insatiable curiosity launch him on a last voyage into the rough waters of aesthetic theory? There is no certain answer to this question. What we do know is that the third person of the hallowed trinity whose members are Truth, Goodness, and Beauty had hitherto been sadly neglected as compared with the first two, and that a treatise on aesthetics was urgently required as the coping stone of a neatly finished philosophical system. Yet it would be a grievous error to suppose that his fondness for the subject was due solely or even mainly to systematic grounds. Art, in its manifold shapes, attracted him irresistibly, and poetry in the wide sense most of all; Professor Muirhead has described his habit of reciting great chunks of Shelley to his friends.

His temperament was not that of the cold-blooded intellectuals whose main interest in a work of art is that of a surgeon in the corpse he has successfully dissected. The wealth of illustration in his writings afford us a glimpse—rare enough in a philosopher—of one who wrote and talked about Art because he really loved the pictures, statues, mansions, poems, novels, and plays that are its concrete manifestations. Communion with the fictitious characters of the dramatist and the inanimate figures of the sculptor or the painter was much easier from him than communication with real people, and one likes to think that much of the happiness denied him by his infirmity in personal relations was given back by a closer intimacy with the more distinguished inhabitants of an imaginary universe. However that may be, the meticulous care he himself paid to the manner in which his ideas were expressed showed a keen appreciation of and a high esteem for verbal artistry. No writer practised more faithfully than he the precept he laid down about words being used by the literary artist for their own sake, and not as mere handcarts in which meanings are trundled about from one mind to another. Not that he ever allowed the philosopher in him to play second fiddle to the artist; his prose, for all the richness and harmony of its texture, is forged in the first instance to yield perfect clarity of definition, to sustain rigorous argument, and to convey to his readers the logical structure corresponding in the mind of man to the material structure of the world about us. A

Pater or a Flaubert would probably have despised him as a mere craftsman.

He had in full measure those blessed gifts of good taste and minor executive ability that aesthetic theory can no more educe from the ungifted than racial theory can bestow blue eyes and flaxen hair upon the most naïve believers in Aryan superiority. Besides, the range of his appreciation was not limited by exclusive attachment to any single branch of fine art, or by an engrossing enthusiasm for any one school or style, classical or romantic, ancient or modern, to the detriment of the many other off-shoots of the artistic faculty in the last five thousand years of history. His appetite for Beauty was insatiable, and his sensibility responded like a well-tuned instrument to every note that was struck upon it. One important and unhappy limitation does, however, deserve mention. The deafness that plagued him throughout his life, and grew painfully worse in his later years—one could only speak to him latterly through the black sound-box of an electrical instrument—shut him off from what many of us still believe with Schopenhauer to be the queen of all the arts. For he listened to music at second hand, with the ears of competent but often one-sided critics, and that explains why his comments on the purest of the arts are scanty and strangely unsatisfactory as compared with what he writes about things seen or read with his own eyes.

Such was the psychological background of the most interesting contribution to a clear intellectual grasp of Art and Beauty made by any English writer on these topics since the time of Bosanquet. And now let me sketch, quite briefly and in broadest outline, Alexander's attitude to the principal problems, philosophical and psychological, of aesthetics. Nowhere in his writings do we find any definition or even discussion of the nature and scope of the most recent outgrowth from the main stem of philosophy. We can only infer from the field over which he roams in the course of his inquiries that the object he is studying covers the whole range of our experience of the Beautiful in art and nature, and the relation in which it stands to our experience of the other values and to the total, all-inclusive reality of which our reflective consciousness is aware. The method of his research into this miscellaneous bunch of problems is the method he used throughout his philosophical work, the empirical method that leads from observed facts to broad generalizations and back again to the stubborn particulars by which they must be verified. It would be platitudinous nowadays to mention the *a posteriori* method in aesthetics were it not for certain Italian thinkers who still sin against the light. It is perhaps remarkable that Alexander never succumbed to the temptation that besets a system-builder to squeeze facts willy nilly into the logical strait-

jacket of his preconceptions. His happy blending of Herbert Spencer's patient empiricism with the bolder systematic sweep of Bradley and the giant figures of German idealism was nowhere more fruitful than in his treatment of aesthetics.

The more technically philosophical aspect of his intellectual task was to compare and contrast Beauty with the other members of the value trinity, to locate the rightful place of their common parent in the scheme of things, and to decide whether the Beautiful is a simple quality of outside objects or born of their relation to an artist's mind; for axiology, ontology, and epistemology are inalienable perquisites of the professional philosopher. Let us take as our starting-point his definition of value, and follow out the path described by one of its consequences. "Value," he says in the second volume of *Space, Time, and Deity*, "in its greatest dilution and least intention is the relation between things in virtue of which one satisfies a want of another." Now as "wants" and their "satisfaction" permeate and pervade everything everywhere, and as possible sources of "satisfaction" are as varied and numerous as the "wants" they cater for, a value is not a prerogative of man or a faint gleam of what is changeless and abiding amid the flux of nature. Beauty, whatever the Platonic philosophers and theologians may say, is no better equipped than Goodness or Truth to furnish a short cut to a transcendent reality, for like all our values it is relative to the mentality of human beings and its future is inextricably bound up with their history upon earth. A little more humility, a little stricter impartiality, would convince us that the universe is not moulded to accommodate the needs and desires of our puny selves, but rather that our noblest cravings and boldest aspirations are simply a special instance of ordinary happenings observable at every level of organic and inorganic being. Thus it is that we have below the philosophical values those "psychological" values which spring from the satisfaction of our biological urges,—hunger, thirst, sexual need—the "economic" values arising from the relation between material wants and a limited number of material goods, and the "instinctive" values pervading animal and plant life from the complex organism of the anthropoid apes down to the pullulating unicellular families of ultra-microscopic bacteria. Descending yet lower in the scale of being, we find the drama of worth being vigorously enacted by the atoms and molecules of inorganic matter; for lo and behold, the lordly and bivalent oxygen atom refuses stoutly to be satisfied by anything less than the constant attendance of two hydrogen atoms. And what about the irresistible fascination, termed "natural election" by Professor Laird, of a magnet for the iron filings that fly like a flock of lovers to its embrace? It would seem, indeed, that wherever two things are related in time and space, they have a value for one another.

In the evolutionary cosmogony of Alexander, values in the narrower and human sense are the highest and most recent emergent from a changing but progressive universe. The infinite and everlasting space-time continuum—surely a modern version of Spinoza's substance—which encompasses all that is and carries in its womb all that is to be, has blossomed forth at immense intervals, by a process of spontaneous emergence, into the whirlwind dance of electrons, into the delicate tissues of living organisms, into the sudden light of consciousness, and into the rapturous awareness of values or ideals, and is still in travail with an unborn God who will be as superior to the most god-like man as he now is to the sanguinary carnivores of the jungle. Such, very briefly, is the relative but elevated function of Beauty in the life of man, and its proper status in the boundless empire of nature.

If we probe deeper into the separate values that lend dignity to personality and provide a fixed purpose among a welter of conflicting aims, we shall find that their worth derives from the satisfaction they give to certain deep-seated impulses we all share. Thus Beauty, we are told, "is that which satisfies the constructive impulse used contemplatively," while Goodness gratifies the social or herd impulse of the virtuous man and Truth slakes the disinterested curiosity of the scientist and philosopher. As seen from the viewpoint of the relative importance of mind and its environment in the manufacture of value, fine art, in which the artist mixes in some sort his personality with his materials, stands mid-way between Goodness and Truth. For in science the brute facts of nature control and direct the mind, whereas virtue appertains to motives and draws all its nourishment from volitional sources. But these superficial differences only serve to mask an underlying identity; for Truth is the intellectual awareness of reality, the reflective self-consciousness of the whole unconscious universe, and therefore includes within its boundaries the Good and the Beautiful as well as much that is actively opposed or stonily indifferent to these highest values.

It might not unnaturally be supposed that so intransigent a realist as Alexander would have joined the school of thought that has singled out some common characteristic of external objects, such as the form with which they have been invested by natural forces or in which they have been moulded by man, as the hall-mark of the Beautiful in art and nature. Not so, however, for a mind sufficiently elastic to respond to the rich variety of experience. The "tertiary" qualities of things cannot be regarded like their "primary" and "secondary" qualities as real properties of the objects to which we attribute them, for Beauty does not belong to the full-blown rose in the same sense as its contour, its size, its colour, its texture, or its fragrance. These so-called qualities are in fact the product of a

unique combination of mind and matter, of subject and object, being a superior mongrel bred of the undeclared marriage between man and nature. "In every value" we are told in the second volume of *Space, Time, and Deity*, "there are two sides, the subject of valuation and the object of value, and the value resides in the relation between the two and does not exist apart from them." This happy compromise between realism and idealism enabled Alexander to avoid the pitfall of an undiluted subjectism as successfully as the snare of a naïve objectivism in aesthetics; for there can be no glimmer of Beauty in the universe without the work of art as well as the artist, without the sunset or the starlit sky as well as their human witness, without an assortment of material objects in an outside world as well as minds that people it with the animated figments of their happiest dreams.

An obvious but paradoxical conclusion is that when we wax enthusiastic about the beauty of natural scenery, we are really praising our own artistic perception of what would be a matter of utter indifference to the philistine onlooker or the domestic cat. The so-called "beauty" of nature is an illusion that not even Ruskin could shatter, for it is we who clothe its naked limbs with fine raiment spun from the thread of our own imaginations. In a pamphlet on *Art and Nature*, Alexander states as follows the problem as he saw it and its solution: "Does nature of herself possess beauty as what the philosophers call a tertiary quality? That is the question of my discourse, and the answer I am about to give is that she does not and that nature and works of nature possess beauty only so far as they are converted into works of art." It follows from this that we are all artists to a greater or a lesser degree when we discover beauty in the countryside, in the sea, or in the sky, and, like a painter or a poet, that we read into the impassive countenance of nature the storm and sunshine of the human soul. The relation of art to nature cannot be that of a copy to its original, and even the landscape painter never "imitates" literally a pleasing scene, for the artist's creative imagination is the common source of Beauty both in the fine arts and among the phenomena of nature. So much for the narrowly philosophical side of Alexander's aesthetics; let us now pass on to his proposed solution of the remaining problems that confronted him.

Writers on aesthetics do not seem as yet to have been able to agree as to where they should look in order to lay a finger on the essence of our experience of the Beautiful. Philosophers have often found in the keenest appreciation of art or nature a direct revelation of some transcendent reality, psychologists have concentrated the bulk of their attention upon the frame of mind of the spectator, while those rare critics and art historians who have speculated about the nature of the fine arts have usually confined their inquiries

to an analysis of its products. The most original feature of Alexander's theory of aesthetics is that he goes for its backbone neither to the keen enjoyment of the spectator nor to the material work of fine or applied art, but to the process of artistic production, exemplified in the labours of the creative artist. In this connection, there is a revealing *obiter dictum* on the views of Lipps at the end of a letter dated April 30, 1933; there he writes: "I have a suspicion, which may not be well-grounded, that he (i.e. Lipps) takes too much the point of view of appreciation and I like to approach the subject from the point of view of creation."

Now though the production of works of art depends to some extent on the technical procedure and the raw materials employed, it is an event in which the imagination and the emotions of the artist play the leading role. And being a psychological manifestation, it can only be studied scientifically with the assistance of psychological science. Alexander was never afraid to make use of psychology when it could help him to throw light on the problems of aesthetics. And, indeed, when he is not engaged in discussing purely philosophical questions, he is usually applying psychology to a sphere of mind which the professional psychologist has rarely ventured to explore.

Following in the footsteps of Herbert Spencer, Alexander tries to disentangle from among the manifold tendencies and impulsions that direct human actions the conative source peculiar to the activity of the artist. But he does not attempt to resuscitate the long-discredited impulse to play; instead he traces the origins of art to a sublimated and unpractical urge to material construction. According to the psychology of McDougall, it is an irresistible constructive instinct that sets the beaver to build, the bird to nest, and the nightingale to sing. In man, this primordial instinct ceases to be blind and becomes purposive though still subordinate to biological need, and we have the products of his handicrafts which are soon followed by the mechanical marvels of his technological inventiveness. Finally, emancipating himself from the dull task of providing for his daily needs, he begins to make things for the sheer joy of making them and without a thought for their usefulness or profitableness; the humble breadwinner at last becomes an artist. To use the writer's own words in his pamphlet on *Art and Instinct*: "The thesis which I submit to you is that the aesthetic impulse and the aesthetic emotion which goes with that impulse and is part and parcel of it are an outgrowth from the instinct of constructiveness, and are that impulse or instinct when it has become first human, and next, contemplative."

In his early comparison between "artistic" and "cosmic" creation, he explains why the former event is not a prototype of the latter,

and has no metaphysical significance. The brilliance and clarity of this psychological theory of artistic creation should not blind us to the fact that it is based on a more than doubtful analogy between animal instinct and human design, and that it ignores much of the little psychological material that has been collected by students of what is probably the toughest problem in aesthetics. It is difficult not to be persuaded that Alexander's most original contribution to the subject is also his most fragile, and that no aspect of his aesthetic doctrine is less likely to survive the legitimate criticism of his successors.

In his treatment of the arts he is at pains to dissociate himself from the popular fallacy of Croce, according to whom a work of art is made of mental stuff, being an "intuition" or "expression," and its material embodiment is merely a practical convenience whereby the artist shares his imaginative conception with like-minded people. He maintains, in contradistinction to this view, that the artist's material actively influences his conception of the object he is fashioning or composing, and that the growth of a poem or a portrait goes on *pari passu* with the recitation of the verses and the brush work of the painter. There is a familiar ring about Alexander's emphasis upon the synthesis of form and content in the finished work of art when one calls to mind the unity of "characteristic" and "abstract" expressiveness in which Bosanquet summarizes the thesis of his *History of Aesthetics.*

The skill of the artist lies in his capacity for "imputing" a "meaning" to materials in themselves emotionally neutral by moulding them so that they become suggestive and eloquent to all beholders of the tenderness and defiance and despair, of the striving and the conflict, that stir in the depths of the struggling and sensitive soul. But a human significance can only be acquired by dumb, inexpressive objects when they have been invested with a form they lacked in the raw state, and there is as it were an organic relationship between the form or pattern of a work of art and its significance for the spectator. In the representative arts it is easy enough to distinguish between the subject and its formal treatment, but in abstract arts like architecture or textiles the two are fused and the subject is no more than the form itself. In his last publication on the subject of aesthetics, originally a broadcast lecture, he writes as follows of the unity of form and content: "The artist's imputation of himself to his materials is represented by the form which he gives them." It would be a simple matter to show that this act of "imputation" is extremely similar in character to what earlier writers have called "aesthetic Einfühlung" or "Empathy," and that Alexander is here re-stating in his own terminology one of the cardinal tenets of modern aesthetics.

Branching out from the parent stem you get the separate members

of the two related families of fine and applied art, and each of these derives an individual flavour from the material—words, tones, pigments, clay, glass, etc.—used by the artist to embody and express his imaginative vision. Raw material in the crude state is thus a convenient principle for dividing art into its component elements. A distinction of some importance that Alexander liked to draw was between "beauty" and "greatness" in the arts. The latter quality is conferred by the subject-matter alone, so that a drama can be both beautiful and great, whereas a Chinese vase or a Persian carpet must content themselves to be just beautiful. Thus it is that supreme poets like Dante, Sophocles, or Shakespeare, bring right home to us the mystery of life and death, reveal the tragic conflict between the forces of good and evil in the world, and show us by the enchantment of their impassioned language how courage and generosity can overcome the sluggish egoism that fetters the majority of human beings. Poets of this order are also, as Shelley claimed in his celebrated *Defence of Poetry*, prophets and preachers who turn the eyes of the multitude away from the trivialities of the daily round towards the shining heights of moral and intellectual achievement. It is not often that aestheticians have laid so much emphasis on the intellectual content of an artistic object; but the stress is natural enough in a philosopher, and especially in one for whom poetry was an adored favourite among the arts. In this respect Alexander shares Volkelt's partiality for a "menschlichbedeutungsvoller Gehalt" wherever anything of profound human significance can suitably be enshrined and imparted by a work of art.

It follows from the conception of art as a mixing of the artist with his materials, and from an interpretation of natural beauty according to which the spectator is an artist travelling incognito even to himself, that there is an element of "illusion" in the appreciation of both art and nature. The "illusion" lies in our spontaneous attribution to physical objects of mental qualities they do not really possess. A vibrating string is neither glad nor sorrowful, a solid mass of marble or bronze is neither heroic nor defiant, a large volume of salt water neither laughs nor rages nor laments. Yet the aesthetic "illusion" is not a mere perceptual error or a mistaken judgment because we do not attribute the illusory quality to a real object as one of its genuine and lasting properties, but rather indulge in a passing fancy that we know full well to be fictitious for the duration and for the sake of the aesthetic experience. The pleasure inspired in us by things of beauty is the purely subjective side of the reaction, for it cannot be shared with or communicated to others. It is a private reverberation set up in our minds by communion with the beautiful in art or nature, and should not be regarded as an intrinsic element of the essential experience.

The obverse of this private side to our reactions in face of art and nature, a factor that fluctuates according to the sensibility of individual art lovers, is the public side that seems universally communicable and enables us to speak of standards of taste having general validity. The standard judgments of approbation and disapprobation, with all the fine shades that lie between the two, are laid down once and for all by the critical verdicts of the practised art critics, the connoisseurs, and the artists themselves, and in so far as our personal judgment approximates to or agrees with this standard aesthetic judgment we have good taste or the reverse. The objectivity and universal validity of the standard judgment is guaranteed in the last instance by the identity between the perfect critic's mind in the moment of contemplative delight and the imaginative vision of the artist himself. Actual diversity of taste in art can be accounted for as an aberration from the common norm due to the interference of personal idiosyncracies or to the lack of sensibility among the cohorts of the indifferent. This bears out the commonsense view that what we actually like is not by any means always what we should like, and that taste can be improved by cultivation or allowed to deteriorate through neglect.

A word or two to wind up this exposition of Alexander's views about his attitude to the minor but interesting problem of the aesthetic categories. He starts by explicitly repudiating the Crocean denial of the very existence of these different types of experience, and sets out to describe a number of them in considerable detail. Curiously enough, he has nothing to tell us about the most fascinating variety of all from the standpoint of the philosopher—I mean tragedy and the tragic. That he had spent on this problem much time and thought is evident from a passage in a letter dated May 5, 1935: "I am now reading Volkelt's *Ästhetik des Tragischen*, and it's a very good book, but it could have been said in half the span." What conclusions he reached, or why he was unable to reach any at all, we shall never know. Caution forbids him to generalize broadly about "comedy or the comic spirit." But he relished the comic talent of Molière and offers us a theory of his type of comedy, according to which its essence is the humorous contrast between the average, commonsensical person who faithfully observes the social conventions, and the foibles and follies of those eccentrics who resent them and find the courage to rebel against them.

The beautiful in the narrow sense is that which lends itself to effortless aesthetic enjoyment apart from its handling by an artist, while the ugly is what in nature is repulsive or repellent but is transmuted into something aesthetically attractive by the skilful touch of the painter or the poet. This distinction is based on the subject-matter of the work of art, and follows Bosanquet's contrast between

"easy" and "difficult" beauty. It is strange that in this connection he has nothing to say about the graceful. In his treatment of the sublime he sticks closely to A. C. Bradley's superb essay. Sublimity is a more than ordinary greatness in man or nature whereof the magnitude does not exceed our powers of imaginative sympathy. It is a "difficult" variety to appreciate because we must overcome the initial disharmony of terror or dismay by a strong effort of self-control before we can sympathize imaginatively with the awe-inspiring grandeur of the sublime object. He concludes these observations by an interesting and original discussion of the sharp contrast between the "classical" and "romantic" styles in art. He attributes their difference to the relative emphasis laid by the artist on the subjective and objective elements in the work of art; thus romantic art is more personal and has greater warmth of emotion, while classical art is colder and more impersonal in conception.

In this essay I have contented myself with displaying Alexander's wares as prominently as possible in my shop window, with just here and there a sentence of praise or blame for what I estimate to be their quality; to have succumbed to the temptation of writing a critical study would have transformed my small effort from a brief article into a stoutish book. Yet I would not care to bid farewell to the friend and philosopher whose opinions I have endeavoured to describe in these pages without one last word about his rightful place, so far as I am able with my scanty qualifications to judge, as an aesthetician among his fellow aestheticians and in the British tradition of speculation on this sorely neglected philosophical topic.

I scarcely think he would himself have claimed to be in the same class as certain continental authorities who have covered the whole field in systematic fashion; he lacked the time and, with advancing years, the energy to emulate the detailed and exhaustive inquiries of the greatest experts. Acknowledging an article I had sent him on British aesthetics, published in a German periodical, he wrote at the end of November 1934: "I accept humbly your reproaches of my want of vigour to do something really thorough and systematic. What I may yet contrive to do I don't know—but I think I can be most useful in taking up special topics." And so we had to content ourselves with the published lectures and papers on a number of these special topics, as a substitute for the slender volume we dared not hope to see.

Yet among English writers on aesthetics, it would be hard to find a compeer in the ranks of his contemporaries, and even harder would it be to fill the gap he has left from among the rare aestheticians of the present day. The mantle of Bosanquet had fallen on his shoulders, and he wore it worthily though with a difference; for there is not one of the main problems of aesthetics, whether philosophical,

psychological, or objective, that he did not illuminate by a treatment that was always fair and quite often original. No English philosopher who has grappled with this thorny subject in recent years better repays the student for his midnight oil, as well for his clear formulation of the essential problems and the spirit in which he advanced to meet them as for the theories he evolved for their solution.

In academic circles Croce was hailed at this time as the thinker who had said all but the last word on aesthetics, and the two stout volumes of his *Aesthetic* had become the vade-mecum of the average university lecturer and professor interested in the subject; but Alexander was not afraid to challenge orthodoxy when it became an excuse for loose thinking or a source of erroneous conclusions. He mentions Croce often in his writings, but it is almost always to refute a misleading fallacy to which the Neapolitan idealist had given currency. He was a scholar in the true sense of the word, being familiar with all the leading authorities on his subject in the English, French, Italian, and German tongues. Judging from occasional conversations and some intermittent correspondence, I should say that his favourite authors were some voluminous and erudite Germans, whose work was so sound and thorough that he even forgave them the weariness of spirit caused by their native prolixity. He had a special liking for Dessoir, whose *Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* he was anxious I should translate. "Dessoir," he wrote in the spring of 1933, "seems to me so sane as well as complete." I cannot myself conceive how a man with so many intellectual interests and attainments was able to read the prodigious number of books on one subject alone to which his scholarship testified. How well I remember my crestfallen astonishment when, soon after the publication of a history of modern aesthetics in which I cited with scholarly pride upwards of two hundred volumes in various languages, I received a letter from Alexander reminding me in the kindest way of two or three authors of some distinction who had escaped my attention. This was a shining example of those rare qualities of heart and mind that made Samuel Alexander one of the most encyclopaedic scholars as well as one of the most inspiring and original thinkers in the long history of English philosophy.

PHILOSOPHY AS ACTION

Professor J. W. SCOTT.

In studying the problems of philosophy, it is commonly considered an advantage to approach them through the history of philosophy. But to be compelled to spread one's sails, and take one's solitary course, "as if no Plato or Kant had ever existed," has perhaps its advantages too.

At any rate, the work of Professor Levy[1] has shown what a courageous Marxian scientist can do in that kind. Leaving tradition on one side, and looking chiefly to physical and mathematical research, he sets down what seems to him obvious about the universe as known to science; and the result is a "philosophy for a modern man" which not only is accepted of the people, but which the people seem to have rushed to read; and which, apparently, they came in crowds to hear discoursed of, in public, by its author.

The achievement exacts a tribute; and if, as philosophy, it should be found by the orthodox to be obnoxious to every criticism and to "sail unconcerned through all the charted shoals," the tribute will still be sincere. After all, why should foot-looseness be other than a virtue in a modern thinker? These are days of revision. And in the past the philosophical path-breaker has often enough sat free from the libraries. Spencer did it. And no less a thinker than Thomas Hobbes was also guilty. Did not Hobbes presume to write philosophy before, in the opinion of his contemporaries, he had mastered the literature of the subject? And wasn't it he who met their taunt with the memorable rejoinder, "if I had read as many books as my friends, I should have known as little"?

Any lacunae that may exist in Professor Levy's philosophical scholarship have nothing to do with his knowledge of what he knows. And if the reading he takes, of what he knows, is being eagerly received by intelligent sections of the public as philosophy, the challenge to any who, like myself, may disagree, is: not to be content with weakly complaining that old-fashioned Naturalism is being taught again, but to make some shift to exhibit the fallacy—doing this, if we will, in the strength of what Plato or Kant may have taught us, but in any event, without talking Plato or Kant.

[1] This article is the substance of an address on Professor Levy's *A Philosophy for a Modern Man*, given at the Left Book Club summer school, 1938, under the title: *Some Reflections on Professor Levy's View of the Social Situation.*

It is on this kind of difficult adventure that I am daring to embark in the series of reflections I am offering here.

And in the course of them—it may be well to say at once—I shall not attempt to submit any alternative reading of the social situation. The latter, I can see, would alone be constructive criticism. Moreover, Professor Levy's work more than usually deserves it. For it itself means to be practical. It is a metaphysic, by intention; and like all the best work of metaphysical type, it is entangled in "the web of thought and action"—to employ a phrase of the author's own. It conceives itself, in fact, to be a work thrown up by a movement which is engaged in "making history"; and to be such that, assimilated by the people in this movement, it will equip them better for their practical task. If a difference between the naturalistic teaching which it purveys and another type of teaching be worth establishing at all, I recognize that the difference ought to be capable of statement in terms of some alternative conception of social progress and social destiny. I am not prepared to say whether any other type of metaphysic is thus competent. I only wish to acknowledge the legitimacy of the demand, while resigning myself, for the present, to the pursuit of a much narrower aim; an aim hardly even in the full sense critical; my object being little more than to show the grounds, if I can find them, of a certain personal dissatisfaction with Professor Levy's position, a dissatisfaction which I admit is easier to feel than to articulate and define.

I can at once expose the place where it is felt. It comes most clearly to the surface in the principle of his practical proposals. As metaphysician he finds reality to consist of "groups." Whatever we isolate as a "thing," in the widest sense of that word, proves to be a group. For example, the Marxist movement can be isolated as something. But *qua* "isolate," it is one of many "in history and in nature," in which "groups of people linked together, or groups of things, or of ideas, intertwine and intereact." The metaphysical question concerns these groups. "What settles their nature and their order?" An answer is sought in the changes they undergo, and the laws of those changes. And the naturalistic bias appears at once in the assumption that a group is a group, and is under one and the same set of laws, whether it be of men or insects, of atoms or stars or ideas. "When it is a group of things . . . scientists study it; when of human beings . . . it is important to scientific Socialists."

The above citations are from Professor Levy's preliminary page describing "What this book is about."[1] The description is fully

[1] *A Philosophy for a Modern Man*, p. 10.

borne out by the sequel. The book offers us a strictly scientific metaphysic, which is made to point the direction from which the chief contemporary human problems are to expect their solution. And its answer to the main question, namely what we are to do about the social situation—or at least the principle of its answer—is: *Put science on the throne, and let us hear a great deal less of reckonings taken from another order of things than the scientific.*

These last words are not quoted. But I believe they are fair. The moment they are understood, it is easy to feel a certain intellectual mistrust. For people oriented to another than the natural-scientific order of reality have been very common in the world, and the social order is very difficult to conceive without them. But it is easier to feel this massive necessity for something other than the natural, than to locate the grounds of it in terms of Professor Levy's own discourse; which yet seems the only thing much worth doing.

I should have found my mistrust easier to locate if I could have been sure that I saw the precise bearing of certain entertaining, and intrinsically perfectly lucid chapters in the body of the work, which carry the main burden of presenting the scientific background of the whole.

Their general theme is the changing qualities of things. The point of underlying interest seems to be the idea of miraculous change. A distinction is made between change by gradual increments, and real or drastic change. And evidence is accumulated to show that drastic change needs no miracle. Gradual changes culminate in drastic change, of themselves. You drive a submarine through water faster and faster, accumulating increments of change, or in another phrase "intensifying" a "quality"; or you speed up a piece of shafting; or you whip a skipping-rope round more and more times per minute; or you make the load on a girder heavier and heavier; or bend a stick further and further.[1] In every case you accumulate increments of a quality, and you can go on at this till, in ordinary parlance, you break something. Whether it be a case of driving, or whirling, or whipping, or loading, or bending, the increments are due to some "external activating cause"; and their end is "drastic" change.

There is a rationale of this. If Q be the external cause—say the bending force exerted on a stick—we can see that, besides occasioning the stick to change its shape and thus intensify its bentness by increments, the external cause gives rise to a secondary cause, within the substance of the stick; namely, a certain stretching and dislocation of the fibres. And we also see that the bent stick ultimately breaks—a change of quality, or drastic change. Here, causal

[1] *A Philosophy for a Modern Man*, pp. 98 ff.

responsibility for the change "shifts from what was the primary cause of the mere sharpening in quality, to a secondary internal cause, which is itself brought into being by the external cause." When the critical point comes, and the crack or break is precipitated, we have a "change of phase." A quality, the bent-ness, had just been going through a whole phase of changes. It is now dispossessed. It is gone. It gives place to *another quality*, the broken-ness, which perhaps may undergo a new phase of changes, as when, having broken the stick, one might proceed to twist, continuing to do so until, by cumulative increments, the two pieces come apart—which is another crisis and "change of phase." Drastic change, apparently, is always on this wise. We have here a "general qualitative law of change" which, we are told, is "usually referred to, in Hegelian terminology, as the passage of quantity into quality." But since we are now seeking to disclose an identical scientific law, embracing the phases of change which occur in social, as well as those occurring in physical fields, further inquiry into the Hegelian context is not called for. "What we are seeking is a generalization that will have a meaning for a succession of qualitative states usually regarded as outside the confines of orthodox science."[1] The main point seems to be that the same law appears n history, as in the physical world, and that no "element of creativeness" is required to account for change in either sphere. To postulate such an element would be "to introduce a special assumption regarding the nature of existence" which "is not only unessential and confusing but stands outside the whole range of human exeprience." It would be to use "a name without an objective referent," to make "an unnecessary *ad hoc* assumption." Whether a change is only a modification of an existing quality or whether it is a transformation, and whether the thing going through it be a piece of wood or a human mind or a social system, no incursion of anything other than the natural is anywhere required.[2]

The abstract scheme of social change is now quite clear. Let Q be the bending force exerted on stick or beam. It "arouses in it, or intensifies in it, a structural quality q"—strain in the fibres—whose intensification is inimical to the continued existence of S, the given state of the substance. "Accordingly, at a critical stage of q the state S is transformed by it into a new qualitative state T. . . . The immediate cause of the intensification of q to its critical value is Q; the immediate cause of the transformation is q." And with the quaint disregard for the meanings of Hegelian terms sanctioned by the Marxist tradition, this kind of process is called dialectical.[3]

[1] *A Philosophy for a Modern Man*, p. 111.

[2] See e.g. *ibid.*, pp. 53 ff.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 112–13.

But another instructive point of identity appears here between the physical and the social types of change. In both cases there are ways of seeking to circumvent the crisis, i.e. of obviating or escaping the effects of the internal cause *q*. In the case of the stick it might be thought that by bending sufficiently slowly, or by putting an indiarubber sleeve round the middle of it, or by some other such device, the break would be averted. But it is, of course, not so. So long as *Q* is operating, you may delay *q*, but you are powerless to prevent its getting into action.[1]

Now, if I could be sure what the incidence of this analogy really is, I think I should find more easily what I am in search of—the exact place at which I have to part company with the author. The nearest I can come to seeing a point in these illustrations is this. Marx's tremendous bid for the "scientific," i.e. for a socialism which was being brought along, not by anyone's ingenuity and cleverness, but by the entire drift of human evolution, led him into disparagement of all the little Utopianisms of the human will. He relies on the economic forces to *take* men somewhere. See e.g. the Preface to his *Critique of Political Economy*. "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their mode of existence, but on the contrary their social existence that determines their consciousness," and so on. But by tracing changes to a double cause, an outer and an inner, *Q* and *q*, our author finds a place for the human factor in the process of social evolution. The "thing" or "isolate" which we call human society is seen to have undergone several distinct phases of incremental change in the course of its history; each having been inaugurated by a drastic change, a transformation, or revolution. Thus there was a slave-holding, a feudal, a capitalistic stage of human society. No stage is static. Each is going through a phase of changes. An "external activating cause" is operating all the time, intensifying the reigning "quality." It makes the slavery always more slavish, the feudalism more pronouncedly feudal, the capitalism more capitalistic, until, in each case, the internal *q* reaches critical value and brings the denouement. Now the great external changing force, in the case of the social "isolate," is technics.[2] "The drive of technique," the author emphasizes, "is . . . the main causal agency which, as it rises, accentuates and enriches . . . the quality of communal life." And "just as a liquid when subjected to heating takes this up by a mutual adjustment and agitational quality of the molecules, so a community, when subject to a growing technical pressure, must show this somehow in the actions of its constituent members."[3] Having thus found

[1] *A Philosophy for a Modern Man*, pp. 125–27.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 190 ff. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

that the *Q* in social change is technical pressure, the author seems to want to stress the fact that *q*, the internal cause, is human. And so human agency gets itself inserted into the Marxian picture. The "agitational quality" shows itself in "what is called the class struggle"; this being, in any period, "an inseparable physical consequence" of technical pressure, i.e. of the way in which production and consumption are organized. This is clearly a process carried on by conscious human beings. Feudalism, let us say, has persisted for a time, despite the onward march of technical improvement. But when it yields at last, it is made to yield by a certain *q*, namely the intervention of men. The "change of phase" only occurs when men have been provoked to a high enough pitch of determination and purpose and clearheadedness and idealism. This, I think, is the position Professor Levy means to endorse. And if so he will, of course, still want to adhere to the earlier position, that it is of no use trying to circumvent the crisis. That would only be putting an indiarubber sleeve round *q*. Such is the net main result of all "Utopian" efforts, as of all others which do not lie back upon the advancing tide, and take as theirs the direction in which the great world itself can be seen to be irresistibly moving.

Now clearly this general picture of the course of human development must make one of the main subjects of study for the "science" which Professor Levy would put upon the throne. And I am compelled to ask, *is it in that case science which he would see in this position of responsibility?* It may be. But if it is, it is certainly science with a difference. I am not sure that he does not even mean it to be science with a difference. And the question by which I am haunted is, whether the difference is enough to fit it for the throne. I know very well what I think would so fit it. It would be such a change as would make it philosophy. Philosophy, in fact, is what it would become, if it could really do the work to which Professor Levy puts it, and which (I think) he thinks it really does—nowadays. For science is not what it was. It has come of age. It has become fit (I think Professor Levy thinks this) *for a new task*; whose nature, however, I find it hard to bring to clarity; but which it is intriguing to me to try to track down. And this I must attempt now to do.

Scattered all over the book,[1] I seem to be continually coming upon some such view as that science should be fit for observing something more now than mere natural facts. It is time it turned to history; and this, without forgetting that it itself is part of the history. In fact the time has come for science to throw *itself* down under the microscope, and see how it *itself* looks among the other facts

[1] Cf. e.g. pp. 96 ff., 154 ff.

that are there. Now we need not forget, though it is a circumstance affecting a long-past speculation, that David Hume tried that. He tried precisely that. He was going to have *science itself* under the microscope, with the world which it gives us; and look at it, as a detached observer should, with no prejudices and no illusions, *abiding by what is there*, like our own Einstein; all with the one result, now well known, but to him sufficiently amazing—that of the thing he thought he had put there, namely science, nothing was to be seen; nothing, that is, of what was essential to it and characteristic of it.

If this indication is anything to steer by, it would appear that there are things which science misses. It misses *itself*. And lest it should seem for a moment that this is nothing of any great account —no disqualification of science for the throne—we must remember that it is only part of a still more disconcerting discovery which Hume made when he turned his scientific glass upon the knower of science, the entity called by his own proper name. *That* had even disappeared. Perceptions he could find in abundance, passions and ideas and impressions; but no possessor of them, no personal ego, no David Hume. He could play a game of backgammon and forget about it. And when he forgot, he believed again in this person. But—what is important for us—science could never find him.

Now I have no wish to drag a particular estimate of a particular historical philosopher into this controversy and shelter behind its authority. I should have to sympathize at once if Professor Levy told me that David Hume had nothing to do with him. At the very most I, as a believer in the usefulness of the history of philosophy, am pointing to a straw on the current. In truth, historical accuracy makes little difference to the argument. The voice that the ear of tradition has heard in Hume, whether it was his real voice or not, is a genuine voice. It is awake now, and is speaking, in all our positivistic approaches to psychology and metaphysics, with precisely the result which has been taken to be Hume's result. If, as psychologist, I seek the aid of the behaviouristic glass, and look within myself, I find that "I" am nothing; just as the substantial world without is also, from the same standpoint, nothing; so that, when Professor Levy asks us to put science in the saddle, with only the proviso that the scientist must see *himself*, now, among his other data, I cannot help wondering if he ever really will. I will put my doubt once more in positive terms. What I am saying is: if we are to enthrone such "science" as will give us man, *and not everything about him except him*, I question if it is science at all that we are asking for, and not philosophy. Science observes; and you cannot observe science; nor yet the intelligent personality whose utterance science is. And an inability to know personality does rather rule out a claim to authority on the social situation, which

is made of persons and is made of nothing else. Any failure to grasp personality, any inadequacy in our conception of selfhood, must write itself out in our social programmes.

But I cannot longer delay making some attempt to say what this "philosophy" is, of which I have been speaking. If persons are hidden from science, what are they to "philosophy"? What does *it* mean that we are to *do* about persons? And at all risks I would seek to answer unambiguously. What philosophy would have us do about persons is, *understand them.* For that alone is how you come at them. And having said this, I suppose I may expect to be asked at once whether our author has *not* been doing this; whether he has in fact been doing anything else than this very thing, with persons. Is not his whole work, I shall be asked, an endeavour to understand their behaviour in the mass?

Let me then amend my answer—even if I have to put it still a little further out of focus, so to speak, in order to get it into focus. When I say *understand* them, I mean *literally walk among them.* The ideal of science is to observe—and keep out. Philosophy is the observer's attempt to plunge in: though, if I may put it so, without shutting his eyes. This step has to be taken. It is the step from thought to action. In making science take it, in making science be active, Professor Levy is pulling science in the direction of philosophy. He calls it philosophy: "a philosophy for a modern man."

Philosophy involves a moment of immersion in, and identification with, something objectively and ideally human. Speaking of history, Spengler says somewhere: "It is the mark of the real appraiser of men, that he understands how the 'other man' is adjusted," and regulates his intercourse with him accordingly. This is the quality of the historian. And he speaks of the difficulty, and the importance, of "the art of appraising . . . some man of the past (say Henry the Lion or Dante) of *living myself into his history-picture so thoroughly that his thoughts, feelings, and decisions take on a character of self-evidence.*" Philosophy is this same living understanding; only, of ideal man. This kind of understanding is really action. It is the inner side of action. It alone can ultimately guide social action.

Society consists of persons; and there is a social problem. Persons, *en masse,* have somehow got wrong in their mutual adjustments. Far from being the beautiful thing they could be, in their "social order," they are become a chaotic crowd, a very formless rabble on the earth. But they are trying to march. They are fumbling for the step. Nay, there is a music, by stepping to which—in their presence—you can give them to find the step. Not the very doing

of this, indeed, but the inner side of the doing of it, *the suspended doing of it*, is philosophy.

The "web of thought and action" is very closely woven. I am persuaded nonetheless that there are two things, either or both of which the writer of any "philosophy for a modern man" can do; and that it makes all the difference whether or not he is conscious of the distinction between them. He can be scientific; and he can lead. He can be the cool, observing scientist; or the warm leader. But there is a hiatus between the first of these two postures and the second, which must not be smoothed down or glossed over, if the science is ever to make itself fit for the throne. One must distinguish the two clearly; and having done so, one must clearly let the one borrow from the other. That done, another attitude is born, which is neither leadership nor science. It is an attitude of sympathy with ideal man. It is an adjustment, *of theory*, to that in the ordinary man in the street which cannot be observed. It is what I call, and what I rather think has been always called, the philosophic attitude. It alone, in the ultimate resort, is socially competent—able to move man man-wards.

Science does not move men. *It observes how they move*, and notes it down. It compiles statistics, draws up indices, makes curves; shows the births, the deaths, the divorces, the curve of suicides in the hot months, and so on. It reveals what happens. And an almost endless amount of work of this kind, such as Professor Levy calls for, still waits undone.[1] But offering men information is not what moves them. What moves men is understanding them; not knowing them, but knowing them as what they are not; knowing them as ideal-men; or, more simply, taking their own inner view of themselves, and carrying it further in the direction in which it wants to go.

We cannot do without science in understanding man and human affairs. But if it is to have sovereignty, if it is to be itself the thing that uses science, its observation and description must graduate into something that will be revelatory of human beings as human. Unless it helps its cool observations by a breath from that atmosphere which moves men, it will never so observe as to be able to indicate effectively the line along which man grows to his satisfaction.

Let us again recall those historical "phases" of which our author speaks.[2] We look at the "isolate," human society. It has a history. Glancing down the course thereof we see phase after phase; always a Q operating without, and slowly pressing some inner q into action, and at last bringing the crack which inaugurates the next phase. All this is observation. Social history is here being passed before

[1] See *A Philosophy for a Modern Man*, pp. 248 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, chap. v.

the camera and recorded. That is not *understanding* men. It is not seeing them from within. But you the observer may be able to come within, and bring all this that you see, with you. If you are lucky you will thereupon find yourself with a gospel, e.g. the Marxian gospel, and thrill men to the marrow. By "coming within" is meant that you lie along men's inner view of themselves, catch that view, enlighten it, broaden it, carry it further. That is action; and *the suspension of that* is the philosophic perspective. I would call it an intellectual attitude of action, or an active observation. And if we would find society, in its living identity, we must approach it in that attitude.

One further point in this aspect of our theme has to be mentioned. It concerns *that which we bring with us* in the moment when we thus come within men's own perspective of themselves. I have called it our observation. But I have qualified it with an adjective. I have called it "active." It is not just observation. It is an observation destined to come within, and already tinted with its destiny. We must be men, not mere observers, while we are doing this observing. We must be men if we are to see men. This means that we must see them with our being, not with our eyes only.

Professor Levy's book takes us to history; and it lets us see a pattern as we glance down the centuries. Everyone would agree that this is the right thing to do if it can be done. My point is that, under his leading, we turn to history seeking a pattern, without having scrutinized what we are taking with us when we go to do the seeking. In all such seeking that is the one important question. Had we, in going to look at history, gone to it equipped with an active understanding of man, of his real make-up, of the destiny shadowed in his structure, of the dialectic inherent in it, then we should have gone to the facts with another selecting-apparatus, and social history would have taken on another aspect; and this, voiced in men's ears, might possibly, for all we know, have given a different practical lead. For instance, it might have planted the flag a little out of line with men's economic interests. In any case, we have to take an understanding of human good with us, into our assessment of history, if we are to get from it a helpful indication of where that obscure wicket-gate lies which leads into the next new phase. Our primary need in all this matter is for balance in our view of the psychological structure of man. We may thereupon hope to clear our ideas concerning what makes him man, the one helpful thought when we are considering the larger questions of social arrangement. We must be content with what little pattern history shows when we look at it as a man-making process. "How is man made man in it?" is the only question we can fruitfully take to history. And no "escapeology" is of any use as an answer.

This brings me within sight, I think, of the exact point at which I must diverge from Professor Levy. He looks at history, and I also try to. But going with a different selecting-apparatus I get a difference in the pattern. What pattern, then, am *I* to say is there? Down what line do *I* see man rolling and staggering, when I go looking in history, as I must do, for some drift of humanity towards manhood?

Hegel's "simple, clean, and noble" view, in all this matter, is of very little service, standing as it does "like a marble temple shining on a hill." But it can be taken as a background: and that chiefly for the following reason.

If the glass, through which we must scan history for a pattern, be an inward view of man, Hegel's glass was at any rate an inward view of man. But he was weak in psychology. He over-rationalized the creature. Hence his "noble" view. The phases of history, for him, are governed, each of them, by an idea—the reigning idea of the time. Keeping to our own scheme we may ask why, e.g., did mankind establish the slave-and-master relationship? "Because at that time," would run the answer, "this was their idea of the best form of social life." And how are we to explain the feudal order? By the fact, again, that it was man's idea of the desirable at a later time. Man, in a word, is intelligent; he has ideas; he tries one conception of what life ought to be and perseveres with it until he discovers it at fault, when he tries another one and a better; working it out through another phase of his development. Thus as a free, creative being, shaping his life always after the last and best idea he has, he climbs the slow spiral of progress. Such is man's movement towards humanity, in Hegel's view.

This view Marx turned upside down. No doubt those leading ideas were there, but they did not make history; rather the reverse; it was history that made them. History takes its own course. It merely throws off all those ideas in the passing—to keep itself right in the eyes of men. True, the leading idea of the period does receive utterance in the period. It finds vehicles for itself in all the features of the reigning culture, books, sermons, politics, pictures, dramas, poems. But all these "spiritual" voices are but the by-product of something that is indifferent to them. Events follow a course of their own. The Great Hunter crashes through the forest, and men get trampled and cry out, or they stand safe and applaud. Their "ideas" are but the expression of that cry. History heeds no such cry. The real track that history follows is that of economic advantage. Plunging down that channel, it carries men's ideas with it like bubbles on a river's surface; which bubbles, Hegel assumes to be directing the stream. They of course think that they are. And Hegel is sympathetically inside them, taking their own

inward view of themselves and carrying it further. But in truth they are like the drunken rider who thinks he is taking the old horse home, when really the old horse is taking him.

I cannot see that Professor Levy, by introducing *q*, alters this position. He would insist, if I am interpreting him rightly, that ideas are something better than bubbles; that they do work; that the revolution cannot come without them. But this is not open to him, on the premises he adopts; which say that they work always at the instigation of a great *Q*, namely, the economic forces. These remain the real causal agent. "Needs and desires, ideas, ethics and morality, science, art, literature, social institutions, social theories," are all derivatives, in his view, from the fundamentals—the stresses and strains of economic life.

This leaves to man, as human, no real agency. And I must moreover dispute the truth of it. In doing so, I am not denying in any way that the spiritual forces *work within* those stresses and strains; if one only means by that that they all work within the laws of nature. But that, surely, is a commonplace. As an individual human creature trying to live a life, I do continually send my ideas scouting ahead of my action; and they do carve out a path for me; and *of course* it is a path in the world, and only within the limits of the nature of the environment. With man in history it is the same. His scouting ideas, if they carve out the course of history, do so always within definite and irremovable limits. No one ascribes omnipotence to ideas. No one claims that *any* idea can do *anything*. When one speaks of ideas one ought not to mean only wild or rotten or foolish ideas. Those do go under. They are carried down the stream. Well that there is a stream to take such debris away! All this is surely common ground. What is between us then? I think it is the view *that when idea calls man in one direction, and economic advantage whispers to him to take another, man can never resist his economic advantage.* Hence history must go where economic advantage leads. Social history must be technological history. To all this, I simply have to demur. I must think that man *can* resist his economic advantage. *When I observe him with my being and not with my eyes only, I seem to observe that fact.*

Perhaps, however, I may be granted this point (or up to a point I may be granted it) by the defender of the economic view of history. The individual, I may be allowed to say, can indeed resist the lure of economic advantage. He may put it from him, for a whole long life, as the total abstainer does drink. The mass, however, will never do that—at least, not in the end.

But I cannot see any better foundation for this than an eye-observed view of the end. Such an end is irrelevant. The earth will

drop into the sun in the end! In the true "end," the non-temporal end, the mass does not enslave itself to its economic advantage. Has not one seen the Scottish Sabbath Day? Did it not persist through a whole nineteenth century? And in a country not insensible to its economic advantage! Would it have gone even yet, if it had been better preached? Who is to say that it would? Have not cathedrals risen, and holy days and fast days, and papal, imperial, monarchical pomps been maintained till peoples have staggered under the expense of them? I would not dream of denying that *it is more difficult* to get the mass to follow a lead, when the lead veers off from their economic advantage, as it must ever and again do. A foolish lead—according to the standard of the wisdom of a period—would have a small enough chance of life, if it asked the masses finally to forgo elements of economic advantage which were open to them. But will anyone say the same of a wise one? The position which I find irrefragable in the matter, I can only conclude by setting down—and it is not without a certain sense of gratitude to Professor Levy's book that I do so, for having forced the view into some degree of articulation.

I say that economic advantage has no power to resist the ascendancy, even with the mass, of ideas really essential to the making of man man, if such ideas ever get themselves fairly presented to consciousness. The view that energies so directed are bubbles on the stream is unacceptable just for the old familiar reason, that it cannot logically be taken. I am a man, and interested in the course of that stream; a man, and therefore worried and disconcerted when it takes the wrong course. When that happens, I immediately find myself appealing to the bubbles—that is to say, taking them *not* to be bubbles. I want to influence men's ideas. It is not in my option—or in any man's—*not* to want it. Everything turns on men's being bitten with the right ideas. All men believe this: I do, Professor Levy does, Marx does. We have to be serious with it. We have to let it into our observation. This is what it means, to *be* men in *observing* men. The moment we observe historical man with more than our eyes, we see that what makes history is not forces; *but men trying to be men in the midst of forces.* And we may have good hope that the forces are really adapted, provided men can be sensible, to make men of them.

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S *MODES OF THOUGHT* [1]

THE appearance of a new book by the most distinguished living philosopher of the English-speaking race is, to use Dr. Whitehead's own terminology, an occasion of serious importance in the annals of thought. Or rather it is a whole "society" of occasions, so richly suggestive is his handling in these lectures of a host of speculative problems. The vague presuppositions of knowledge, ignored in the epistemology of the last three centuries owing to exclusive emphasis on what is "clear and distinct" in perception and thought, and the structure of reality as process—these two questions are in the forefront throughout; but woven into the web of the argument, with unfailing relevance to the central themes, are discussions of the origin and nature of language, the method of history, the analogy and distinction between aesthetics and logic, the problem of evil, the validity of moral codes, and the theological doctrine of the immutability of God. Of Dr. Whitehead we can truly say that "age cannot wither" him, "nor custom stale" his "infinite variety." This book is bound to prove both exciting and provocative. For Dr. Whitehead does not hesitate to trail his coat before the champions of what he holds to be error, however fashionable the error may be in contemporary thought. What, we wonder, will the mathematicians say when they find a master of their own science writing these words: "A prevalent modern doctrine is that the phrase 'twice-three is six' is a tautology. This means that 'twice-three' says the same thing as 'six'; and that no new truth is arrived at in the sentence. My contention is that the sentence considers a process and issue. Of course, the issue of one process is part of the material for processes beyond itself. But in respect to the abstraction 'twice-three is six,' the phrase 'twice-three' indicates a form of fluent process, and 'six' indicates a characterization of the completed fact" (125). What will the logical analysts think of this virtual resuscitation from Kantian depths of "synthetic *a priori* judgements," or of the relegation of tautology, as implying completion of the unending task of understanding, to be "the intellectual amusement of the Infinite" (71)? How will the Behaviourists, or their American survivors, like being told, *à propos* of the implication of value in all human thinking, that "a consistent Behaviourist cannot feel it important to refute my statements. He can only behave?" Or the scientists, that we find them at one and the same time "denying infractions of natural order, and denying any reason for such denial, and denying any justification for a philosophical search for reasons justifying their own denials" (120)? They will retort perhaps that here is one who, though in past time a great thinker, has anchored in his declining years in a haven of exploded fallacies. A perusal of this volume is sufficient refutation of such an absurdity. It shows beyond possibility of question that Dr. Whitehead's speculative vision is not yet dimmed nor his intellectual force abated. His provocation is never inappropriate or diffusive. Like his master Plato—a master, be it noted, whose doctrine of Forms he is not prevented by loyalty from criticizing—he goes unfalteringly "whither the argument leads."

[1] *Modes of Thought*, by Alfred North Whitehead, F.R.S., F.B.A., Sc.D., LL.D., Cambridge, at the University Press, 1938. Pp. viii + 241. Price 7s. 6d.

The book before us consists primarily of six lectures delivered at Wellesley College, Massachusetts, in 1937–38; to which are added two earlier Chicago lectures on "Nature and Life," and as an epilogue, a brief address on "The Aim of Philosophy" given at an annual reception for graduates at Harvard. In the Wellesley lectures, here printed for the first time, the author develops certain important aspects of his philosophy, not fully treated in his previous works. He expressly disclaims the intention of entering upon systematic metaphysical cosmology. That is to be found in *Process and Reality*. His aim, he tells us, is "to indicate those elements in our experience in terms of which such a cosmology should be constructed" (231). What he means by this is clearly explained in the opening lecture. All systematic thinking arises amid a background of indeterminate presuppositions; the explicit premises are abstractions from a vague beyond of awareness, that stretches forth in varying degrees of relevancy over the whole infinitude of natural process defying formulation in clear and distinct concepts. To ignore these obscure but basic presuppositions is the besetting temptation both of science and philosophy, and to yield to it entails slow but certain retribution. "The conjunction of premises from which logic proceeds presupposes that no difficulty will arise from the conjunction of the various unexpressed presuppositions involved in these premises. Both in science and in logic you have only to develop your argument sufficiently, and sooner or later you are bound to arrive at a contradiction, either internally within the argument, or externally in reference to fact" (14). The disjunctions of what Hegel called "the abstract understanding" break down when we discover the limitations of the closed system within which our mind is working. Henry Sidgwick once observed, with Hegel in mind, that he was unable to grasp the difference between the kind of contradiction that was just a contradiction and the kind that conveyed a profound truth. Dr. Whitehead would reply by reference to the grade of abstraction in which the contradiction had its source. "Consistency grows with abstraction from the concrete" (82). Geometrically, a patch of red presents no inconsistency with an adjacent patch of blue. Yet, for aesthetic valuation, the juxtaposition of colours may mean the ruin of a masterpiece. The moral is that the philosopher must keep his system open, by constant reference to "the presuppositions and the interpretations of ordinary life," i.e. to the implicit *Weltanschauung* which limits and conditions all systematic construction. Otherwise speculation will degenerate into pedantry. "Philosophy can exclude nothing. Thus it should never start from systematization. Its primary stage can be termed 'assemblage.' " (2). This task of "assemblage," that is "the free examination of some ultimate notions" of wide generality, "inherent in literature, in social organization, in the effort towards understanding physical occurrences" (1), is the concern of these lectures.

The argument is at once critical and constructive. On the negative side, Dr. Whitehead calls in question the whole trend of epistemology during the last three centuries, in that it takes its start from the data presented in sense-perception interpreted in the light of clear and distinct concepts. His grounds for this conclusion and the method by which he reaches it are already familiar to readers of *Process and Reality*. What is new in his latest presentment lies in the tracing of the error to its source in the neglect of the aforementioned presuppositions of knowledge. The thinkers in question repudiated "our intimate vague experiences in favour of a mere play of distinct sensations, coupled with a fable about underlying reality" (43). To do this is like attempting to explain modern civilization as "wholly derivative from the traffic-signals on the roads" (*ibid.*). The nemesis befalling such a mythology is illustrated (in the first of the two Chicago lectures on "Nature and Life")

more convincingly perhaps than anywhere else in Dr. Whitehead's writings, from the history of physical speculation. He shows there how the common-sense view of Nature as "the world as interpreted by reliance on clear and distinct sensory experience, visual, auditory, and tactile," accepted uncritically by the founders of modern science, and developed to such high issues by Newton and Hume, has generated its own nemesis, in the denial by twentieth-century physicists of every detail in the original concept. The doctrine of inert matter in simple location in space and time has given way to a doctrine of sheer activity. If we ask, activity for what? physics can give no answer. For that, nature must be integrated with life and value. "A dead nature can give no reasons. All ultimate reasons are in terms of value" (184). Of course, Newton and Hume "are right as far as they go." Their error lay in the omission of "those aspects of the Universe as experienced, and of our modes of experiencing, which jointly lead to the more penetrating ways of understanding" (185). In a word, they systematized without previously "assembling."

This brings us to the positive side of Dr. Whitehead's argument. We might take as the text his final dictum that "the key notion from which such construction should start is that the energetic activity considered in physics is the emotional intensity entertained in life" (231–232). In elucidation of this principle he starts in the first three lectures with a discussion of Importance, Expression, and Understanding. As his manner is, he uses these terms of popular speech with a meaning of his own. Two things are clear with regard to all three terms: they indicate no mere subjective fantasies, but universal characters of "occasions" in the objective process of Nature; and they imply activity of valuation. We need not remind our readers how for Dr. Whitehead everything that exists partakes essentially in the nature of organism, and how selective "prehensions," stretching outwards over the whole universe of actuality, are directed and utilized in the light of a "subjective aim." In other words, what the human mind distinguishes as fact and value are integrated in the basic structure of all existence. This is the main point of the first lecture; the Importance of things signifying that they have meaning and value—and for Dr. Whitehead all meaning is of the nature of value—and that they rouse a feeling of "interest" in each experiencing subject. That something matters is a primary disclosure of experience, which systematic reflection, when it arises, can disregard only at its peril. "The notion of importance is like nature itself: expel it with a pitch-fork, and it ever returns. The most ardent upholders of objectivity in scientific thought insist upon its importance. . . . The zeal for truth presupposes interest" (12). It follows that the knowledge of any single fact presupposes a "co-ordinated environment," which is "the whole universe in perspective to the fact." Matters of fact, whether taken collectively or in atomic isolation, are mythological abstractions; connectivity and value have their roots in the bedrock of actuality. The second notion, Expression, presupposes the first, representing the reaction of the individual occasion to the importance of its environment. Importance stresses the monistic aspect of the universe, in its relevance to its finite constituents; "Expression is the gift from the world as many to the world as one" (29). Here lies the evidence for the presupposition of an external world. The human body, which is at once part of ourselves and continuous with surrounding nature, is "the primary field of expression" (30). Dr. Whitehead enlarges this definition, so as to apply the idea of expression to infra-human animal organisms, vegetable organisms, and finally to the inorganic world, which is "dominated by the average" and where individual expression is at a negligible minimum. The impersonal methods of science fix attention exclusively on the "manageable relationships" of man with the world and on

the "traffic-lights" of sensa which, for all their practical utility, are yet completely superficial as a revelation of reality. This brings us to the discussion of language, "the outstanding example of the way in which mankind has fabricated its manageable connections with the world into a means of expression" (44). In speech, "while a superficial, manageable expression is diffused, yet the sense of the vague intimacies of organic existence is also excited," i.e. in the functioning of the lungs and throat. Herein lies the superiority of the spoken to the written word. Language is not thought, as some hold—were it so, translation, even the most imperfect, would be impossible; but it is thought's most important expression, apart from which the rise of human civilization would be inexplicable. "The account of the sixth day should be written, He gave them speech, and they became souls" (57). In the third lecture, we pass to Understanding, i.e. to the ideal of completed knowledge, in which all differences are synthesized in unity, all process in achievement, all inference in self-evident intuition. The attainment of this ideal transcends the capacity of finite minds. For man, to understand means ever-increasing penetration into the unknown, and the arrangement of novel disclosures in patterns of order, which represent the measure of self-evidence realized at a given stage of intellectual advance. In mathematical thinking, for example, self-evidence—the *scientia intuitiva* of Spinoza—is very restricted; only such a "snippet of knowledge" as that $1 + 4 = 2 + 3$ seems self-evident to Dr. Whitehead, though Ramanujan's power of intuition is said to have covered the first hundred integers (65). We confess to finding it hard to grasp the topics successively treated in this chapter with anything approaching to self-evident understanding. But two points stand out clearly. Among the many types of pattern revealed to human knowledge, at varying levels of abstraction, the extreme poles are represented by logic and aesthetics. Logic concentrates upon high abstraction, moving from details to the totality and achieving the enjoyment of an abstract unity of composition; aesthetics keeps close to the concrete, and moves—the reference here is to the spectator's enjoyment of the finished work—from appreciation of the whole to appreciation of the parts (84–86). The other point is the moral on which Dr. Whitehead is never weary of insisting, that for philosophy, as for the life of civilization, it is the inclusion of novelty that is all-essential. The gathering of details into pre-established patterns is necessary indeed, but not sufficient. The main concern of the philosopher is with the discovery of new patterns, adequate to his "new vision of the great Beyond" (79–80). That is why a genuine philosophy is incapable of proof. Its aim is to convey self-evidence. "Unless proof has produced self-evidence and thereby rendered itself unnecessary, it has issued in a second-rate state of mind, producing action devoid of understanding." "In philosophical writings," therefore, "proof should be at a minimum. The whole effect should be to display the self-evidence of basic truths, concerning the nature of things and their connection" (66–67). Dr. Whitehead lets the cat out of the bag without compunction.

The second part of the Wellesley Course is entitled "Activity," with the sub-headings "Perspective," "Forms of Process," and "Civilized Universe" for Lectures IV, V, and VI respectively. The governing thought is the differences of the perspectives of the universe for different entities, i.e. what the universe is for each entity "either in the way of accomplishment or in the way of potentiality" (91). Familiarity with Dr. Whitehead's previous writings is presupposed throughout. In Lecture IV he discusses types of being, with special reference to the Platonic conception of a world of timeless Forms, characterized by the "question-begging" terms, "self-sustaining," "completely real," "perfection" and "certainty." Theologians, scientists, and humanists

alike have enslaved themselves to dogmatism, ignoring the intrinsic reference of the forms to process, of actuality to potentiality. True, Plato in ascribing life and motion to the Forms, revealed an insight beyond the cadres of his own system; as also did Hume, when he appealed for explanation of the connectedness of phenomena to the fact of expectation (113). For reality is process, characterized fundamentally by three pairs of opposites, Clarity and Vagueness, Order and Disorder, Good and Bad. There is a close affinity between the first members in this triad of contrasts; it was natural for Plato to think of number when he gave his lecture on the Good. But "transcendence of mere clarity and order is necessary in dealing with the unforeseen, for progress, for excitement" (109). Dr. Whitehead does not, we note, explicitly mention a need for transcendence of Good. The fifth lecture asks and answers the question as to whether the universe has intrinsic value. Organic life implies both frustration and stability. Any process can be analysed—it is the doctrine of *Process and Reality*—into data, form, transition, and issue. Every fact is inclusive of potentialities constituting "the driving force of process." But the universe is more than process. The reflective consciousness discerns within the universe not only the two moments of attainment and transition, but ideals of value beyond ourselves; thus apprehending three realities, which, with explicit reference to Alexander, we may designate Space, Time, and Deity (139–142). "Deity is that factor in the universe whereby there is importance, value, and ideal beyond the actual." Apart from the sense of Deity, we should be enclosed in a solipsistic prison. Within our primary grasp of realities—so we read in the last lecture of the series—prior to the clear disclosures of sense-perception, we vaguely and obscurely discriminate three factors, The Whole, That Other, and Myself (150). The discrimination is of worth rather than of distinct existence. We enter the room of clear presentation and reflective thought "already equipped with an active aesthetic experience," to which sensory experience adds vividness and colour. "The primary glimmering of consciousness reveals Something that matters"; and "Totality, Externality, and Internality are its primary characterizations" (159).

Two points remain for special notice: concerning respectively the groundwork and the coping-stone of Dr. Whitehead's argument. (I) Readers of his later books cannot fail to have been both excited and perplexed by the distinction drawn between two modes of direct awareness, viz. perception in the mode of sense-presentation and perception in the mode of causal efficacy. Everyone understands the former; but the latter was bound to provoke a demand for further elucidation. In the fourth and sixth of these lectures, Dr. Whitehead sets himself to satisfy this requirement. Direct experience, he tells us, falls into two divisions. On the one side there is a qualitative experience, "complex, vague, and imperative," embracing "the sense of derivation from without, the sense of immediate enjoyment within, and the sense of transmission beyond," and involving past, present, and future. In this experience we are immediately aware of our historical connection with the outside world (through our body which is continuous therewith), with our own individual existence, and with the distinction between "the animal body which is the region of intimate, intense, mutual expression and the rest of nature where the intimacy and intensity of feeling fails to penetrate" (98–99). In the mode of sense-presentation, on the other hand, we distinguish clearly, but with no sense of personal intimacy, forms of quality (*sensa*) in the external world, in their spatio-temporal relations. The knowledge thus acquired is rigorously impersonal, devoid of emotional significance and of value. The former mode of apprehension is primary, the latter a "sophisticated" abstraction. "Our

experience starts with a sense of power, and proceeds to the discrimination of individualities and their qualities" (162). That is Dr. Whitehead's answer to Hume. His language in exposition is often cryptic, especially in regard to the cognitive value of these primitive and vague causal experiences. The appeal is not to logical demonstration, but to "self-evidence," in the sense in which that term is defined in these lectures. The doctrine makes sense of civilized experience (144–145). If we build a theory of knowledge exclusively on the basis of sense-presentation, we find ourselves inevitably landed in absurdity and paradox. A public world, the connectivity of self and things, valuation and all that makes civilized life worth living, are alike inexplicable. We are left with a universe without expression and without importance. If, on the other hand, we take the primary experiences of valuation as the groundwork, the disclosures of sense-perception fall into place. Dr. Whitehead is far from decrying their significance for civilized thought and life; they render the world manageable, in the service, be it understood, of purposes which they are unable, when taken as the sole data of knowledge, to explain. What he rejects uncompromisingly is their claim to primacy. It is strange, surely, that so pregnant and revolutionary a doctrine should not already have aroused more discussion among contemporary thinkers. For the most part, they have been content to exclaim "How very interesting!" adding "How very improbable!" and to pass by on the other side. Such a step-motherly attitude is hardly adequate in face of what promises to be the most significant contribution of the last half century to the advance of philosophic inquiry.

Our second comment (II) has reference to the concept of God. In the closing pages of *Process and Reality*, Dr. Whitehead outlined what might be called a novel form of the Cosmological Argument. "God," he there wrote, "is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification." The governing thought, that the process of Nature requires an actual entity who is the *locus* (can we say, the *bearer*?) of all value, is clear enough; but its development by Dr. Whitehead is bound to raise a hornets' nest of questions, in the minds both of those who accept Theism and of those who reject it. What precisely does he mean by God's "primordial nature," which, though eternal, is yet unconscious in conceptual appetition? The extension of the field of "conceptual feeling" to cover what is generally called inorganic nature is intelligible—we recall Professor Laird's doctrine of "natural election"—but why is the experience unconscious in God? Because consciousness implies integration of conceptual with physical feelings, which are absent from this primordial nature. But it is hard to conceive an eternal act of infinite conceptual valuation as in any way deficient in actuality. When we read of the "static majesty" of God's "appetitive vision," the language seems irreconcileable with entire lack of conscious apprehension. And how are we to interpret God's relation to the mystery of "creativity," the "ultimate" of which He is the "primordial, non-temporal accident"? How, if this primordial nature be wholly unconditioned, can He be said to be "in the grip" of creativity? Nor are the difficulties diminished when we consider the relation of God's primordial nature to His "consequential" nature, as immanent in the time-process of the universe? Is the consequential nature, though temporal, transcendent in its everlastingness of the particular finite experiences within that process? We recognize that the distinction is one "of reason," between abstract moments in the divine nature. God, we are told, is "not *before* all creation, but *with* all creation." If Time be a feature of the created order, this statement is consonant with traditional Christian speculation; but would Dr. Whitehead allow God's primordial nature to be in *any* sense ontologically prior to His consequential? How, again, is the

goodness of the consequential nature compatible with its being determined, not free? Further, does God's consciousness develop in time as a characteristic of His consequential nature, *pari passu* with the historical emergence of consciousness in finite entities and the reception of *their* consciousness into His nature? Or is He *everlastingly* conscious? In the latter case, the relativity of His consequential nature to the temporal process of nature seems to be seriously impaired by His consequential transcendence. These are some of the problems raised in the reader's mind by Dr. Whitehead's previous book. The impression given by the present lectures is that God's primordial nature has receded into the background, and that we are left with a God who, though not identical with the totality of the universe, is wholly relative to its temporal history. "There is an essential relevance between Deity and historic process" (142). An ambiguous sentence like this calls for further elucidation. Dr. Whitehead, as we have noted, has no patience with the Hellenic legacy, echoed by Descartes, of a God who exists in self-contained perfection above time and change (92–95, 164). He seems to think such a being to be incapable of activity or life. But what of the Aristotelian concept of *ἐνεργεία ἀκινησίας*? Was Plato, after all, so inconsistent in ascribing "life and motion" to the Forms? In Spinoza's system, the Attributes constituting the essence of God are active powers, generating by timeless causal energy the world of *natura naturata*. Christian orthodoxy, too, recognizes diversity and process within the aseity of the divine Unity. Moreover, it secures by its doctrine of Creation the reality of the spatio-temporal process. Nor is the religious demand for a God "in whom there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning" to be accounted for solely or mainly in terms of the Greek mathematical tradition. As Dr. Whitehead himself has reminded us, the familiar hymn "Abide with me, fast falls the eventide" expresses a deep-rooted desire in human nature, and one that has its sources in those primitive insights which are the basis of our knowledge of reality. While he recognizes the need of a permanent amid change, he leaves us uncertain as to the manner in which this need is met by his philosophy. If, again, as Dr. Whitehead holds, the historic process is as necessary to God as God is to it, he would surely find it hard to come to terms with the religious consciousness. It would be interesting, too, to learn what meaning Dr. Whitehead, who has touched so often and with such insight upon Christianity, would ascribe to the doctrine of the Incarnation, which marks the line of separation between Christianity and all other religions. Such are some of the problems, in regard to which these lectures still leave the reader in perplexity. It may well be that we have failed in understanding. It is no easy task to follow Dr. Whitehead, either in his thought or in its verbal presentation. And he has given us so much in this book that is illuminating, that it seems churlish to voice any feelings of dissatisfaction. But he has said so much on this last-mentioned subject that he can scarcely be excused from saying more. We close, therefore, by entreating him, with all respect, to develop yet further his metaphysical theology, and to set forth, in sufficient detail to enable the judicious reader to appreciate their "self-evidence," what he judges to be the essentials of a reasonable theistic faith.

W. G. DE BURGH.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

In No. 34 of *Philosophy* (April 1934) I drew attention to an important publishing enterprise in Italy—the task, namely, undertaken by R. Mondolfo, of translating and bringing up to date Edward Zeller's *Philosophy of the Greeks*.[1] The second volume of the work is now published, comprising the philosophy of the Ionians and the Pythagoreans. It is enough to note that two chapters alone of Zeller's history have been extended into a volume of more than 700 pages, to be convinced that Mondolfo's commentary and modernization far exceed in bulk the original text. The undertaking is really unique of its kind: Mondolfo takes Zeller's edition as his starting-point for a critical exposition of all the questions that succeeding writers down to the present time have debated concerning Greek thought, and on these questions he formulates his own considered judgment. There is no monograph of importance published within the last fifty years in Europe and America that Mondolfo has not analysed and discussed, so that the student has before him the most complete bibliographical inventory he could desire, together with the clearest and most authoritative guide in his own research.

Naturally at a distance of more than half a century from the last editions issued by Zeller the orientation of studies on Greek philosophy has considerably changed, and this movement is so accentuated in the book that at times the two authors seem to have been collocated more for antithesis than for any likeness. But since Mondolfo is careful to indicate through the intermediate literature the gradual stages of the transition from Zeller's reconstruction to that of the present day, the very antithesis is comprehended in the view of a unified development. With regard to the pre-Socratic schools the progress from one position to the other is effected by several converging routes: (*a*) by means of a more positive valuation of the influences of oriental thought, which Zeller had excluded on principle; (*b*) by the use of sources of romance and mystery (Rohde, Joel, etc.), revealing a closer adherence of the first philosophers to the popular Greek soul and religious feeling; (*c*) by according greater importance to the scientific significance (Tannery, Burnet, etc.) of some doctrines which doxographical tradition, through misunderstanding of their ancient interpreters, rendered too superficial and extrinsic; (*d*) by an ever-wider exploration of sources and more frequent comparative analyses of them, so as to illustrate and clarify them reciprocally.

Mondolfo has not only been able to give us, through his additional matter, the measure of the efficiency with which contemporary critical thought has worked along these ways, but he has succeeded also in showing their final convergence, which has sometimes escaped the observation of those who were moving in them, because they were not in a position to follow the movements of others from their own restricted viewpoint. Thus, for example, at first sight the emphasis on the mystical-romantic elements may seem to be in opposition to that on the scientific themes of pre-Socratic philosophy, so that they tend to neutralize one another. On the contrary, they tend to com-

[1] Zeller-Mondolfo, *La filosofia dei Greci nel suo sviluppo storico*. Vol. 2, *Ionici e Pitagorici*. La Nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1938, pp. 716.

plete one another. In fact, as Mondolfo points out, "the spiritual needs of an age in the first ardour of expansion, pervaded by the related exigencies of knowledge and power, respond with one accord to the same impulse of life. Hence, in the unity of the activating spirit they do not suppress or inhibit one another, nor can they remain separate in themselves and in the various forms of intellectual activity and practice to which they give rise, but they are determined and stimulated and fertilized by one another. The ages of intense exuberance of development and of the vigorous effervescence of new life are, as pre-Socratic Greece and Western Europe at the time of the Renaissance afford eloquent proof, ages of active enthusiasms in the fields of practice as of theory, of exploration, commerce, industry, and technics as of the disinterested disciplines of the fine arts and pure speculation. These active enthusiasms naturally assume mystical hues and shapes, which, however, do not fetter them, or choke out of them the ampler air of scientific activity, but add fuel and spiritual fervour to their unfolding" (p. 45).

With this criterion Mondolfo is able, among other things, to solve the vexed question of the coexistence, in the most ancient Pythagoreanism, of an ethical-mystic with a scientific-mathematical direction. As is well known, this coexistence has been denied in recent times by many scholars, who wished to reduce the primitive school of Pythagoras to a religious sect, to which any kind of scientific activity was still foreign. Now it is certain that the denial or affirmation of such activity should depend in the last instance on historical and philological documentary evidence. But it is also certain that the orientation of research in one direction or the other, in view of the obscurity and scarcity of the sources, depends principally on the manner in which the two orders of interest, religious and scientific, are understood, whether they are taken to be antithetical or concurrent. In consequence Mondolfo is able to confront the excessively narrow supporters of the negative thesis effectively with the assertion that "the true problem of the historical comprehension of Pythagoreanism eludes whoever posits the originally separate existence of a purely religious aspect; it is the problem of the initial unity of the two aspects, whereby the religious spirit has been able to inspire and fecundate scientific activity" (p. 682).

A more detailed examination of the innumerable questions debated in this most copious volume would, of course, fall outside the scope and intention of the present notice. It must suffice to call the attention of students to it as an indispensable instrument of their labours.

Many monographs on Pico della Mirandola have been published in Italy in the last few years, and I have already introduced one of them, written by Anagnine, to the readers of *Philosophy*. But the latest to appear by E. Garin,[1] is the best of them all, and gives an analysis, balanced as a whole, and penetrating in detail, of the whole philosophical-religious activity of this suggestive thinker of the Italian Renaissance. From this monograph it appears ever more clearly how greatly European philosophy in general in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was indebted to the so-called Platonic Academy of Florence.

Garin in his study vindicates Pico's independence of Ficino, in face of the common tendency to make of him a mere follower of Ficino's thought. In fact, not only did Pico energetically maintain, against the exclusive predominance of the Platonic tradition, the rights of Aristotelianism and of the Arabic and Jewish interpretations of it, but he also collected in his syncretism other elements, magical and cabalistic, which confer a certain exotic note on

[1] E. Garin, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Vita e dottrina*. Le Monnier, Firenze, 1937, pp. 238.

his mental individuality, differentiating it clearly from Ficino's. However, the expression "syncretism," by which it is customary to characterize Pico's philosophy, seems to Garin inappropriate. Rather than a patchwork of incongruous elements, he sees in it a synthetic principle, which the philosopher's premature death at the age of thirty-two prevented him from realizing in all its completeness. Thus, in studying the cabalistic sources of Pico's thought, Garin shows that he was not a mere passive and uncritical collector of them; and therefore he confutes "the equivocal interpretation of those who made him out to be a convinced and faithful follower of the grossest forms of cabalistic mysticism, which in reality included a cast-iron astrological determinism. On the contrary, Pico, who in every way sought to gather out of the Cabala its deepest speculative contents, found in it above all a method of scriptural exegesis, and at the same time accepted the assertion that the universe is the book wherein God has written His own thoughts in mathematical symbols. This Pythagorean thesis, which the genius of Galileo was to make his own, was effectively expressed by Pico in the last of the cabalistic theses, in which, opposing the true astrology—astronomy—to judicial astrology, he asserted: '*Sicut vera astrologia docet nos legere in libro Dei, ita Cabala docet nos legere in libro Legis.*' Hence, when Pico composed the *Conclusiones* and the *Oratio,* just as he refuted astrological determinism in his praise of the dignity of man, so already, however vaguely, he outlined those theories that the *Disputationes in astrologiam* were to develop in full" (pp. 180–1).

In connection with these *Disputationes,* I was pleased to find in Garin's book a confirmation and a development of my argument in *Rinascimento, Riforma e Controriforma,* to the effect that, contrary to the general opinion of the interpreters, there is no contradiction but full agreement between Pico's confutation of astrology and his profession of magic. It is customary to take astrology and magic as expressions of a single current of thought, and this may perhaps be true in the oriental and Hellenistic traditions. But the strong humanistic feeling that the Renaissance brings with it implies, at least in the more conscious thinkers, a discrimination between the two teachings, that is, an acceptance of magic as the expression of the active power of man to dominate the forces of nature by magical formulas, and a refutation of astrology as the expression of the dependence of man on astral determinism. This discrimination is the work of Pico, and foreshadows, though in a form that is still fantastic, the gradual transformation of magic into science, and of its formulas into scientific laws, which will have in reality that power to enchain and control the forces of nature of which magic was the obscure presentiment, and which will give to man that Baconian power that he had already fancifully attributed to himself by means of the magic art.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(*Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen.*)

NEW BOOKS

A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. By A. C. Ewing, M.A., Litt.D. (Cantab.), M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon.). (London: Methuen. 1938. Pp. viii + 278. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

The distinctive feature of this new commentary on the *Critique of Pure Reason* is that it is written principally with the idea of making the work plain to ordinary honours students in universities, especially those who study it as a set book. It thus aims not so much at detailed exegesis of the text as at giving an adequate presentation of the general argument and indicating (and in some cases attempting to solve) the chief difficulties about it. No one is likely to deny the author's claim that a book of this sort has been long needed in English, and there are few who will not think, in view of his earlier work on Kant, that Dr. Ewing was a very good person to write it. Here, as before, Kant's arguments are presented sympathetically and lucidly, and here, as before, the comment on them is pointed and stimulating. The result is that the *Short Commentary* should prove a most useful addition to English philosophical literature. Its value, however, does not lie in its utility alone. Dr. Ewing himself thinks that his interpretation of Kant is sufficiently original to make his book a contribution to Kantian scholarship and of interest to professional philosophers; and this claim is, I think, a just one. In what follows I shall try to indicate the most striking features, as well as the general quality, of the work.

The two things which I found most interesting in Dr. Ewing's introduction were the statement of Kant's general problem and the discussion of *a priori* synthesis. (i) The *Critique* is said to have two main aims: to provide a philosophical basis for physical science, and to "deny knowledge in order to make room for faith," in Kant's special sense of faith. The two aims are connected, and the latter was to Kant the more important, but that does not mean that we can't be interested in the first without having much sympathy for the second. This is true, but rather perfunctory. It might have been shown how both problems arise out of the question of the competence of the intellect to attain knowledge *a priori*, which itself interests Kant because of his preoccupation with the respective claims of theoretical and practical reason. (This last point is mentioned, but not so prominently as it should be.) The whole section could have been lengthened, and perhaps illustrated by reference to Leibniz and Hume, with profit. (ii) The question whether synthetic *a priori* judgments are possible is again (cf. the author's *Idealism*, pp. 67 ff.) identified by Dr. Ewing with the problem of significant inference, and an interesting discussion of it is given. The matter is complicated because many philosophers say that propositions which cannot be denied without self-contradiction cannot give new knowledge. Therefore, they say, significant inference, resulting in *synthetic a priori* propositions reached by thinking, is impossible. But this argument cannot hold, according to Dr. Ewing, since the proposition "what cannot be denied without self-contradiction gives no new knowledge" is itself *a priori* and synthetic. A conclusion, then, like Kant's, that the only valid synthetic *a priori* propositions are those which can be justified by a peculiar sort of reference to experience, or by appeal to "pure intuition," is false. And it may be granted

that Kant would have great difficulty in answering the question, "How are the synthetic *a priori* propositions of *philosophy* possible?" But whether this in itself invalidates his account of non-philosophical synthetic *a priori* propositions is another matter. It would have been interesting to have had explicit statements from him both about significant inference and about philosophical propositions.

Dr. Ewing's comment on the Aesthetic is distinctly good, and his treatment of the "Transcendental Exposition" of space is perhaps the most original thing in the book. He asks whether modern developments in geometry have put out of court Kant's arguments from the requirements of Euclidean geometry to the necessity of regarding space as a pure (subjective) intuition. In answering this, he says, we must distinguish between Euclid's axioms and the inferences from them. Kant's account of the latter is almost certainly wrong, but there does seem to be some plausibility in the suggestion that the axioms of Euclidean geometry are true, either factually or logically, of perceptual space. Now, I suppose, if we could say that there was some necessary connection between Euclid's axioms and perceptual space, Kant's argument (B 41; cf. A 24) from our consciousness of their necessity to the subjectivity of (perceptual) space might still hold. The difficulty is to know whether there is such a connection; and Dr. Ewing does not seem able to make up his mind about it. But in any case Kant's other argument, from the necessary applicability of Euclidean geometry to everything in the physical world to space's subjectivity, will not be valid unless we can show that physical as well as perceptual space is necessarily Euclidean, or else that there is no distinction (or no distinction of kind) between the two; and this, though perhaps not impossible, is certainly more difficult to establish.

In dealing with the Analytic, Dr. Ewing takes the Transcendental deduction first, a procedure which makes Kant's argument more intelligible than it is in the *Critique*. (What is needed to set the Analytic going is an exposition of the view that there are *a priori* elements in understanding and a preliminary sketch of their part in knowledge, and this is very hard to get out of the Metaphysical deduction.) Dr. Ewing gives first a general statement of the argument of the deduction, and then a discussion of the main difficulties. The general statement is clear and helpful, though I confess to feeling doubt about the saying (p. 83) that the unity of apperception and the unity of objects entail each other. I should have thought it truer to say that *consciousness* of the unitary character of the self depended on our synthetizing the given manifold and being, at least potentially, aware of it, but that unity derived not from the manifold but from the self. But perhaps this is what Dr. Ewing means too, and the dispute is about words. Apart from this, as I say, the general summary is admirable, and so are the discussions of detailed points—particularly those on the "multiple" theory of the composition of the *Critique*, the relation between understanding and imagination, and the controversy over the noumenal/phenomenal character of the synthesis. The remarks about affinity are interesting too, though they might have been developed by reference to the appendix to the Dialectic and the two introductions to the *Critique of Judgment*. Altogether, Dr. Ewing (like Kant) is inclined to say too little about the possibility that the nature of the manifold may make the deduction impossible.

I can only comment on two points in the treatment of the rest of the Analytic. First, one of the stages in Dr. Ewing's summary of the Metaphysical deduction is that "a judgment must be defined as the bringing of data under the objective unity of apperception." But, as Vleeschauwer[1] and others have

[1] *La déduction transcendentale*, t. ii, 46, 131 ff.; iii, 142 ff.

pointed out, this seems to be just the view of judgment which is *not* presupposed in the Metaphysical deduction, and this it is which makes the argument so difficult to state plausibly. My other point concerns the very interesting treatment of the different "Refutations of Idealism." Dr. Ewing holds that, despite what he says in the second edition Refutation, Kant never "means to assert the existence of physical objects in any sense which could not be reduced to propositions about what human beings experience or would experience under certain conditions" (pp. 180–1). This is to transform the permanent Kant speaks of into something like Mill's permanent possibility, and perhaps it truly describes Kant's view; though I confess I still feel puzzled about his sharply distinguishing (B 275) *things* from *representations* after virtually holding that things are in some sense groups of representations. (Perhaps the real difficulty is about the status of "representations.") Statements like that of A 98 that "all our representations, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense" are very hard to swallow if they mean that they are all subjective images. Yet Dr. Ewing sometimes accepts this as Kant's view (e.g. p. 60). Presumably it is not the view of the Cambridge philosophers whom he compares with Kant on this point.

I have left myself very little space to deal with the Dialectic, of which the discussion is short but fairly adequate. There ought surely to have been something about the difficult opening section (and about the nature of theoretical reason generally), and there ought to have been a mention, at least, of the Hegelian treatment of the Antinomies. To compensate for the lack of these there is an interesting half-chapter on the ideas of reason, and a valuable discussion of freedom. A corresponding section on moral theology would have been welcome.

On p. 268 n. the reference should read: *Logik, Einleitung* IV (*not* p. 4). There is something wrong with the reference on p. 2, n. 2, though I can't discover what it should be. The title of the *Dissertation* on the same page should be *On the* Form *and Principles*, etc. There are a few other misprints, but none serious.

W. H. Walsh.

The Problem of Historical Knowledge: An Answer to Relativism. By Maurice Mandelbaum. (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation. 1938. Pp. xii, 340. Price, $3.50.)

This book fills a gap, and fills it admirably. I do not know of any other monograph of any recency in English (translations excluded) devoted to the systematic study of the philosophical problems raised by the fact, methods and content of historical inquiry. This is a subject of which we are excessively shy, presumably because whenever we think of the philosophy of history as a possibility we remember Hegel and recoil. But historical science has at least as much title to philosophical attention, whether critical or constructive, as any other science; and it has a particularly direct interest for those who pursue or make use of the history of philosophy.

Dr. Mandelbaum's chief concern is to refute the charge that objectivity cannot belong to historical knowledge. Croce, Dilthey and Karl Mannheim are selected as relativists and their theories briefly expounded and criticized. As opponents of historical relativism Simmel, Rickert, Scheler, and Troeltsch are examined and found to be unsuccessful. From his survey of these seven thinkers the author analyses out what he regards as the two basic grounds of relativism, namely, that the content of an historian's knowledge is determined on the one hand by the sociological conditions of his own thinking,

on the other hand by his own valuational viewpoint; or, more generally, that whatever structure historical events may have intrinsically, the structure they are given in historical knowledge is contributed by the historian's mind. Such a separation of the connections of knowledge from the connections of fact is encouraged not only by epistemologists like Hume and Kant but also by those writers of treatises and textbooks on the methods of historical investigation who treat the establishment of particular events and the synthesis of these as two distinct processes or even provinces of historical inquiry. That in practice they are not and could not be distinct, except at a fairly high level of synthesis, the author is easily able to show, the internal and external criticism of source-material being impossible without a background of already synthesized historical knowledge. Dr. Mandelbaum's most general reply to the relativists is, then, that events do not in fact come before us atomically but are apprehended from the start in a context of other events. But is the context thoroughly objective? Obviously, Dr. Mandelbaum could not settle this question without swelling and ruining his book by entering into the labyrinth of general epistemology. He rightly confines himself to the specific objections against *historical* objectivity, to what he has called the two basic grounds of historical relativism. To the first—that an historical statement is what it is because of the factual conditions under which it was made—he replies that the question whether an historical statement is true or no is distinct from the question what led to its enunciation because they cannot both be answered by an appeal to the same set of facts; and he notes the relativist's *petitio principii*, that the sociological conditions of the historian's statement can themselves be objectively known. To the second ground of relativism—that the historian's statements are shaped by his valuations—he also gives an uncompromising denial. The fact that much alleged history is propaganda is deservedly disposed of with the remark that in so far as its content is determined by its motive it just is not history; and the obvious influence of valuation in broad philosophical syntheses is similarly set aside as falling outside the properly historical province. Still, the most empirical historian always selects, and the principle of his selection is valuational in part; he studies what he conceives to be worth while or important. This fact, however, is irrelevant, for the events selected are thenceforward investigated causally by the usual empirical methods. Of course, unconscious evaluations sometimes find links where there is insufficient objective evidence, but the nature of historical investigation is not to be defined by admitted lapses from the ideal. The unassailable point is that in practice as in propriety any historical statement of alleged fact or linkage of fact is tested not by examining the character of the historian's values but by reference to the field of fact itself. With this position the need of each generation to rewrite history is entirely compatible, for the need may arise through factors belonging to the strictly historical field, such as the discovery of new documents, of the falsity of familiar ones, of the causal repercussions of certain types of fact (e.g. economic) formerly understressed.

With objectivity in Kant's weakened sense of the term Dr. Mandelbaum is not content, but has room only to declare, not to elaborate, his reasons. It is sufficient for his purpose to argue that historical science can hopefully aim at an objectivity comparable with that attained by the natural sciences of matter.

There are many interesting pages on historical relevance as a category not of logic but of fact, as synonymous with causal relation, and on the nature of this relation. They cannot be cogently summarized in a few lines. I can only say that they leave me with misgivings. An important consequence which

Dr. Mandelbaum believes to follow from his analysis of these and the preceding matters is what he calls historical pluralism, the denial that the entire field of historical events can be regarded as a single system, whether causal or teleological. If there were a single organic system, he urges, we should be in the difficulty, set by a coherence of truth, of not being able to begin at all without a prior knowledge of the system. If we tried to explain everything by national character, we should be elevating an observed typical way of behaving into a principle, besides supposing to be constant what is demonstrably changeful. Anyhow, there are many nations, each with its own character, so that such a version of history would leave it pluralistic; and so too would the explanation of all the events of an epoch by reference to an epochal spirit (*Zeitgeist*), for such a procedure would tend to make each epoch largely self-contained. Nor can any teleological monism be worked out, except speciously through large-scale surveys which either rule out the incompatible small-scale episodes—which is tantamount to pluralism—or simply postulate in these concealed concordant purposes. Hegel, for example, effected his synthesis by ignoring primitive times, and Comte by considering little more than the peoples of Europe. History is to be conceived, then, as an aggregate of interpenetrating but partly independent causal patterns, and this is the warrant for the growth and relative autonomy of such divisions of the field as the history of a nation, of politics, of economics, of art, and so forth.

The best tribute I can pay to the book is that neither in content nor in tone does it invite any trivial criticisms: the examination it demands would concern fundamentals and would go beyond the scope of a review. The argument is developed carefully and unaggressively, without rhetorical emphasis or any other sort of display, and is informed throughout by relevant knowledge. There are incidental insights of real penetration such as the remarks on historical periods on pp. 280–283 and 313 f. Those who have never grappled with the philosophy of history are fortunate to have available so competent and level-headed an introduction. A very useful bibliography is added.

T. E. Jessop.

The Clue to History. By John Macmurray. (London: Student Christian Movement Press. Pp. xii + 237. Price 7s. 6d.)

Professor Macmurray warns his readers that this book is "hard to understand and easy to misunderstand." The difficulty is due to the fact that "the traditional habits of life upon which our civilization is based give rise to habits of thought and reflection which prevent us from understanding Christianity." And since Christianity is "the motive-force behind the development of our civilization," the future of civilization depends upon such understanding. For this we have to create in ourselves "that religious comprehension of reality which is the historic achievement of the Hebrew race, and which reached its mature expression in Jesus." In a limited review I shall perhaps be least likely to do injustice to the book by going to the heart of the matter, in an attempt to understand at its centre the conception of history it proposes to work out.

"The discovery which Jesus made," we are told, was the discovery that human life is personal, and the special significance of this is "the self-discovery of his own essence as a human being," and, therefore, "of the essence of humanity." Further, the "fundamental postulate of religious rationality" is that the purpose of God must inevitably be achieved." Combining these

principles it is concluded that past history is explained by them and the end to which human history is, in fact, moving is defined. "The intention of God for man is then—the kingdom of heaven which is to be established on earth." The achievement of this end, however, depends upon the co-operation of man. For a "dualist consciousness" this suggests that the end may be frustrated. But for the religious consciousness with the "totalitarian" religious view this is impossible. "Man must and will co-operate since the end must inevitably be achieved." The problem of evil, it is admitted, is not thus disposed of but it is "transformed." If man refuses the "intention" which is involved in his own existence he is inevitably divided against himself. "Every such effort will in the course of its history defeat itself," until the intention which belongs to the reality of the human essence is adopted. Thus, the law of future history is defined. At the same time, the problem of human freedom (as freedom of the will) would apparently disappear because to do the Divine Will is our real nature. We are not ourselves when we do otherwise. The difficulty of seeing that the Divine purpose is accomplished or that history is the "continued Act of God" (page 93) in face of actual history would be overcome, as the general argument of the book seems to indicate, by a transition from the individual event to the course of history in the long run, beyond our vision. Since it is axiomatic that the end must be achieved we may look confidently to future history. Here it should perhaps be noted that the "clue to history" does not apparently apply to all history, at least the illustrations only concern the Christian era including its immediate prelude in the Roman system, and the history of the Jews. This is the more noticeable because of the employment of the notion of the dialectic transition between opposites which, in theory, should have a universal reference, and which is especially regarded as belonging to the discovery of Jesus, as expressed in the saying, "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it." Professor Macmurray speaks of this as "the working of the practical law of contradiction." This is verified by the whole course of European history down to our own day. The will to power necessarily frustrates itself. "It creates an intention which negates its own reality." This is especially seen in the way in which the will to freedom and equality of the individual self, necessarily achieves its own destruction and the establishment of its opposite, collectivism and the collective mind. Whether Christ's words with their deeply personal quality can be made to stand for a universal historic law, affecting relations of Empires to subject races, and classes to each other in the industrial age, and whether the notion of a collective mind can be extracted from any of His teachings is not a question that can be discussed here. But was the collapse of the Roman Empire due to the negation of the will to power in the governing class, and its opposite the desire of the "common people" for freedom and equality?—or does this law explain the conflicts between spiritual and secular powers within the Holy Roman Empire? The close association in the historic survey of the dialectic law of opposites with the Christian purpose and intention which is throughout towards "freedom, equality, and community," is a source of difficulty. For the logical law should operate with indifference to human values, whilst the Christian law can only work in one direction towards higher value. In this respect it might seem that actual history is a less negative though highly inexact illustration of the dialectic law than of the Christian. From Professor Macmurray's standpoint the best illustration of a combination of both is in the development which he thinks inevitable from the industrial capitalist society to a communism which recognizes and does not reject the real Christianity which is its true basis.

By the Christian purpose we are to understand essentially the Jewish. The

intention which defines Christianity has its source completely within the experience of the Jewish people. The universalism of Christianity, totally inconsistent with the Jewish religious-racial idea of the Chosen People, is the true completion of Judaism though rejected by it.

The supreme place of the Jewish genius in Christian history in Professor Macmurray's view is primarily due to its complete religious interpretation of life, the superiority to dualism, i.e. to the distinction between action and reflection, this world and another, material and spiritual, ideal and actual. "God is a worker, not an aristocrat." Leisure is not the goal of human life. The Greeks, on the other hand, whose contribution to real Christianity is disavowed and their contribution to culture only allowed in the aesthetic realm to which their philosophy also is assigned, exalt contemplation. The meaning of their view of the changeless divine contemplation is that "God is the opposite of a worker." Professor Macmurray's special depreciation of Stoicism as the refuge of the contemplative consciousness makes him ignore its significance as precursor of Christianity in the unlimited ideal of citizenship of the world and human brotherhood. He would seem also not to estimate as real work the development of law and equity by the great Stoic Jurists, though he makes a slight reference to it. A similar point of view determines the interpretation of Descartes, who "prescribes the universal form of modern philosophy." His *cogito ergo sum* implies individual freedom in reflection, but conceals the negative of freedom in action. He does not claim freedom to act, but only freedom to think. *Cogito ergo sum* is in fact equivalent to "I will not be a worker." Professor Macmurray must certainly be seeking in the depths of Descartes' unconscious! "This identification of the self with mind—is simply the reflective expression of the character of modern society." We are curiously reminded in the association of a ruling class with intellect, and a working class with emotion and action, of the class divisions of Plato's Republic. The explanation of Kant's Practical Philosophy has a like root. Its dualism "results from membership of an individualist society in which the individual needs a world bound by determinate laws, in order that he may freely enjoy his own reflection." It may be observed that this standpoint is illustrated in modern Russia, where, it appears, the pursuit of truth, if divorced from immediate practical results, is usually frowned upon.[1] The key to the interpretation of philosophy may be found in the concepts that "the substance of any society is the workers," and that social dualism determines philosophic thought, so that those who are not engaged in physical work must in their thinking be in opposition to the workers, and to the spirit of Christianity. As regards the question what is the substance of a society, it may be observed that this will be differently answered according as we are referring to the component membership, of which the greater proportion will be (in a political society) physical workers, or to the qualities which have given the society its special place in history. These will in general, though not always, be found in all classes. What, if we are referring to population, for instance—constitutes the substance of Soviet Russia? In one sense the mass of industrial workers and the peasants, the great majority of whom did not (as many who know them well have testified) desire revolution as such but individual possession of the land. In another sense Lenin's band of professional revolutionaries[2] and their successors in the Bolshevist party.

Another aspect of dualism is found in a contrast between the emotionalism of the Eastern Church in Russia regarded as favourable to revolution and socialism, and the intellectual character of German socialism, to which it is

[1] Cf. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism.*
[2] Cf. E. Borkenau, *The Communist "International."*

argued its failure was largely due. The fact that the greatest influence of the Orthodox Church was amongst the peasants, who were not the most distinguished by revolutionary enthusiasm, seems to be overlooked. The bitter hostility of Soviet Communism to Christianity which, according to the argument it ought to recognize as the force which freely brought it forth, as a close approach to fulfilment of the Jewish (Christian) purpose, is explained as opposition to official Christianity and its frequent alliance in history with the ruling class. A still deeper source of opposition—namely, to the Christian principle of love, if not also to that freedom and humanity which are declared to be the purpose and intent of history—is not noticed. But in a remarkable aphorism Professor Macmurray observes, though not in this connection, "hatred is love frustrated by fear."

In a brilliant passage, Hitler's antipathy to the Jews is explained as dependent upon the fact that he has taken over for the German race the narrow Jewish principle of the Chosen People, whilst he dreads the universal principle hostile to all racial exclusiveness, which, as maintained in Christianity, is the true culmination of the Jewish faith. Thus Hitler's racialism will achieve the triumph of the Jewish consciousness in the German. The idea expressed in the notion of the "Chosen People" has, of course, profoundly affected other races, as, for instance, notably the Japanese.

Some at least of the difficulties raised by Professor Macmurray's interpretation of history might disappear if one could correct one's "habits of thought" so far as to accept the religious totalitarian conception as he understands it, involving that man is really co-operating in the achievement of the Christian purpose whatever he seems to intend. But since Professor Macmurray evidently does hold the view that he has found the "clue," not merely as a "List der Vernunft" or an overruling Providence but as experientially verifiable, grave doubts as to his success must arise, at least from the standpoint of a philosophic interpretation of history. Such doubts are chiefly due to the partly concealed *a priori* method, in which only those aspects of the infinitely complex process which are capable of apparent exemplification of certain principles are allowed to stand out. History will not suffer the *a priori* or the imposition upon its course of necessary laws whether the Hegelian doctrine of the union of (or logical transition to) opposites, or an ethical principle of inevitable progress to a certain end. It does not work "according to schedule" (page 92). Laws applied will fail to correspond to the endless novelty and individuality of the development and the contingency of the events which interrupt and carry the stream far beyond reach of the supposed laws. In the case of Professor Macmurray's interpretation there is an immense simplification. Abstract concepts, as for instance the idea of Fascism as a kind of "psycho-analytic process in society which brings the suppressed emotional unconscious into consciousness," take the place of analysis of all the individual factors in the emergence of any new historic development. The fact that according to the principles adduced much ought to have happened in Christian history which has not happened is not a difficulty for Professor Macmurray, since, as he observes, "the end is not yet." The end never is yet, in history.

As regards the original warning concerning the difficulty of understanding Christianity, and the importance of returning to its ethical principles truly understood, it appears to me that Professor Macmurray is in the main right. But the attempt to combine these principles with a modified form of dialectic law working in history seems to distort the interpretation and lead to some strange paradoxes, in respect to the Christian core of modern developments. The book, however, certainly wins respect and arrests attention by the

earnestness and conviction with which the argument is presented, and is an interesting treatment of one of the greatest problems.

H. D. Oakeley.

The Will to Civilization: an Inquiry into the Principles of Historic Change. By John Katz. (London: Secker & Warburg. 1938. Pp. viii + 346. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This book does not only offer a philosophy of history (and of much else besides), it is also a tract for the times. In form it is an attempt to work out a theory of human development, and then to apply this to the actual historical process; but throughout Mr. Katz has his eye on our present discontents, and he concludes with some explicit suggestions as to how they may be met. In spite of a fairly definite structure, his argument does not admit of brief summarization; and many of his most interesting contentions cannot be mentioned here. But his general thesis can be roughly outlined as follows. According to his view, the problem of civilization is to reconcile the principles of creativity and unity; and we in modern times have been so creative that we have failed to attain unity and indeed are unlikely to attain it short of a world community. But at the same time we appear to be in danger of losing our creative powers. For his chief remedy is that we should recover, as he thinks the Bolsheviks and even the Nazis in a way have done, the faith in civilization which he regards as the essence and justification of religion. We must avoid the religion of the churches, which sacrifice creativity to unity, and seek, by rationalizing them, to console mankind for failures in civilization; and still more must we avoid mysticism and metaphysics, which perform these functions for individuals whose spiritual and intellectual demands are more complex than those of common men. Instead we must "accept the empirical" in the way that creative religion demands, and become more fully conscious of our relationship to the historical process. If we do that, we shall heal the wounds in our own souls and increase our chances of realizing the universal community.

In a work of this kind it is obviously impossible to expect a high standard of accuracy everywhere; and Mr. Katz seems to disclaim any pretensions to scholarship by eschewing such things as quotations, references, and footnotes. But it is difficult not to feel that many of his generalizations are hardly compatible with one another, or with the "acceptance of the empirical" which he desires to inculcate in his readers. Moreover, his statements are often obviously questionable. At the same time it is natural to admire the courage of a work which not only takes all knowledge for its province, but bases confident practical recommendations upon its theoretical conclusions. Even readers with specialized knowledge of the many matters with which it deals will welcome its bold handling of its main theses and can hardly fail to be stimulated by many of its discussions.

O de Selincourt.

Background to Modern Science. Ten Lectures at Cambridge arranged by the History of Science Committee. Edited by Joseph Needham and Walter Pagel. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1938. Pp. xii + 243. Price 7s. 6d.)

The growing realization of the mutual interaction between scientific and other cultural ideas has led to an increased interest in the history of science.

London University has for many years led the way by instituting a department of the History and Philosophy of Science, and now there is hope that such enlightenment will spread to Cambridge.

These lectures commence with two very valuable essays on the pre-Newtonian era, from the Greeks to Galileo, by P. M. Cornford and Sir W. C. Dampier. They form a background for the description of the last forty years or so of science by experts who have themselves contributed largely to the advances made. The late Lord Rutherford gives a fascinating and characteristic account of the development of ideas on atomic structure, and his successor in the Cavendish Chair of Physics, W. L. Bragg, brings out the increasing importance of the methods of crystal structure analysis. Chapters of equal interest on Atomic Theory by F. W. Aston and Astronomy by Sir Arthur Eddington complete the non-biological series.

In "Physiology and Pathology," J. A. Ryle concentrates on gastric physiology, describing the work of Beaumont, Pavlov, and some more recent workers. The advances in Parasitology and Tropical Medicine are exemplified by the discussion of malaria and yellow fever by the late B. H. F. Nuttall, and the changes which have occurred in the theory of evolution are traced by R. C. Punnett.

J. B. S. Haldane concludes with "Forty Years of Genetics," and sums up the present situation as follows: "In spite of the biometricians, Mendelism is accepted by a vast majority of biologists, but if we want to discover whether a particular Mendelian hypothesis will explain a set of facts we are forced to use the mathematical criteria invented by Pearson."

It is to be hoped that the editors will be encouraged to publish a further series of these interesting and stimulating lectures on a rather neglected subject.

G. Burniston Brown.

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. By A. Cornelius Benjamin, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago. (New York: Macmillan & Co. 1937. Pp. xvi + 469. Price 16s. net.)

It is well known that recent discoveries in physics have forced attention upon the philosophy of science: for instance, in the journal *Science Abstracts* there is now a heading "Philosophy of Science." and every month appears a number of abstracts of papers which are definitely of a philosophical nature. This would have been unthinkable not many years ago. Granted, then, the growing importance of such studies, it is clear that there is need of a textbook from which the student may obtain an introduction to the subject as a whole, and which will supply references to the works of individual writers. To produce such a book has been the aim of the author, and he has achieved a large measure of success.

After an introduction on "The Field of Philosophy," there are three parts: (1) Problems in the Logic of Science, (2) Problems in the Analysis of the Concepts of Science, and (3) Speculative Problems. It is evident that in a textbook comparing *different* philosophical views it is essential to have a well-defined set of terms: in this respect the author chooses the term *event* as the "most adequate name for the basic entity of science." Knowledge then becomes "the awareness of the realm of events." Symbols are also events, and their meaning is found in Ogden's "sign situation." They have two very important types of relationship: (1) Reference to events not themselves normally symbols; and (2) reference to other symbols. Few scientists

will wish to find fault with this approach, but it is unfortunate that two important words constantly in use—"fact" and "real"—should have evaded definition; this, as always, leads to obscurity.

In analysing the concepts of science, in particular Space, Time, Force, and Probability, the author is not quite so convincing and admits that several concepts have not yet been clearly analysed. In view, however, of the very great difficulty of the subject, the author is to be congratulated on having produced a good and valuable textbook.

G. Burniston Brown.

The Riddle of Life: A Survey of Theories. By William McDougall, M.B., F.R.S. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1938. 8vo. Pp. xv + 279. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

Professor McDougall's latest work consists of a critical exposition of all the more important theories purporting to explain the phenomena of life. He examines in turn the mechanistic and materialistic, the vitalistic, the holistic and organismic, and the monadistic hypotheses, and the evidence, or lack of evidence, upon which these hypotheses are based. On the whole they are impartially stated and generally, though not always, exactly expounded. This criticism is aimed, for instance, at the author's treatment of the teaching of Aristotle with regard to the nature of the *psyche*, and in respect of his doctrine of causality. It is aimed also at the inclusion of the hypotheses of the Gestalt psychologists among "other supports for mechanical biology." The Gestalt psychologists themselves would certainly protest against their views being classified under that head. Indeed, "the tendency of every Gestalt to maintain and restore a dynamic equilibrium" is, as McDougall says, a dynamic principle; and it has teleological implications rather than mechanistic ones. Other criticisms might be offered also; but they need not be stressed in a review of a non-technical work written for the general reader. The author states in his preface that he has no hypothesis of his own to offer, but in fact he does present one. His predilection becomes increasingly obvious as one proceeds from chapter to chapter, until finally he embraces a monadic theory of the living organism in these terms, ". . . nevertheless, the purely psychological study of human subjects would inevitably suggest and compel us to formulate a monadic theory of the constitution of man." He goes even further in supporting the view that the monads are hierarchically organized, and brings forward telepathy in support of his contention, accepting the results of J. B. Rhine's experiments on extra-sensory perception as good evidence for its occurrence. McDougall is first and foremost a psychologist, and insists upon the necessity of taking mental events into account in any discussion of vital processes. Purpose, memory (the basis of which he holds to be immaterial), and teleological behaviour must be given due weight in any attack upon the problem of life. His criticisms, especially of the mechanistic biologies, are trenchant; but he seems to be unduly willing to accord hospitality to questionable evidence where his own hypotheses are concerned.

F. Aveling.

Human Needs in Modern Society. By B. T. Reynolds and R. G. Coulson. (London: Jonathan Cape. 1938. Pp. 274. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

The authors of this interesting book, which acknowledges inspiration from the Institute, have written it, not because they have anything new to reveal

about human nature or modern society, but because they think they have discovered a way out of the unhappiness which is now so prevalent. They have used Psychology, "the science which throws most light on human well-being," as guide in their experiments and test of their conclusions. In Part I reasons are given, justly, as many will think, for preferring McDougall's system to all others. Having very clearly outlined his famous doctrine of Instincts and Sentiments, from it is derived a handy five-fold criterion of "the essentials of human well-being." By the aid of these the reader is shown in Part II the meaning of the stresses set up in human personalities as society evolved through the Industrial Revolution to the Class War and the World War, leading on to our "Brave New World." The sickness of society to-day, with its classes and masses and its increasing bureaucracy, is diagnosed in Part III. Not forgetting Primitive Needs, Self-regard arrested at the predatory stage, and starved Other-regard, are leading features of its malady. The authors claim to have found a cure, apparently commonplace but effective, in experiments with small discussion groups of unemployed and others. To drop all defensive barriers (that is the secret) till the ground of a common humanity is reached, lifts all who share in such an experience out of the prison of narrow Self-regard and satisfies very profound human needs. The masses and the classes both need each other and if they practised together in small groups this communion by discussion it would ultimately lead to a new kind of society. The Church should be the great agency for bringing to pass this "next great step of mankind in the ascent towards the Kingdom of God," but, as one of the authors concludes in Chapter II, she is perhaps too much preoccupied with unessentials to rise to the height of her great opportunity. A religious element is necessary in the ideal development of both Self-regard and Other-regard, and new ways of providing this will have to be found if the Church does not play the part she should.

Readers of this book may perhaps think the plan it suggests impracticable, but they can hardly fail to salute its noble plea for the widespread application of sweet reasonableness to the problems of a world made nervous by constant threats of force.

A. E. Elder.

The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought. By Peter Anthony Bertucci; with a foreword by Frederick Robert Tennant. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1938. Pp. xv+311. Price, $3.50.)

"The empirical argument for God," the author tells us at the outset (3), "is a generic name given to arguments which seek to show that the most reasonable interpretation of presumptive knowledge drawn from the various realms of human experience leads to belief in God." Logical Rationalism, with its reliance on the *a priori*, on the one hand, and Naturalism, with its exclusion of all evidence that is not sensibly verifiable, on the other, are ruled out of consideration from the outset; though whether any form of empiricism can wholly dispense with the *a priori* is, as even Mr. Russell has recently admitted, more than doubtful. Nor does Mr. Bertucci discuss the objection that will be urged against his essay on grounds of principle by the very able group of empiricist thinkers who contend that all so-called propositions about God are meaningless and therefore are not propositions at all. He confines himself, as he is well within his rights in doing, to one line of empirical theology, represented in modern British thought by Martineau,

Pringle-Pattison, James Ward, Sorley and Dr. F. R. Tennant. How far the first four of these thinkers would have relished being classified as empiricists is open to question; all of them, however, lay great stress on the evidence of teleology and of moral experience. Their respective arguments to theism are expounded and criticized in the main body of the book (chapters ii–vi), and both the exposition and the criticism bear witness to the scholarship, sound judgment, and speculative acumen of the author. His lucid and equitable summary of their doctrines and the penetrating strictures to which he subjects them will assuredly be of service to examination candidates in theology and to readers who lack the leisure or the opportunity to study the five writers in detail. In each case, exposition and criticism are accompanied, as is fitting, by a progressive unfolding of Mr. Bertucci's own argument. He is out to present—and this constitutes the original contribution of his essay—the empirical argument to Theism in a more adequate form (see especially chapters v and vi, in connexion with Sorley and Tennant, and the final chapter (vii), entitled "An Empirical View of the Goodness of God," where he deals expressly with the problem of evil). None of the five thinkers aforementioned—not even his own teacher, Dr. Tennant, whom he regards as by far the most satisfactory of the group—can be wholly acquitted of disloyalty to empiricism. "His views of the noumenal ego, the nature of moral obligation, the eternity of God, non-temporal creation, and ultimate reality are insufficiently empirical and inadequate interpretations of the data" (256). At the close, the author turns for consolation to Professor Edgar S. Brightman, claiming that the history of the world we know, i.e. the ascertained course of the evolutionary process up to date, inclusive of the ideals which are systematized inductions from human experience, warrants the belief in a "cosmic Ally" who is temporal and creates the world in time (though "his time-space be much greater and his tempo different from ours"); who loves mankind and whose purpose is ethically good, though realized in face of "a retarding factor, refractory to God's will," "an ultimate, irrational, constituent element of God's nature, which is uncreated and as eternal as God himself" (276). The order and values discernible in the world we know indicate that this "Given," as Brightman terms it, "is controlled by God, although it does delay the realization of his purpose" (277). The known facts of evil force upon us this admission.

It is very interesting to find a writer of Mr. Bertucci's ability and sincerity, who is prepared to propose a God thus limited as the object of religious worship. Yet what more could he do with the restrictions imposed upon his method from the outset? Even the conclusions he reached are purchased by a sacrifice of empiricism. Only by drawing blank cheques upon the future can any faith in God's goodness be grounded on the chequered record of past happenings, whether in cosmic or in human history. What security does the record offer of a temporal millennium? To say nothing of the tragic story of human and infra-human suffering, the second law of thermo-dynamics hangs like a pall over the far-off event. Mr. Bertucci deserves praise for facing the problem of evil in his last chapter, but his handling of it goes a very little way to support his theism. The real source of the failure of his argument, as also of Dr. Tennant's failure in *Philosophical Theology*, is the ruling out of the evidence of religious experience. If we are to take into account "the various realms of human experience," why is this particular realm regarded as irrelevant? It is just as though in arguing to the value of art we were to exclude aesthetic experience from consideration, pending the establishment of our case on evidence drawn from non-aesthetic sources. The essay before us gives abundant proof of Mr. Bertucci's competence to

discuss the philosophy of religion; we can only hope that his talents will some day be exercised in an inquiry on more fruitful lines.

W. G. DE BURGH.

A Basis of Opinion. By ADRIAN COATES, M.A. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1938. Pp. xvii + 461. Price, 16s. net.)

This is, I think, as vigorous and provocative a piece of philosophical writing as has appeared in English for some time. Its *genre* is that of the *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik*: its claim is to have established a "basis for an anti-metaphysical philosophy"—a basis of opinion for those, like the author, "who have cast loose from the anchorage of religion and traditional belief, and find no satisfaction in any of the contemporary philosophies, popular or academic" (p. 9). Its position may be roughly described as a variant of personalist pluralism. It has affinities, not necessarily conscious, with some modern variants of pragmatism. The author's thesis presents a front of consistence and clarity: nevertheless, on close consideration I find it hard to be sure just where the argument (as distinguished from asseveration) begins, how it develops and hangs together, and what it concludes. This may be my fault.

Philosophy, Mr. Coates holds, aims not at Truth, which is the peculiar *ignis fatuus* of the philosopher; but at a "reasonable Point of View" to be arrived at by criticism of common beliefs and opinions. As to both end and means this is unoriginal enough. So too, if more modish, is the qualification of this criticism as concerned fundamentally with the use and meaning of words. The reasonable point of view is that which is linguistically consistent. Such consistency, however, is not that of a 'mathematical Logic' (another *ignis fatuus*) but that of 'language-thought' which "embodies the whole range of human thought, feeling and activity" (p. 50). I fail to find any illumination, however, on the problems of language and meaning in this hyphen; nor do I see ground for believing that the 'reasonable' can be pursued once truth is repudiated.

Philosophy as a 'Point of View' is sharply distinguished from metaphysics —by which he ostensibly means any and every kind of transcendence, every kind of 'realism' (except his own which, like the schoolboy seeking protection by crossing his fingers, he supposes saved by his use of the words 'exist' and 'actual' instead of 'real'), every form of hypostatization, every assertion of a supernatural Order, a Universe or Cosmos. In fact, I have concluded, he means by "metaphysics" philosophy which he does not like, and by "philosophy" metaphysics which he does like.

This violent anti-metaphysicism runs—a veritable *écrasez l'infâme*—through the whole work: and like all such bellicosities, it leads to odd misperceptions and extremes. "It is astonishing," he writes, "that . . . men of the highest intellectual attainments . . . cannot see, what should be plain to anyone with a trained critical intelligence, that the whole structure of metaphysics is built up by the method of ambiguity, that ambiguity is to metaphysics, as mathematics is to the physical sciences" (p. 111). Two further *obiter dicta*: ". . . present-day educated opinion . . . rejects equally the claims of revealed religion and metaphysical philosophy . . ." (p. 451), and "the tendency of the bulk of present-day philosophy in England seems to be to support orthodoxy in politics and religion rather than to attack it" (p. 15). From these, taken together, we may validly draw the interesting conclusion that most contemporary English philosophers are (or seem) uneducated.

Mr. Coates's philosophy may be set forth, for brevity, in a few citations: "Against all such metaphysical aberration let us make our stand firmly on this twofold foundation of sound opinion: first, that *self-consciousness is focal to thought and reality;* second, that *self-consciousness means and can only properly mean the self-consciousness of individual selves or persons*" (p. 218). "Personal existence is not a department of reality; but rather reality is a department of personal existence" (p. 229). "Ultimately the space-time continuum is nothing else than the public or universal form of our perceptual experience; . . ." (p. 275). "The unity of the real is made to depend . . . upon the unity and publicity of our sensible experience" (p. 196). "That we share a common universe of experience depends on our sharing, for all practical purposes, the same here-now and the same type of mind and senses." "The independent existence of other people" we "take for granted." "And if we take as our fundamental datum this mutual intercourse of independently existing selves or persons, willing, thinking and feeling, creating and sharing together a public world of history and reality, then we shall be able to relate in terms of it reality to history and history to actuality. Reality is its common, public, spatial-temporal-logical aspect, actuality its aspect of individual experience and consciousness; and history combines and comprehends these two opposite categories" (p. 397).

Concerning all of this Mr. Coates says, "But this Point of View will not be metaphysical, inasmuch as no objective validity will be claimed for it, but only a logical validity: that is, it will be claimed to be reasonable, inasmuch as it avoids ambiguity, equivocation, and other logical errors" (p. 38).

A few comments and questions only. (i) *Does* the author only claim linguistic consistence for the above propositions about 'independently existing' persons, and their 'mutual intercourse'? It seems to me quite incredible. His metaphysical disclaimers, if taken seriously, would undercut them all. (ii) Does the author, in these (and other) passages avoid the 'verbal tricks' —the vaguities and ambiguities—of the 'metaphysician'? What of the phrases (several times repeated) 'is focal to,' 'a department of'? (iii) By what right does Mr. Coates speak of 'the unity and publicity of *our* sensible experience'? *We* do not, strictly, have sensible experience. *I* have it, and *you* act as though you had it, or as I should if I had it. In short, under the neat phrases 'unity and publicity' is he not burking the whole crucial and complex issue concerning the *private* and the *public*? Is he not side-stepping the really hard question, 'How do I pass from sensitive experience to a common world and a community of persons?' Mr. Coates seems to me to 'take for granted' precisely those points which most evidently need establishment. (iv) Has he appreciated the difficulties provoked by his being *also a body*? (v) What warrant have we in our knowledge of Descartes to describe him as of a 'servile temperament' (p. 134)? Can it be doubted that Hume realized how far-reaching was his scepticism? Is it not a bad case of the so-called 'intellectualist fallacy' to expect by clearing up a few points of politics, metaphysics, and theology, "the envious passions of men to wither and lose strength" (p. 393)?

Notwithstanding the many points on which it seems to me that Mr. Coates fails, I have no doubt that his work is worth reading. His concluding discussion of history, and parts of his treatment of causality, seem to me instructive.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

The Philosophy of Whitehead. By Rasvihary Das, M.A., Ph.D. (James Clarke & Co., Ltd. Pp. 200. Price, 6s. net.)

Mr. Das has written an able exposition of certain leading ideas in Whitehead's philosophy of organism. It is a baffling task to compress into an essay of 200 pages the gist of the elaborate and sometimes diffuse discussions of two books such as *Process and Reality* and *Adventures of Ideas*. In some chapters, notably those on "Propositions," "Feelings," "God," where Mr. Das gives us mainly compression, and that largely in Whitehead's own words, with the minimum of elucidation, it is doubtful whether much is gained except that he provides a readable summary for those already familiar with Whitehead's work. In other chapters, however, such as those on "Perception" and "The Extensive Continuum," he has been more successful in bringing out the salient points which Whitehead is making. He reserves his own criticisms and difficulties for a short chapter at the end of the book. My own wish is that the points here raised, which are well taken, had been given much fuller discussion and perhaps made into the main section of the book. Such difficulties concern what Whitehead means by creativity, and his attempt to combine an atomic view of actual entities with universal relativism through his conception of objective immortality. Possibly the difficulties Mr. Das finds in seeing how a subject which is a "process of experience" can constitute itself out of its own feelings would be somewhat mitigated if he had given more attention to Whitehead's view of "subjective aim"; and also had considered Whitehead's view of the becoming of an actual entity as its "achievement of definiteness" in the light of analogies from aesthetics rather than from science. The indications are that it is such analogies which have been the dominant consideration in Whitehead's mind during his later work.

Mr. Das concentrates on certain points in Whitehead's systematic metaphysic, and (no doubt from exigency of space) takes no note of any of the *obiter dicta*, in the wit and insight of which Whitehead's deeper influence on contemporary thought is likely to lie. But students of his metaphysic will find a number of useful suggestions, especially in the last two chapters of this little book.

Dorothy M. Emmet.

Social Thought from Lore to Science. By Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker, with the assistance of Émile Benoît-Smullyan and others. Vol. I: A History and Interpretation of Man's Ideas about Life with His Fellows, pp. xxiv + 790 + lxxxiv. Vol. II: Sociological Trends Throughout the World, pp. viii + 387 (numbered 791–1178) + lxxvii. (Boston, New York, and London, 1938: D. C. Heath & Co. (Social Science Series). Price: Vol. I, 5 dollars; Vol. II, 4 dollars 50.)

This large work was conceived and begun by Mr. Barnes, and finished and seen through the press by Mr. Becker, with the help of a numerous staff of collaborators; the table of contents indicates the authorship of its various sections and subsections. Between them its two volumes offer a comprehensive picture of the social thought of all times and places; and a certain unity is provided for them by this fact and by the extensive dependence of the second volume upon the first. But, as their titles indicate, they differ considerably in method and in subject-matter. The first volume proceeds chronologically, and offers a sketch of the development of social thought of all kinds, beginning with the notions implicit in the customs and institutions

of preliterate man (of which it is naturally necessary to offer an "interpretation" rather than a "history") and carrying the narrative down to the most elaborate and recondite notions of present-day sociologists and philosophic historians. The second volume, confining itself to social thought in the more restricted sense appropriate to writers of these kinds, divides its subject-matter by place rather than by time and attempts to depict the recent development and present condition of sociological thought in different parts of the world.

The authors and their collaborators are to be congratulated on the accomplishment of what must have been a herculean task. And many students will undoubtedly welcome the results of their labours, both as offering in one place a conspectus of the whole of man's thinking about society, and also as enabling the reader to refresh his memory of particular thinkers or to envisage such thinkers in their historical contexts. But the chief value of the book is probably that it provides an introduction to important writers, in many different times and places, who have understood their business differently from most of the better-known figures in the history of social thought (and often in a way more similar to that of the modern sociologist), and are therefore likely to be unfamiliar to the ordinary student. Some of them, like Ibn Khaldūn (in whom our authors seem to be specially interested), are unfamiliar for special reasons of time and place and language; but there are no less valuable discussions of writers like Ferguson and Turgot who are much nearer to us in these respects. We can also welcome the information which the second volume provides about the sociological thinking done in countries and languages with which we are not normally acquainted; but our authors seem to have discovered less of interest here than in their studies of the past.

Certain defects are of course inevitable in a work of this kind, and are by no means to be laid at the door of the authors. To make such a work complete, it is desirable to pay an apparently disproportionate attention to thinkers of little or no intrinsic importance; and to make it readable, it is desirable to have some kind of unifying conception, which cannot be adopted without neglecting such writers and in other ways giving an undue emphasis to certain parts of the material at the expense of others. Nor have our authors avoided these difficulties. It is very natural to feel about many of the writers whom they discuss, what they say *à propos* of one of them, that "explanation of the respectful attention such absurd thinking attracted remains both difficult and fruitless" (p. 1071); and there is little obvious unity in either of their two volumes, still less (as we have seen) in their work as a whole. At the same time, it is difficult to resist the impression that the book would have had a greater appearance of unity, and that some of the apparently irrelevant and uninteresting writers might have been excluded, if the authors had possessed a more definite conception of the nature and aims of sociology and other kinds of social thought. It is true that they often discuss the question, and show a distinct preference for modern ways of envisaging the subject. But this preference does not prevent them from being well aware that much modern work is wrongly conceived, if not actually absurd; and their frequent discussions of the question do not seem to have enabled them to make up their minds about it at all clearly.

What is perhaps more serious (though this may again be inevitable in a work of such comprehensiveness) is the presence of some inaccuracies: Professor Ginsberg, for example, is implied to have been the author of *Dialogues on Metaphysics* (p. 813), and Adam Smith (p. 954) to have been Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh. The reader who finds such errors in matters with which he is acquainted, is likely to feel less trustful in reading those parts of the book (and for most readers they will probably be numerous)

which deal with matters with which he is not acquainted. It must finally be added that the value of the book as a work of reference is considerably impaired by the fact that the very numerous notes are printed at the end of each volume, and that both in the main text and in the section devoted to the notes the chapter-numbers, which to facilitate consultation should be on every page, appear only at the beginnings of chapters.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Fashion and Philosophy. By H. J. PATON, White's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1937. Pp. 23. Price 2s.)

In this stimulating address Professor Paton gives us something like a survey of the various trends in present-day English moral philosophy. Starting from the observation that changes in our philosophical outlook are often due to other factors than those connected with the requirements of philosophy in its narrower sense at a certain stage of its development, he suggests that the tendency of contemporary thought is unmistakably towards a realistic conception of things and "away from the old idealism which had its origin in Germany and received new life in this country by the work of men like Green and Wallace and Caird and Bradley" (p. 5). This "reaction against the romanticism of the nineteenth century" he considers in the main to be salutary. If, however, it tends to manifest itself, as it often does, in mere analysis for its own sake, then Professor Paton thinks it necessary to remind us that after all the "business of philosophy is to be synoptic, to see things in their togetherness, to fit our different experiences and our different theories, as far as may be, into a consistent whole" (p. 6).

Passing, then, over to the sciences to which moral philosophy for some time to come is still likely to be indebted for material for reflection, Professor Paton warns us that it would not be wise for a philosopher to place too much confidence in the findings of the scientists as regards the issue of determinism versus indeterminism, since so his task would appear to be not much more than an attempt to settle down in those gaps of knowledge which science has so far left unfilled. He for himself acknowledges that "the thinking which discovers causal law cannot itself be governed only by causal law" (p. 13) and that "obedience to the laws of thought, which is itself a kind of freedom, is necessary if the causal laws discovered by science are to be valid" (p. 13 sq.); nor does he fear that these conclusions could be overturned by some such psychology as that of Freud or some such sociology as that of Marx, however useful it may be for us occasionally to be reminded how much of our thoughts and ways of feeling is the direct result of our psychological make-up and of our position in organized human society.

But probably the most interesting part of this address is the last one, where Professor Paton speaks of the influence on moral philosophy by moral practice, and where he urges that the philosopher in these days should strive to get in closer touch with the realities of life. I trust that every reader of *Philosophy* will whole-heartedly concur with him when he concludes his essay with the following sentence: "My final suggestion is that the time may be ripe for a new fashion in philosophy; that philosophy may have to give up the cold detachment which I have described as its present character; that it may be compelled, without abandoning the rigour of its present thinking, to face again the ultimate problems of man's position in the universe and on this disturbed and perishable planet; even that it may be led once more

to become what it has always been in the persons of its greatest exponents, certainly a criticism, and perhaps even a way, of life" (p. 23).

H. Gauss.

Perception and Aesthetic Value. By H. N. Lee. (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1938. Pp. xii + 271. Price $3.50.)

Judging from the fact that this is the second American book on aesthetics from the axiological standpoint that has come my way in the last six months, axiology must be as much the vogue in America as is the Lambeth Walk in London. The value of such works cannot always be measured by their concern for value; but Mr. Lee's contribution to the subject is one I can heartily recommend to serious students of aesthetics.

He gets a really first-rate start that promises steady progress along the right lines; go to experience, he says, sounding a warning against the paraphernalia of philosophical presuppositions, and in Appendix A excellently describes the proper relationship between aesthetics and metaphysics. For experience gives us the subject-matter of all aesthetic inquiries; aesthetics is a philosophical study of the data furnished by the common experience of this type of worth, and cannot therefore be narrowed down either to a philosophy of beauty or to a philosophy of art. Here is an interesting definition: "Aesthetics is the intellectual study of the experience of aesthetic value."

Now value in general, according to Perry, is a relation arising from conative interest between an individual and his environment, and any specific variety of value—economic, moral, religious, aesthetic, etc.—is found by analysing the terms of the particular relation. It follows that subject and object are equally indispensable to aesthetic experience. Such is the lay-out of the book. The essence of the author's conclusions is that what distinguishes aesthetic experience and value from every other known kind of experience and value is *its preoccupation with perception as an end in itself.* "The aesthetic experience," he writes, "is fundamentally the experience of perceptual grasp," or, in another passage, "aesthetic value means perceptual value."

Now the value attributed to the aesthetic object perceived can be either positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant, beautiful or ugly; it is not equivalent either to beauty or pleasure taken alone, for these are parts only of a larger whole. And as perception is also apperception, our appreciation can be reinforced by the logical and emotional significance, the "derived" value, we add unconsciously and spontaneously to whatever we see or hear.

An ingenious doctrine this, and not devoid of psychological insight; but how much subtler the psychological analysis would have been had the author realized the whole difference between the empathy of "Vernon Lee" and the "Einfühlung" of Volkelt and Lipps. I venture to draw his attention to the chapter on the theory of "Einfühlung" in my *Critical History of Modern Aesthetics.*

I imagine aestheticians would agree that aesthetic experience transpires for the most part at the perceptual level. What really matters is surely the singling out of the aesthetic differentia in the act of perception; and here, I'm afraid, the author fails us. For the perceptual activity *per se* is just as aesthetically indifferent as the act of digestion or circulation; it is a psychological function, no more akin to aesthetic experience than sensation or cognition. What lends a barren act of perception aesthetic value is the formal or emotional significance of the object perceived. A minor point I cannot accept is the selection of "pleasure" as the criterion of worth; for surely a

waltz of Strauss is far pleasanter than *Hamlet* or *Lear*? I am strongly inclined to think that this interesting psychological study of the aesthetic field would have benefited if Santayana had been supplemented by Volkelt and Dessoir instead of, or as well as, by Croce and Carritt.

LISTOWEL.

The Education of the Emotions—Through Sentiment Development. By MARGARET PHILLIPS, M.A. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1937. Pp. 318. Price 8s. 6d.)

The doctrine of the "sentiments" as it has taken shape in the writings of Shand and McDougall has had a considerable vogue among British psychologists; and it is strange that until recently it has occurred to no one to ascertain the actual facts concerning the nature and development of particular sentiments in particular cases. This is what Miss Phillips set herself to do. By a very simple and direct procedure she has attempted to discover the origin and the course of development of some representative sentiments and interests in a group of her students, colleagues, and friends. Her method was to ask some two hundred and seventy-five subjects to give in writing a life history of any developed sentiment, passion, or interest of their own, showing the stages of its development, the sources from which it derived, and the nature of the satisfaction obtained from it. Quite wisely no attempt was made to submit the data so obtained to any elaborate statistical treatment. The author prefers rather to indicate the general impressions and tentative generalizations which emerge from an attentive, impartial, and reflective survey of the data. Copious extracts from the subjects' own records are given to enable the reader in some measure to judge for himself the justice of the author's conclusions.

Broadly, Miss Phillips's thesis is that the purposive striving underlying sentiment formation focuses first of all on those persons and things in the child's immediate environment which are most significant for early needs and that it extends progressively to persons and things more remote. Sentiments for persons have their origin, naturally, in attachments to parents, and sentiments for other persons Miss Phillips holds—in common with Freudian psychologists—are in considerable measure sentiments for "parent substitutes." But on this, as on many other points, the author is critical of psychoanalytic views. The interesting suggestion is put forward that the wider social sentiments have a dual origin, in the family and in membership of adolescent gangs; and that whilst the former source is conducive later to allegiance to an authoritarian system, the latter fosters devotion to organizations of an equalitarian type.

A dual origin is also assigned to the sentiments for things. Some arise directly from immediate contact with impersonal features in the child's early environment (and in this connection Miss Phillips has several very sensible and pertinent things to say about ribbon development, urban aggregates, and the importance of preserving some parts of the earth's surface simple and unobscured). Other sentiments for things come into existence through sentiments for persons, a sentiment for a person being in effect and in part a sentiment for that person's world. This explanation is offered as an alternative to explanation in terms of suggestion and sympathetic induction, but it might with equal force be regarded as an amplification of an account of how suggestion actually works.

In the working out of a general theory along these lines particular interest attaches to the sentiment for oneself. "Since development is thus from the

centre outwards," Miss Phillips writes, "the self necessarily forms the point of departure." If this means the first sentiment is *for* the self the argument is an obvious *non sequitur*. But this is probably not what is meant, since the remark is followed up by the suggestions that a sentiment for the self arises (*a*) when some obstruction prevents the normal attachments to others and (*b*) in consequence of attachment to others. This second mechanism is a special case of a sentiment for another person engendering an interest in that other person's world.

It is a pity that Miss Phillips did not go into this in a little more detail as there is much that is queer and obscure about the self-regarding sentiment. She excuses herself from doing so on the ground that satisfactory emotional development depends much more upon sentiments for "the not self." In fact, Miss Phillips does not appear to endorse the approval which other psychologists have accorded to the sentiment for one's self. In this connection she expresses some unorthodox views concerning the moral and educational importance of team games. On the evidence she adduces it certainly looks as if the central object of a sentiment for games is "the self as successful" and not the game itself nor the team nor the larger society which the team represents. In a quiet way many distinctly challenging assertions are set out in this volume. In short, the author may fairly be said to have written a very controversial and provoking book, and it is sincerely to be hoped that its modest and disarming style will not obscure this fact. It deserves to be widely read and to have its findings either confirmed or refuted by further research.

C. A. Mace.

Mental Conflicts and Personality. By Mandel Sherman, M.D., Ph.D. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1938. Pp. viii + 319. Price 12s. 6d.)

In the present century the study of abnormal psychology has made notable contributions to the understanding of human nature: among the fruitful concepts introduced by this study that of mental conflict has an important place. The significance of this concept has hardly been fully developed, and the author of *Mental Conflicts and Personality* places before us an excellent survey of its far-reaching possibilities. The opening chapters of the book are necessarily expository: the author avoids the restraints of rigid definition while indicating clearly those aspects of a living human being which are involved in the idea of conflict. He gives us a survey of current theories as to the drives or instinctive desires: this is sound, but has the usual quality of a baffling attempt to define the indefinable. The dynamic forces thus envisaged may be in conflict among themselves or with forces from the environment without. Personality is presented in a conceptual connotation and its characteristics are shown to be derived through conflict as a means of adjustment and a way of maintaining individual integrity. This difficult part of the subject is treated with admirable simplicity, and the reader is left with a clear picture of the purpose of the author. The emphasis on conflict as an essential accompaniment of growth and an ever present condition in the human psyche is much needed. The introductory matter concludes by drawing attention to the existence of inborn differences of constitution which influence individual reactions to similar environmental stimuli. An interesting chapter follows on the origin of personal attitudes. These are presented to us as the basic framework of behaviour and a means of avoiding continual minor conflict. The author shows how these attitudes may be the

outcome of deep emotional conflicts; and further, that any significant change of attitude is accompanied by conflict. He relates these ideas to the stages of human growth. In this connection we are rightly warned of the difficulty of any objective determination of personal attitudes.

The rest of the book is a descriptive classification of varieties of conflicts under various simple heads. Those conflicts due to culture, inferiority, and sex receive detailed attention and may be considered as applicable to all human life. A logical sequence of thought leads to the last two chapters, which show the rôle of conflict in the genesis of neuroses and asocial behaviour. The difference between ordinary conflict and neurotic conflict is clearly defined, but the nature of endo-psychic conflict perhaps receives less attention than its importance warrants. A useful distinction is made between asocial conduct due to accessible conflict and that due to dissociation.

It is perhaps inevitable that the tendency of the book is to show the undesirable effects of conflict on human personality, and it is to be regretted that the author did not enlarge on his hint of the creative possibilities of conflict. The emphasis on prestige as a source of conflict is an interesting comment on a culture which claims to be essentially democratic. It is clear that differences of culture will tend to place the burden of conflict in accordance with the characteristics of that culture. The arguments of the book are reinforced with examples which are admirably chosen to illustrate the points at issue, and the author has used them skilfully and with moderation. The book does not lay claim to originality, but has many provocative ideas and is an excellent exposition of the subject envisaged.

GRACE NICOLLE.

A Bibliography of David Hume and of Scottish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson to Lord Balfour. By T. E. JESSOP. (London and Hull: A. Brown & Sons, Ltd. 1938. Pp. xiv + 201. Price 21s. net.)

Professor Jessop has done for Hume and Scottish Philosophy what he did for Berkeley some years ago. The present work consists of two sections. The first deals with Hume alone, giving the latter's writings, the various editions, translations, articles, and books on Hume and on his writings. The second deals with Scottish Philosophy from Francis Hutcheson, though he includes the latter's teacher and also the Chevalier Ramsay, to Lord Balfour. Professor Jessop seeks to confine the list as far as possible to *philosophy* and to those who were in the native tradition—a condition which excludes Scotsmen who wrote on philosophy under other influences. There is a short but interesting preface and at the end a list of Gifford Lecturers and a valuable index of names.

The work, involving a prodigious labour, is, as far as the present reviewer is competent to judge, carried out with great thoroughness and completeness, and will be very helpful to students not merely of Hume and of Scottish Philosophy but of the wider international field. If any omissions occur they must be quite minor in character or else result from the conditions imposed by Professor Jessop on himself. Within the body of the work itself two points might be noted. On page 38, under "other literary activities," a date 1785 is given; is this a misprint for 1758? On page 155 (Mackintosh) under *Miscellaneous Works*, 1846, there is *Trans.*—*1829. *Mélanges philosophiques*; if the latter is a translation of the former, the dates seem to constitute a difficulty.

B. M. LAING.

General and Social Psychology. By ROBERT H. THOULESS. (Second Edition, Revised and Extended. London: University Tutorial Press, 1937. Pp. xii + 522. Price 8s. 6d.)

This well-known text-book has been so thoroughly revised, and so usefully enlarged, that it has become a new and better book. It is now an introduction to general psychology centred upon social phenomena. The author is undoubtedly right in maintaining that students of the social sciences need a full psychological background, rather than a selection of topics too specifically directed to their other studies. There is no real distinction between individual and social psychology, and it is best to avoid suggesting one. So he is amply justified in dealing with intelligence tests, and for this reason alone (though there are others) it was necessary to introduce the elements of statistical methods. He is over-cautious in suggesting in the preface that the reader may omit these chapters without great loss, for they are much more profitable parts of social psychology than much of the speculative discussion we too often meet in this field. The book is obviously intended for the serious student, and is compact, clear, and well organized. It will be found useful and stimulating, especially by those who enjoy competent teaching.

For Dr. Thouless has obtained an unusual comprehensiveness by a brevity which frequently leads to statements so disconcertingly sudden that the beginner may not always appreciate their importance. In particular, his own admirable critical arguments would be improved by fuller statement and the chapters on "Social Grouping" and "Scientific and Religious Developments" (which the student cannot easily supplement) could have been expanded profitably. But this criticism only implies a wish that the book had been longer, to enable the reader to digest more readily the wealth of information supplied. As we should expect from this writer, the work is firmly scientific in tone, balancing free analysis with appeal to experimental data. It should enjoy even greater popularity than in its earlier form.

A. W. WOLTERS.

Psychology: The Changing Outlook. By FRANCIS AVELING. (London: Watts & Co., 1937. Pp. vii + 152. Price 2s. 6d.)

This small book can be praised without reserve. Professor Aveling has given in this short space a lucid and satisfying account of the chief schools of psychology, described the most important fields of application, and indicated future lines of development. He achieves this by great economy of words and precision of statement, and the result is a most readable book, which can be commended to the lay reader while it must stimulate the professional psychologist. It is closely packed with information selected for its importance, and admirably organized. It is remarkable for an impartiality so complete that the reader cannot detect which way the author's sympathies lean, except that he stresses the importance of a wise eclecticism which shall lead to a future synthesis of the rival theories. He holds that the progress made by researches inspired by theories which seem at the moment to be sharply opposed, indicates that each has seized some aspect of the final truth. But he is no undiscriminating eclectic, and ventures to suggest the points at which reconciliation can occur. These selections of the book deserve the full consideration of all psychologists. It is encouraging to meet a book which stands so well above the battle, not ignoring it, but showing the way to peace and alliance.

A. W. WOLTERS.

Human Affairs: An Exposition of What Science Can Do for Man. By Various Authors. Edited by R. B. Cattell, J. Cohen, and R. M. W. Travers. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1937. Pp. xi + 360. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Human Affairs is a collection of essays on social and political problems written by fifteen distinguished representatives of the social and biological sciences. It is the outcome of a project to establish a periodical which would deal with current matters of social interest from a scientific point of view; and, as the Preface states, "It is as an attempt to pave the way for this periodical and to measure the extent of public support awaiting it that the present volume has been launched." This book is to be welcomed in that it presents in a simple and very readable manner the contributions that the sciences which deal with life have to make to the art of actual living; and the names of those who have contributed to its pages are a sufficient guarantee of its scientific standard. Should a journal planned on these lines and maintaining this standard come to be established, its editors would have a right to expect success for it. F. Aveling.

The Modern Mind. By Michael Roberts. (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd. 1937. Pp. 284. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This is, in the best sense, a popular book. It is written for a wider public than that of the universities—where, however, it might be not unprofitably perused. (I have myself recommended it as general reading for second-year students.) Mr. Roberts is a poet and critic of poetry; and he brings a fresh note into a theme which might have been very dull and ordinary. His work may roughly be described as an analysis of the forces productive of the modern mind; and it is a merit that he casts back into the Middle Ages instead of making his start with Descartes, the so-called Father of Modern Philosophy.

While the author puts forward no claim to be a first-hand student of the many men and movements he is compelled to consider, his reading has been wide and discriminating; his judgment, too, where I am at all competent to pass upon it, is just. His principal aim is to follow up the changing senses of certain key words in the language, such e.g. as *reason* and *imagination*, and to show how this shift affected (and was affected by) shifts in the dominant mental attitude. His chief complaint concerning the modern world is that it is unpoetic; that it has turned its back upon imagination as upon mere fancies or fictions. Hobbes is one of the true parents of the modern mind, and against him, "The real, the crucial charge . . . is not that he was an atheist but that he was blind to poetry." (It is, I fear, no answer to this charge to remind Mr. Roberts of Hobbes's versions of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, nor even of his charming *Vita Carmine Expressa*.) Thus, deprived of all but the categories of mechanism and material effect, Reason dwindled to that pale and unfructifying light which glimmers in the rational theology of the eighteenth century.

"Rational theology," the author writes, "makes use of certain feelings, instincts, or needs in man in order to show that religion is necessary. Those feelings can be called up by a suitable use of language: they exist, the Christian believes, in all men; they are recognized and acknowledged by the reader, and the deduction, the necessity of faith and worship, follow. But that appeal and argument cannot be made if we are restricted to the evidence of the senses (more especially the evidence of the sense of sight) and to the language appropriate to the discussion of that evidence" (p. 101).

The situation of religion in the modern mind is for him something of a test-case, though his argument is of wider scope. This citation, therefore, should

suggest the general line he takes, as well as the sort of difficulties in which his case, if fully argued, might become embrangled. Mr. Roberts's thesis is admirably developed and documented, and I have found it very suggestive indeed, even (perhaps particularly) where it seems to me least conclusive. It deserves to be read.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

The Māndūkyopanishad with Gaudapāda's Kārikā and Śankara's Commentary Translated and annotated by SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. With a Foreword by V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER. Sri Ramakrishna Centenary Publication (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama. 1936. Pp. xliii + 361. Price Rs. 2.8.)

The Māndūkya-Upanishad is the latest of the well-known Ten Upanishads, and it is also the shortest, consisting, as it does, of only a dozen small prose paragraphs engaged in the symbolism of the sacred syllable *ōm*. The latter is said to comprise in its "three quarters" (*a–u–m*) the whole universe, viz. the three states of existence (waking, dreaming, deep sleep), while pointing with its (imaginary) "fourth quarter" to "that which is beyond threefold time." The difference of the soul abiding in its third and fourth state respectively is that of the "omniscient" "inner ruler" (world-soul) and the Absolute.

This Upanishad has given rise to a metrical paraphrase in 29 stanzas and a purely philosophical elaboration of the subject in three chapters called respectively Vaitathya (Falseness, Illusion; 38 stanzas), Advaita (Non-duality; 48 stanzas) and Alātaśānti (Quenching of the Fire-brand; 100 stanzas) and this whole work has become known, from the colophons to its four chapters, as the Gaudapādīya-Kārikā, i.e. the Manual of Gaudapāda. The work is of very great interest, as it is the first attempt to place the idealistic Vedānta on a strictly philosophical basis. The result is an adaptation, to the Vedānta, of both the spiritual monism (vijñāna-vāda) and the so-called nihilism (śūnya-vāda) of Buddhist philosophy, with surprising contacts, as pointed out by Deussen, with the method and thought of Parmenides.

The commentary on this unique work is attributed to the famous Śankarāchārya—wrongly, in our opinion, though tradition may be right in regarding Gaudapāda (about whom nothing more is known) as the "teacher's teacher" of the great Vedāntin. The commentary is useful and the only one we possess.

The neatly printed book before us contains in Sanskrit and English the Upanishad and the Kārikā and, in English only, the commentary on the latter. The translator has made use of the earlier translation of the same three texts by Manilal L. Dvivedi (published in Bombay in 1909 for the Theosophical Publication Fund) and succeeded in improving upon it, mainly by a large number of well-conceived and, for the most part, very necessary notes. His long and interesting Preface (i.e. introduction) is largely occupied with his objections to the difference of opinion believed to exist by Professor Das Gupta (and other scholars) between Gaudapāda and Śankarāchārya. The Foreword is by V. Subrahmanya Iyer (Reader in Philosophy to H.H. the Maharaja of Mysore), who wants us to recognize that "Māndūkya deals exclusively with *Philosophy* as defined by *the most modern authorities*" (see page preceding Foreword).[1]

F. OTTO SCHRADER.

[1] The same scholar has availed himself of the "unique method" of the Upanishad in his original contribution to the volume, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*; see our review in *Philosophy*, vol. xii, No. 47, April 1937.

The Heyapaksha of Yoga, or *Towards a Constructive Synthesis of Psychological Material in Indian Philosophy*. By P. V. Pathak, M.A. (Lahore: The Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot. 1932. Pp. xii + 294. Price Rs. 7.8.)

Mr. Pathak is of those who have yielded to the lure of seeing a student's degree-thesis appealing in book-form to a vaguely greater number of readers than his examiners. In such a volume there may be vivid freshness here and there in point of view—this it is worth while to get into print. But there will be also immaturity in perspective and synthesis, which the years subsequent to hyperconcentrative study can alone bring. This makes us senior folk head-shakers over a rush into print, and the author is modestly self-critical herein. There *is* this lack of perspective and symmetrical grasp in the essay. It might just as well have been written with order inverted. At the same time it is full of promise, so much so that I regret it should only have come up for review in the fifth year after its appearance, and unknown by me when I was rewriting and expanding two years ago the little manual of psychology from Pali sources which is so frequently and aptly quoted in it.

In any riper edition Mr. Pathak must come out from his cramped position as student of an Indian academy and place himself in view of cosmopolitan needs. The reader must find a historical placing in literature of so unfamiliar a term as is borne by the title, a far more important desideratum than is shown in the apparently hasty way in which the work has been prepared for and passed through press. Nor must he remain content with the shallow generalization of the Preface: that whereas the Western ideal is "complete power over nature," the Indian ideal is to "approach and realize the innermost Self in which that power already lies." For the former tradition the "know thyself" is by no means limited, as he suggests, to Socrates. The crucial difference perhaps lies in what is the "self" that is in both traditions to be known.

C. A. F. Rhys Davids.

Facts and Theories of Psycho-analysis. By Ives Hendrick, M.D. (London. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1934. Pp. xi + 308 + xii: Price os. 6d.)

"Until some genius can give another equally rational explanation of the universal phenomenon that adults remember much of their lives after five years, and very few experiences of earlier years, the discovery of Freud that the human race forgets the events of infancy because infancy is a period when sexuality and rivalry are taboo, and yet is unconsciously influenced by them in adult life, will mark an epoch in the understanding of human nature and its problems."

These are the concluding words of Dr. Hendrick's volume. They indicate the tenor of the whole volume. Fortunately it is possible to assure the perspective reader that the style and lucidity of the book are not to be judged by this extract. Indeed, the author has written a most readable book setting forth in a simple way the main outline of Freudian theory and illustrating the theory with appropriate and often striking examples. Furthermore, if such a comment be permitted, the author writes English of an excellence that is not always associated with the subject of Psycho-analysis. Naturally the critical reader encounters the usual difficulties—e.g. the study of instinct from the psychological aspect alone; the "scientific" and "controlled" qualities of a process that is centred on an affective transference, and so on.

But these are not peculiarities of the book; they are inherent in the subject. Dr. Hendrick's volume is, of its kind, excellent.

H. CRICHTON-MILLER.

Art and Understanding. By MARGARET A. BULLEY. (London: B. T. Batsford, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xix + 292. Price 15s.)

The second half of Miss Bulley's book consists of illustrations and a commentary thereon. These illustrations are delightful in themselves, and they are selected in such a way as to prove highly instructive; a photographic likeness is placed next a painting of a similar scene, a picture postcard next a portrait of the same subject, modern departures in furniture and decoration next specimens from the Victorian era. But however pleasing the reproductions from ancient and modern masters, they cannot wholly atone for the conspicuous absence of any real knowledge of aesthetics exhibited by the first and theoretical half of the volume. Miss Bulley develops her Platonic hypothesis in the language as well as in the spirit of the mystics, and even denies the possibility of scientific analysis as applied to mind or art. The book is an interesting example of the not infrequent divorce between genuine artistic sensibility coupled with an acute sense of the value of beauty and that cool detachment of mind from which true knowledge proceeds.

LISTOWEL.

Modern Man in Search of a Soul. By C. G. JUNG. Translated by DELL and BAYNES. (London: Kegan Paul, Trubner & Co. Ltd. 1933. Pp. ix + 282. Price 10s. 6d.)

This consists of a series of lectures which have been brought together in book form. The lectures give, however, a connected exposition of the views of the author, the central theme linking them up being Jung's belief in the spiritual part of man. His attitude is that man is now turning from material things to spiritual things. This can best be accomplished by man acquiring a greater knowledge of the laws governing his psyche, and a more intimate acquaintance with the workings of his own mind. Such topics are discussed as dream analysis, problems and aims of psychotherapy, a psychological theory of types, the stages of life, and a comparison of the beliefs of the author with those of Freud. Chapters are also devoted to archaic man, psychology, and literature, the basic postulates of analytical psychology, and the spiritual problems of modern man—the final chapter being reserved for a discussion of whether treatment in certain cases should be the prerogative of the psychotherapist or the clergy.

The lectures have all been written with a practical bias, and as such are of very great importance. Each also embodies a discussion of Jung's own standpoint, sometimes in contrast with that of Freud or Adler. The book will serve to clarify some of Jung's views for the reader, as well as give what is almost a résumé of his principles and his tenets. It is full of interest, and is written in an easy style, very pleasing to read. It is a useful book for the academic psychologist, and at the same time is of value to all interested in modern scientific problems.

M. COLLINS.

A Hundred Years of Psychology. By J. C. Flugel. (London: Duckworth & Co. 1933. Pp. 384. Price 15s. net.)

The Preface of this book begins: "Such a book as this is almost inevitably bad." This method of disarming criticism, however ingenious it may be, is not quite fair, and in the present case is quite unnecessary. The author has produced a really excellent book. It is comprehensive, yet concise and coherent. As for the perspective, placed as we are so near the event, it is very difficult for us to find fault with it, whatever may be the verdict a hundred years hence.

Starting with Herbart's conception of psychology as a science, at the beginning of his period, the author shows how this has been realized during the century, though perhaps hardly along the lines which Herbart himself would have laid down, and how psychology faces the next hundred years with a definite place achieved in the "hierarchy of sciences." It is astonishing how much has been got into the book, which is not only a good one, apart from some slight and pardonable inaccuracies, but also a timely one.

J. Drever.

The Evolution of Physics: The Growth of Ideas from the Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta. By Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld. (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1938. Pp. x + 319. Price 8s. 6d.)

In presenting the historical approach to the theory of relativity and the quantum theory, Einstein and his collaborator have attempted to sketch "in broad outline the attempts of the human mind to find a connection between the world of ideas and the world of phenomena." They have adopted the best method available—that of making frequent quotations from the actual writings of the pioneers themselves. They trace the rise of the mechanical theory, and then show how it seemed incapable of explaining the results of certain optical and electromagnetic experiments. The introduction of the idea that some disturbance must take place in the space between bodies, leading to the concept of a "field" of force (which is due essentially to Faraday), is excellently done, and problems arising out of this view lead to the relativity postulate. The present position of the quantum theory is discussed in the final section.

From a scientific point of view this is an important book, and just because it is authoritative and ambitious in its scope, it is not easy reading, and calls for considerable powers of concentration. From the philosophical point of view, however, it is very disappointing, and it seems that no attempt has been made to deal with the really difficult questions. No doubt the answer would be that the book is already difficult enough. Nevertheless, philosophers will want to know what Einstein means when he calls the highly abstract electromagnetic field a *reality*, and they are bound to protest when the Gothic myth energy is called a weightless *substance* and is equated indiscriminately to *matter* or *mass*, none of these terms being defined except the last.

G. Burniston Brown.

The Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile. By P. Romanelli. (New York: S. F. Vanni Inc., 1938. Pp. xi + 191. Price 2 dollars.)

This will be useful for those who feel the need of an outline of Gentile's doctrines and of the historical situation out of which they arose. It is a short

book, divided into four chapters, the first sketching the origins of the new idealism in Italy, the second expounding Gentile's general philosophy of experience, the third indicating its application to the spheres of science, art, and religion, and the last giving the author's estimate. A fairly full bibliography is appended. It is the second member of a series of Italian studies issued by the Casa Italiana of Columbia University. Poorly printed and poorly bound, its price is relatively high.

The book is too unpretentious to call for detailed treatment. It is well written and competent, and keeps in the forefront Gentile's dominant motives —his dislike of any form of realism, intellectualism, abstractionism, and pluralism. I do not think, however, that Gentile lends himself well to summary exposition: with so uncompromising and pontifical a thinker, what we need is less summary and more explanation. After a hundred years of idealism we naturally expect some of its extreme affirmations to be modified, and are therefore disconcerted when Gentile declares that knowing is not contemplation but always creation and that there is but a single knower, a transcendental or cosmic self. Since he is too learned an historical scholar not to be aware of the intense criticism which such doctrines have brought upon themselves, what we want to know is why he feels able at this time of day to revive Fichte and Hegel on their extremer sides. In his concluding chapter Dr. Romanelli assumes a critical attitude, arguing that Gentile's "actualism" is the most consistent form of subjectivism and therefore the perfect historical example of idealism. This disparaging identification of idealism with subjectivism perhaps betrays the influence of W. P. Montague, to whom the book is dedicated.

T. E. Jessop.

Modern Man and Religion. By T. G. Masaryk. (Preface by V. K. Škrach. Tr. by A. Bibza and V. Beneš, Tr. revised by H. E. Kennedy.) (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1938. Pp. 328. Price 7s. 6d.)

The death of President Masaryk a year ago, removed from Europe one of her most remarkable personalities. This book serves as a reminder of another of the varied aspects of his genius. Masaryk fulfilled the Platonic ideal of the philosopher who was ruler. Dr. Škrach, who was his literary secretary, contributes a short but illuminating preface, which reveals the chief influences and convictions of Masaryk's life, an introduction which explains much of what is written in this book. Masaryk was a deeply religious man, of Catholic upbringing and with many Protestant sympathies, a man who stood outside any particular creed, and yet believed in God and in man, which is to say in man's need of God. In the post-war world he saw that only a restoration of the idea of God to its rightful significance could give a centre around which to rebuild the world. He begins this book with a section entitled "Modern Suicidism: Wearied Souls," in which he sketches the disillusionment and consequent weariness of the world. He then passes to the philosophers and their attitude to religion, in particular to Hume, Kant, Comte, Spencer, and a man much less known in this country, Augustin Smetana. The last section deals with "Modern Titanism," or the Superman idea, as literature reveals it. It will be understood that this book was not a product of Masaryk's recent activities. It belongs to the "nineties," and yet it deals with essentially the same problems which we face to-day, and perhaps is the more valuable, because it has been written long enough to see its views tested by time. As originally it grew out of a series of articles, it lacks something of the continuity of thought that a book written as a whole would possess, but the depth of insight it

displays and the brilliant vigour of exposition are more than compensation for this. There is a delightful freshness of style. Witness the following example: "Sometimes I like to take a look at Hume's face as it is pictured in an old woodcut, and more than all I always notice how Hume, despite his scepticism, put on weight—a nice double chin and an irreproachable pigtail and wig strangely adorn the mighty rationalist." Masaryk had the happy art of being light without being trivial. If one is asked what exactly is the chief contention of this book, the reply will be that atheism and agnosticism, even in the hands of their chosen champions, reveal their insufficiency. They are ways in which men think but not ways by which men live. If man and society are to remain integrated, it will be only by means of a religious conception of life. The religious question is an eternal question, says Masaryk, and he finds it inexplicable that anyone can doubt this. Scepticism is not enough. The real question is why men fight against religion and what is the content of the seemingly irreligious life. This is a remarkable book by a remarkable man, and the very fact of Masaryk's position as administrator and statesman makes it the more significant. He had learnt the philosophy of religion in the lecture room, but it was in the State that he saw afresh what the practice of religion meant to the life of men and nations. Here is the measured judgment of a man who has every right to speak, and it is one to which we should all listen.

E. S. Waterhouse.

T. E. Hulme. By Michael Roberts. (London: Faber & Faber. 1938. Pp. 310. Price 10s. 6d.)

Henri Bergson wrote of T. E. Hulme, the subject of Mr. Michael Roberts's new book, that he was "un esprit d'une grande valeur. Il apporte, à l'étude des questions philosophiques, de rares qualités de finesse, de vigueur, et de pénétration. Ou je me trompe beaucoup, ou il est destiné à produire des œuvres intéressantes et importantes dans le domaine de la philosophie en général, et plus particulièrement peut-être dans celui de la philosophie de l'art." Hulme returned these compliments by translating Bergson's *Introduction a la Métaphysique*, and also the *Réflexions sur la Violence* of that "Bergsonian Marxist," Georges Sorel. He was killed during the War before he completed the large works of his own which he had planned, and the only writings of his that have hitherto appeared in book form is a series of fragments collected and edited by Herbert Read under the title of *Speculations*, and published in the International Library of Psychology and Philosophy. One of the signal services which Mr. Roberts has performed in his *T. E. Hulme* is that of bringing further material before us, including new poems and extracts from his articles written against Russell and others in defence of militarism during the Great War.

As in the case of Pascal and Sorel, Hulme's influence has been far less in academic circles than among the "literary intelligentsia," but here it has been a very profound influence indeed. Few individuals have been more definitely responsible for the discrediting in these circles of the optimistic and "scientific"philosophy of such writers as H. G. Wells, and its replacement for good or ill by the much less cheerful and expansive viewpoint of men like T. S. Eliot. And if he criticized Russell's pacifism, he did much to make literary men aware of the realistic pluralism of Russell and Moore in England, and of the phenomenologists on the Continent, and the reaction of both movements against the idealistic monism and pantheism of Hegel. In Hulme's mind the attack on monism in philosophy was essentially bound up with

an attack on romanticism in poetry and art. He was a vigorous and convincing protagonist of philosophical trends which from the viewpoint of the Hegelian tradition were "atavistic," and of art such as that of his friend Epstein which "romantic" tastes and notions of beauty lead people to regard in the same light. He believed that the age of "expansiveness" which began with the Renaissance was inevitably drawing to a close, and welcomed the change to a more stern and sober view of life.

ARTHUR N. PRIOR.

Honesty. By RICHARD C. CABOT. (New York & London: Macmillan & Co. 1938. Pp. 326. Price 10s. 6d.)

This is an interesting and valuable popular, not academic, discussion of one of the most difficult problems for the moralist: Is it right to tell a lie under any circumstances? or, Is the obligation of telling the truth absolute without any exception? Most writers on ethics concede, if reluctantly, that the obligation is not absolute, as there may be circumstances in which a lie may be morally justified. This is the issue with which this book is concerned. The author, who teaches ethics, but whose illustrations are mainly drawn from a long and wide experience of medical practice, challenges this conclusion, and for the most part insists on the absoluteness of the duty of honesty without any exceptions. Nevertheless, he admits that some kinds of deception are excusable in war, although he condemns any lying propaganda; and in the end of the book, *One Word More*, he concedes all I should contend for, when he says: "it is paradoxical but true that we can think a person heroic for telling a lie and yet condemn all lies as I do. . . ." "We are almost ashamed of ourselves for admitting that Desdemona's words are false. We admire her far more than if she had not said them. We know that her lie was vastly nobler than our truth. And yet we do not believe in lies. How is this possible? Because we can distinguish between the motive and the means. A heroic person snatches up, for a noble purpose, a harmful tool" (p. 320). He extends this concession to war, as I should. "War is bad. Many fighters are heroic; we honour them and hate their trade" (p. 321). I should probably admit more exceptions than the author would, cordial as is my agreement with him generally in his contention against the too prevalent practice and the too lenient judgment of lying. The arrangement of the matter is good, but the argument tends to be discursive and the style diffuse. There are abundant practical illustrations. There is an occasional Americanism unfamiliar to English readers. I have read the book with intense interest and sincere appreciation.

In the first Part, *Definitions*, he defines honesty as a Life-Preserver, "the King of the virtues and the life-saver of men" (p. 6), but he is careful to distinguish veracity from infallibility, exact conveyance from accurate apprehension of truth; he admits the legitimacy of *feints and fictions*, as a sport or art, when no deception is intended: he allows for reserve in speech, qualifying frankness, and discusses the limitations of the claims of privacy and the duty of secrecy: he lays stress on the danger of self-deceit as the root of deception of others, and distinguishes prevarication, equivocation, and evasion. "Other people's secrets we are not free to pass along, and should do our best (short of lying) to preserve. But the best people that I have known had the fewest secrets of their own" (p. 45). The better people become, the more transparent can they afford to be.

The second Part offers a discussion of *Selected Problems on Honesty and Dishonesty*, in War and Crime, Government, Industry, Science, Education,

Medicine, Social Work, and Confidential References, Art, Social and Polite Exchanges, and in Religion; he ends with a close scrutiny of "types and techniques of self-deceit." Into details it is impossible here to enter: one conclusion may be stated; he does seem to me to prove that prevalent practice does fall far short of what is not only desirable, but practicable. The chapter dealing with Medicine is specially valuable as coming from a medical man.

The third Part attempts to deal with the *Philosophy of Honesty*. First he shows how by resolve and habit honesty should be made automatic, excluding indecision and debate. Next he argues the right of men to experience, and, therefore, the duty to practice veracity, for in the long run reality defends itself and us in conveying it truthfully, then the root of honesty to others is traced to internal honesty, veracity to sincerity (self-knowledge in self-reverence), and this internal honesty has its support in the *habit of living on facts*. The title of the last chapter, *Creative Honesty*, is too narrow to express the contents, and may be thus expanded: live freely and fully yourself, and help others to live freely and fully also, so that you and they may grow, and to do this live honestly and expect and assist others to live honestly.

It is in his philosophy I should join issue with the author. Honesty is for him the ultimate moral principle. He denies that "kindness is more fundamental than honesty" (p. 253); yet he associates with honesty courage and good will, as "always needed in the endless journey of growth, because all three are parts of the same effort." (p. 254). The dynamic view here suggested should have led him beyond the *means* to the *end*. In the Christian principle of love—esteem for others, interest in others, effort for others—as well as self the end is given; and by this end—full personality in full community—all practice must be determined.

A. E. Garvie.

The Aesthetic Object. By E. Jordan. (Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press; London: Williams & Norgate. 1938. Pp. xii + 275. Price 15s.)

This study of aesthetic experience belongs to the body of American axiology best exemplified in the works of Urban and Perry. It aims at distinguishing the judgment of aesthetic value from ordinary judgments of fact, and does so by an analysis of the aesthetic object which reveals the concepts or categories implied in all appreciative propositions about art.

"Thus the judgment of existence depends upon the familiar system of scientific and philosophical categories of space, time, cause, quantity, etc., while the value categories are, in spite of the enormous amount of writing done about aesthetics, ethics, religion, etc., still awaiting their deduction. It will be our hypothesis that the most elementary formulation of these value categories will be the aesthetic, . . ."

The concepts in question are given as appropriateness, ambiguity, analogy, cumulation, colour, tone, colour-tone, rhythm, line, mass, form, design, and when an object is determined by the foregoing principles it becomes an aesthetic object, and has the quality of beauty.

The main species of the genus beautiful are the ugly, the sublime, the tragic, the comic, and the grotesque.

The attempt to fit aesthetic experience into a pigeon-hole in a logical or philosophical system is, in my opinion, foredoomed to produce results not even remotely corresponding to an impartial analysis of the facts relating to this sphere, and to base aesthetic judgments on general ideas or concepts of any description whatever seems to remove at one blow any claim they may have to rank as judgments of value.

Listowel.

In the Spirit of William James. By R. B. Perry. (New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Oxford University Press, H. Milford. 1938. Pp. xii + 211. Price $2; 9s. net.)

It is only three years since Mr. Perry's great book on William James appeared, but these five Powell lectures at the University of Indiana are as fresh as their author is indefatigable. The last two of them are the most accurately described by the book's title, for the fourth lecture, "A Militant Liberal," discusses how one might react to Fascism in the spirit of William James, and the last, although very general, is an attempt to extend and simplify a characteristically Jamesian position. The second and third lectures, on the other hand, are, in the main, "straight" expositions of James's philosophy. They attempt, however, to contrast James's radical empiricism with the more belligerent forms of present-day positivism—in Mr. Perry's opinion "a new cult which touches human thought at all points, and threatens a profound and epochal change in the intellectual life of the Western world." The first lecture, comparing James with Royce, is an exercise in the modern biographical style.

I liked the fourth lecture best, although in a way it seemed to be the least successful. It was able to say how a Liberal should deal with illiberalism in a Liberal country, but not how a Liberal should behave in an illiberal country. The reason for the failure is that there is probably no answer to the last question, but the exordium of the lecture and the courage of its analysis seemed to me to be of a very high order. The last lecture I found rather disappointing. Its whole argument seems to depend upon a doubtful analysis of "belief." There may be a "right" to act or to be confident where the evidence fails, and if this condition of active confidence is to be called "belief," there is no problem. In any ordinary sense of language, however, while we often believe upon insufficient evidence, we have surely no *right* so to believe, since nothing but evidence can justify belief. There is no peculiar "sanctity" about such a statement. Unevidenced hopes may be very good hopes, but an unevidenced legitimate belief would seem to be just an absurdity.

The second and third lectures are admirable expositions of very difficult themes. I think, however, that the distinction in the second lecture between what is "given" and what is "revealed" is unfortunate. Most revelations are "given." The third lecture seems to me to exhibit very clearly how good a psychologist and how admirable a phenomenologist James was. It also seems to me to show that neither psychology nor phenomenology can be a metaphysics. On the last point, I dare say, Mr. Perry would not agree. but the exceptional clarity of his exposition makes a decision on the question as easy as it could be.

John Laird.

Explanation and Reality in the Philosophy of Émile Meyerson. By T. R. Kelly. (Princeton, U.S.A.: Princeton University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1937. Pp. vii + 133. Price 9s. net.)

The writings of the late Émile Meyerson provide a striking example of the philosophical value which can come from the work of a man of science who is sufficiently interested in the nature of his technical studies to view his subject in historical perspective. This book gives a careful and complete account of Meyerson's philosophical publications. It is frankly written, and brings out the radical inconsistency in his contrast between Explanation and Reality. Nevertheless (and perhaps because of this), it also demonstrates

its value. Professor Kelly succeeds in giving a living picture of the development of Meyerson's thought.

In short, this is a useful and well-documented treatment. I am not sure that the attempt at synthesis of the difficulties is very convincing: but the book will be most valuable to students for its careful account, and for its comprehensive bibliography both of Meyerson's works and of commentaries upon them.

A. E. HEATH.

Psychology and Religion. By CARL GUSTAV JUNG (London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1938. Pp. 131. Price 9s.; 2 dollars.)

It is strange to find Jung amongst the prophets, but, judging by this book, he bids fair to enter their company. There is certainly a wide difference between this estimate of religion and Jung's earlier words "the gods are libido." The title is rather too general accurately to describe the contents of the book. It is divided into three chapters—The Autonomy of the Unconscious Mind—Dogma and Natural Symbols—The History and Psychology of a Natural Symbol. All are of interest and importance, but only a few aspects of the psychology of religion can possibly be represented in this scheme. Jung adheres to the empirical and phenomenological position in psychology, but adds that "experience is not even possible without reflection." Psychology, he insists, must deal with mental facts in the same manner as zoology deals with various species—"an elephant is true because it exists." Religion is described as "a peculiar attitude of the human mind . . . a careful consideration and observation of certain dynamic factors, understood to be 'powers,' spirits, demons, gods, laws, ideals or whatever name man has given to such factors as he has found in his world, powerful, helpful or dangerous enough to be taken into careful consideration, or grand, beautiful and meaningful enough to be devoutly adored and loved." No definition of religion is fully satisfactory, but this at least serves to make clear what Jung considers religion to be and embraces some of the chief points. The human psyche, he insists, is not a personal affair, a statement which he supports by reference to the fact that mobs and madmen are moved by non-personal and overwhelming forces. Jung reveals a pragmatic attitude when he states that he is convinced only by what he knows, and all else is hypothesis. Therefore, he explains, that he supports the hypothesis of the practising Catholic so long as it works for him. On the other hand, he describes atheism as a "stupid error." "Is there," he asks, "as a matter of fact any better truth about ultimate things than the one that helps you to live ?" He recognizes the place of projection in religion, yet states that "Consciousness can hardly exist in a state of complete projection." He speaks of the error of "psychologism" which assumes God is an illusion begotten of fear or the will to power or repressed sexuality, an evident thrust at Freud. "The idea of God represents an important, even overwhelming psychical intensity." The man who rejects this belief re-creates it in some other form. "Nietzsche was no atheist, but his god was dead." So God, once dismissed, disappears only to return as Wotan or "State" or "something ending with -ism."

A good deal of the book is occupied with analyses of dreams and with symbolism. Incidental passages such as those quoted, show whither Jung is wending. Probably the journey is not yet complete, for this book has many signs of being a half-way house. Yet it continues what was begun in *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, and is a welcome sign that maturer reflection has once more, as with so many other men, shown Jung that the religious attitude

to life is one of the fundamental verities. The closing words of the book deserves to be fully quoted. They are entirely significant of what Jung has been led to think. "Nobody can know what the ultimate things are. We must, therefore, take them as we experience them. And if such experience helps to make your life healthier, more beautiful, more complete and more satisfactory to yourself and to those you love, you may safely say: 'This was the Grace of God.' "

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

To Become or Not to Become. (That is the Question!) Episodes in the History of an Indian Word. By MRS. RHYS DAVIDS, D.Litt. M.A. (London: Luzac & Co. 1937. Pp. xi + 164. Price 1s. 9d.)

It is well known that Mrs. Rhys Davids has for the last ten years or more been dissatisfied alike with her former interpretations of Buddhism and those of other scholars. She is convinced that the modern "orthodox" Buddhism is a caricature of the teaching of Gotama. It is certainly true that it is difficult to connect modern Buddhism with universe of thought that prevailed in India in the sixth century B.C. But Mrs. Davids brings more to bear on the subject than such general considerations. Here she patiently and inductively follows out the meanings of two verbs *bhu* (become) and *as* (be). She tracks down all the *bhu*-forms in the Suttas and considers them relatively to their context. She also examines the noun *bhava* (becoming), and the kindred verb *bhavati*. Whilst only a Pali scholar can fully appreciate the finer points implied, there is little doubt that Mrs. Rhys Davids makes out a signally strong case for distinguishing *as* and *bhu*. She argues with a wealth of examples that *bhavati* is not a mere alternative for *atthi* (present indicative of *as*), but expresses a misrepresented and misunderstood aspect of Buddhism's original message, namely the idea of striving, becoming, seeking, transcending, passing on from what is to what is to be. This little book offers strong presumptive evidence for Mrs. Rhys Davids's contention, not merely subjective evidence, but evidence based on close study of shades of meaning of the original texts. None is better fitted to estimate such evidence than Mrs. Rhys Davids, whose services to Pali have had a large share in restoring that rapidly lapsing tongue into the position of a living if not a spoken language. It is becoming more clear that Mrs. Rhys Davids is establishing her case, and increasing recognition of that fact amongst scholars of repute leads one to hope that she will live to see what she has so patiently and carefully explored, recognized generally.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology. Prepared by WILLIS D. ELLIS, Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Arizona. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1938. 8vo. Pp. xiv + 403. Price 21s. net.

This "Source Book" is a very valuable and opportune exposition in English of the development of the holistic view in psychology. It consists of admirably abridged translations from the German of a number of original contributions towards the construction of what has come to be known as "Gestalt" psychology. Beginning with Wertheimer's address to the Kant Society in 1924, by which time the theory could be presented as a coherent whole, it deals firstly with the general problems of psychology towards a solution of which the Gestalt hypothesis was proposed. It then passes on to a presentation of the manner in which special problems, such as those of visual perception, per-

ception and movement, perception and touch, have been attacked. There follows an interesting account of experiments on the behaviour of animals, notably those of Köhler with chimpanzees and of Hertz with birds. A third group of problems has to do with the thought processes, and a fourth, consisting of the speculations of Lewin and the experimental work of Zeigarnik, with volition. The last section treats of pathological phenomena, including the famous case of figural (cortical) blindness reported by Gelb and Goldstein, and the studies of Fuchs on vision. The volume ends with three replies to criticisms of the Gestalt theory, the first by Koffka in answer to that of Vittorio Benussi, the second and third by Köhler in respect of those of G. E. Müller and Eugenio Rignano. *A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology* presents to English readers for the first time a compact account of the development of Gestalt thinking from 1915 to 1929. Though the original thirty-four articles and one book from which it is compiled constitute a material some ten times as long as the present work, the gist of the sources has certainly, as Professor Ellis says in his Preface that he hopes it has, been consistently retained throughout. This is a book which all psychologists who have not access to the original voluminous literature should read, and it will be of interest also to the philosopher and, indeed, to a large circle of those who are concerned with the movements of contemporary thought.

F. Aveling.

The Science of Society. An Introduction to Sociology. By J. Rumney. (London: Duckworth. 1938. Pp. 125. Price 3s. 6d.)

Dr. Rumney opens with a plea for sociology as an indispensable aid to the understanding of society as it is and as a necessary part of the education of everyone who hopes to contribute to the solution of our social problems. He supports this view by pointing out how incomplete are the findings of any single social science, whether it be economics, psychology, biology, or human geography. This point is well made. The complete, realistic view, he continues, cannot be obtained by a mechanical synthesis of these various specialisms. There must be a science which concerns itself with the totality of human relations. Sociology "is a synoptic science in that it studies a complex thing in its totality. It does not merely analyse or dissect a thing into its parts and then synthesize or build up the parts together as a whole." This is, of course, a more difficult point to establish and he has no space to treat it adequately. Instead he gives us an excellent account of the development of sociology and of its methods of research, and a rather less excellent account of some of its conclusions.

The weakest part of the book is that in which the author surveys the evolution of property, the family, the State, and the social classes. Perhaps he was unwise to attempt, not merely to show what these institutions are in essence, but also to summarize their history and present character. It is hardly possible to do this in brief without giving the impression of superficiality, which is exactly what sociology most needs to avoid. The reader may feel that sociology is telling him no more about property and class than he could hear any day from a popular left-wing orator.

Not the least valuable part of the book is the bibliography giving references for each chapter, supplemented by a list of periodicals and a table, with dates, of some outstanding contributions to social theory since Machiavelli.

T. H. Marshall.

Bradley and Bergson: A Comparative Study. By Ram Murti Loomba, M.A. With a Foreword by Narenda N. S. Gupta, M.A., Ph.D. (Lucknow: The Upper India Publishing House Ltd. 1937. Pp. xi + 187. Price Rs. 2.8 net.)

Mr. Loomba contends ably that Bergson's mystical intuitionism, or something very much like it, is the sort of view to which Bradley's last-minute and despairing retreat from reason to an immediacy analogous to that of feeling should lead. Bradley's underlying scepticism, however, prevented him from realizing what he appeared to recognize. Thus, "while Bergson's is a philosophical mysticism, Bradley's is a mysticism in spite of philosophy." There is, no doubt, a good deal to be said for this contention. The author interpolates some interesting parallels drawn from Indian systems.

R. E. Stedman.

Books received also:—

E. H. Palmer. *Oriental Mysticism. A Treatise on the Sufistic and Unitarian Theosophy of the Persians.* London: Luzac & Co. 1938. (2nd Edition.) Pp. iv + 84. 5s.

T. M. P. Mahadevan, M.A., Ph.D. *The Philosophy of Advaita.* London: Luzac & Co. 1938. Pp. 284. 7s. 6d.

Various Authors. Five Essays: *The Meaning of the Humanities.* London: Humphrey Milford. Princeton: University Press. 1938. Pp vii + 178. 11s.

D. D. Kanga. *Where Theosophy and Science Meet,* Part II, "From Atom to Man." Madras: The Adyar Library Association. London: Theosophical Publishing House. 1938. Pp. xxxi + 168. Rs. 1.14. 3s. 6d.

B. O. Smith. *Logical Aspects of Educational Measurement.* London: Humphrey Milford. New York: Columbia University Press. 1938. Pp. 182. 12s.

J. Macmurray, A. T. M. Wilson, R. Noble, and F. G. Crookshank. *A Philosopher looks at Psychotherapy.* (Individual Psychology Medical Pamphlets—No. 20.) London: The C. W. Daniel Co., Ltd. 1938. Pp. 70. 2s. 6d.

K. Britton. *Communication. A Philosophical Study of Language.* London: The International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method. 1939. Pp. xvi + 285. 12s. 6d.

Various Authors. The Aristotelian Society. *Action, Perception, and Measurement.* London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1938. Pp. 194. 15s.

The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1937–38. London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1938. Pp 327. 25s.

Various Authors. (Ed. by O. K. Buros.) *Research and Statistical Methodology Books and Reviews 1933–38.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1938. Pp. vi × 100. $1.25.

The Yoga-Upanisads. (Tr. by T. R. S'rīnivāsa Ayyaṅgār. Ed. by S. Subrahmanya Sāstri.) Madras: The Adyar Library. 1938. Pp. xxxviii + 502.

G. H. Thomson. *The Factorial Analysis of Human Ability.* London: The University of London Press. 1939. Pp. xv + 326. 16s.

J. A. McWilliams. *Cosmology.* A Text for Colleges. New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1938. Pp. 243. 9s.

E. Nagel. *Principles of the Theory of Probability.* (International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, No. 6.) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Pp. 80. 4s. 6d.

G. W. Howgate. *George Santayana.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. London: Oxford University Press. Humphrey Milford. 1938. Pp. viii + 363. 16s.

P. Leon. *The Philosophy of Courage, or The Oxford Group Way.* London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 222. 6s.

H. C. Link. *The Rediscovery of Man.* London: Macmillan & Co. 1939. Pp. ix + 257. 7s. 6d.

Samuel Alexander. From the Proceedings of the British Academy. Vol. xxiv. 1938. London: The Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. Pp. 20. 1s. 6d.

W. Brown. *Psychological Methods of Healing. An Introduction to Psychotherapy.* London: The University of London Press, Ltd. 1939. Pp. vi + 224. 7s. 6d.

H. Gomperz. *Limits of Cognition and Exigencies of Action.* London: Cambridge University Press. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1939. Pp. 70. 1s. 3d.

G. Ives. *Obstacles to Human Progress.* London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 283. 10s. 6d.

D. M. Goodfellow. *Principles of Economic Sociology.* London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. 1939. Pp. xx + 289. 12s. 6d.

E. Thomas. *A View of All Existence.* London: Watts & Co. 1939. Pp. 238. 1s. 6d. (Cheap edition.)

L. Arnaud Reid. *Preface to Faith.* London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 214. 6s.

S. Radhakrishnan. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. xiii + 394. 15s.

N. K. Brahma. *Causality and Science.* London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 120. 6s.

F. Leander. *The Philosophy of John Dewey. A Critical Study.* Goteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag. 1939. Pp. 155.

M. Oakeshott. (Foreword by E. Barker.) *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe.* Cambridge at the University Press. 1939. Pp. xxiii + 224. 10s. 6d.

J. L. Stocks. (Ed. by D. M. Emmet.) *Reason and Intuition: and Other Essays.* London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. xxii + 259. 12s. 6d.

C. Konczewski. *La Pensée Préconsciente.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1938. Pp. xvi + 273. Frs. 40.

A. Burloud. *Principes d'une Psychologie des Tendances.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1938. Pp. 426. Frs. 60.

J. Urban. *L'Epithymologie* (*La Désirologie*). Paris: F. Alcan. 1938. Pp. 356. Frs. 50.

Collection, *Philosophes*: André Cresson. *Pascal, Marc-Aurèle, Platon.* E. Dhurout. *Claude Bernard.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1939. Pp. each 130. Frs. 12.

M. Viller, S.J. *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité.* Fascicule viii. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et ses fils. 1938. Pp. 242–495.

E. Souriau. *Avoir une âme.* Paris: Société d'édition, Les Belles Lettres. 1938. Pp. 141.

Variés. *L'Invention.* Discussions. Paris: F. Alcan. 1938. Pp. 213. Fr. 25.

F. Venturi. *Jeunesse de Diderot* (1713–53). (Tr. par J. Bertrand.) Paris: A. Skira. 1939. Pp. 417.

H. Dingler. *Die Methode der Physik.* Munchen: Ernst Reinhardt. 1938. Pp. 422.

R. Junge. *System der Lebensphilosophie.* Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt Verlag. 1937. 2 Vols. Pp. 142 + 478.

E. Liljeqvist. *Studier. Tillägnade.* Lund: Aktiebolaget Skanska Centraltryckeriet. 1930. 2 Vols. Pp. xiii + 586, and xi + 503. För bada banden tillsamman: 55 kronor.

V. Norström. *Brev. 1889–1916.* (I urval uitqivna av E. Akesson.) Stockholm: C. E. Fritzes Bokforhages. 1923. Pp. 458. 10 kronor.

V. Norström. *Religion und Gedanke.* Lund: Aktiebolaget Skanska Centraltryckeriet. 1923. Pp. xl + 324. 12 kronor.

E. Akesson. *Norströmiana.* Stockholm: Sveriges Kristliga Studentrörelses Förlag. 1924. Pp. 203. 4 kronor.

E. Cassirer. *Axel Hägerström. Eine Studie zur Schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart.* Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerbers Förlag. 1939. Pp. 119. 6 kronor.

P. Carabellese. *L'Idealismo Italiano.* Naples: Luigi Alfredo. 1938. Pp. 379. Lire 20.

A. Guzzo. *Sic Vos Non Vobis.* Vol. i. Napoli: Luigi Loffredo. 1939. Pp. vi + 302.

E. A. Chavez. *Notas y Reflexiones sobres Importantes Problemas Filosóficos.* Considerados en el IX Congreso Internacional Celebrado en Paris y en el I Nacional de las Sociedades Francesas de Filosofia. Mexico. *Luminar.* 1938. Pp. 112.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Sir,

While, of course, I accept unreservedly Professor Hartshorne's restatement of his own principles in your January issue, I regret that I still fail to find these clearly presented in *Beyond Humanism*. This, however, will add materially to the interest of his *Vision of God*.

I am sorry, too, that he feels my comments to be "dogmatic"; but this is due purely to review limitations, so that I still believe his arguments to be "weighty," though not "conclusive." Nor do I think it useful to count heads with regard to Determinism, however eminent they may be. But since one may cite, against those he names, Einstein and Planck, Rutherford and Lodge, it is perfectly obvious that the issue will long remain open, so that all one can do is to risk being wrong in excellent company.

Yours faithfully,
J. E. Turner.

The University of Liverpool.
February 7, 1939.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

During the past term Mr. A. C. Ewing, M.A., Litt.D. (Lecturer in the University of Cambridge), has delivered an interesting course of lectures on "Theories of Ethics."

The Addresses at the Evening Meetings have been as follows: "The Present Relations of Science and Religion," by Professor C. D. Broad; "The Permanent Significance of Hume's Philosophy," by Professor H. H. Price; "Ethics and the Supernatural," by The Very Rev. W. R. Matthews, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Litt., Dean of St. Paul's.

SPECIAL LECTURE IN THE SUMMER TERM

A Lecture entitled "The Nature of Truth" will be given by Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (Professor of Philosophy, Central Hindu College, Benares; King George V Professor of Mental and Moral Science, Calcutta University; Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics in the University of Oxford) at University College, Gower Street, London, W.C.1., on Wednesday, June 7, 1939, at 5.45 p.m.

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[*Suggested*]

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.

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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Appeal for New Members and Donations

The Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 1s. per annum. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

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